Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber

[2024] UKUT 84 (AAC)

Fecha: 27-Feb-2024

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL Appeal No. UA-2022-001558-CIC

(ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER) [2024] UKUT 84 (AAC)

On Judicial Review of the First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) CI003/16/00043

BETWEEN

DOMINIC STEPHENSON

(by his appointee VICTORIA TREACEY)

Applicant

and

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL (SOCIAL ENTITLEMENT CHAMBER)

Respondent

and

CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION AUTHORITY (CICA)

Interested Party

BEFORE UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WEST

Decided after an oral hearing on 27 February 2024: 5 March 2024

DECISION

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Section 1
The Tribunal’s Decision
Costs of appointing a deputy in the Court £16,710 of Protection
The issues
Whether the costs of administering a trust of any award and Court of Protection costs were compensable and Whether the costs of adaptation/ extension to Mrs Treacey’s house were recoverable
Discussion
The Decision
The 2001 Scheme So far as a material, the 2001 Scheme provides that
The 2012 Scheme So far as material, and as I explain at the end of this decision, the 2012 Scheme provides that
The Applicant’s Submissions
adaptation to accommodation – at [39] trust and Court of Protection costs – at [40-41]
The First Ground – The interpretation of the word ‘other’
words in the scheme were intended to have their ordinary everyday meaning, contrary to other words which could have very specific legal meanings. The paragraph did permit discretion as to which facts
The Second Ground - Adaptation to accommodation
The first line of reasoning was that
The second and third line of reasoning was that
the Concise Oxford English Dictionary read
The first line of reasoning at [40] was that
The second line of reasoning at [41] was that
The Applicant repeated his submission that the Tribunal erred in finding that “other resultant losses” meant “ resultant from”
The First Ground: The interpretation of the word ‘other’
the phrase “ other resultant losses ” appeared in a paragraph specifically concerning loss of parental services (both the stem of paragraph 42 and paragraph 42(a)) and it was a natural reading to link
the payment for loss of parental services at paragraph 42(a) was a tariff award; it made sense therefore that the Scheme should provide discretion to the claims officer under paragraph 42(b) to make “
the interpretation of paragraph 42(b) contended for by the Applicant, that it concerned payments “ distinct from parental services as previously mentioned ”, was to read words into the scheme which we
the wider reading contended for ignored the word “ resultant ” – if the Scheme were intended to refer to any heads of loss without restriction, the word “ resultant ” would not have been used
The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
the question was whether a loss or expense claimed was to meet “ other resultant losses ”, not whether the items were spent as part of the provision of parental services. Otherwise, the 2001 Scheme wo
The Third Ground: Trust and Court of Protection costs
they were described in the Applicant’s Grounds as “ administrative legal costs ”. Under that logic, any legal costs associated with the fatal injury could be captured by paragraph 42(b); that clearly
the fact a decision maker would consider “ factors and contingencies ” when considering the appropriate multiplier to be applied to payments which fell under paragraph 42(b) was not relevant to the qu
Analysis
The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
The Third Ground: Trust and Court of Protection costs
Coda: The 2012 Scheme
Conclusions