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the Concise Oxford English Dictionary read
the Concise Oxford English Dictionary read:
“Adapt ‘make suitable for a new use or purpose’”.
The question for the Tribunal was one of pure interpretation. It was wrong to say that, because the Scheme did not use the word “extension”, adaptations which included the creation of new rooms was deemed not to qualify. The scheme was prescriptive in terms of categories which were applicable, but the interpretation by the Tribunal was too narrow and ventured into the absurd.
That erroneous interpretation also had far-reaching ramifications for both fatal cases and other cases in the Scheme and later Schemes where paragraph 35 (as updated) was applicable. Had the Tribunal intended to limit the interpretation so as to exclude the creation of new rooms, the matter ought to have been adjourned to consider the case law on the point. That was at the very least a procedural irregularity.
Finally Ms Skander submitted that, if one worked on the basis that the word “other” was denied its everyday meaning and was taken to mean “resultant from”, it remained unclear how the Tribunal found that the provision of a downstairs toilet was “not a resultant loss resulting from the loss of parental services”.
The Tribunal was only required to assess whether that was permitted in law, not whether it was reasonable. However, it elected to take evidence on that, despite the Applicant’s concern that that would be procedurally irregular. The evidence was that the Applicant’s appointee (who had parental responsibility) adapted the accommodation so as to create inter alia a downstairs toilet because the claimant was incontinent.
The reasons took no account of the fact that the provision of suitable accommodation (in this case by adaptation) was on any analysis a fundamental aspect of the provision of parental services. To say otherwise was to say that parents could house their children in unsuitable accommodation. The provision of parental services and the provision of suitable accommodation were inextricably linked.
Third Ground - Trust and Court of Protection costs
The Tribunal provided two reasons for the finding that trust and Court of Protection fees were not permissible.
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Tribunal’s Decision
- Costs of appointing a deputy in the Court £16,710 of Protection
- The issues
- Whether the costs of administering a trust of any award and Court of Protection costs were compensable and Whether the costs of adaptation/ extension to Mrs Treacey’s house were recoverable
- Discussion
- The Decision
- The 2001 Scheme So far as a material, the 2001 Scheme provides that
- The 2012 Scheme So far as material, and as I explain at the end of this decision, the 2012 Scheme provides that
- The Applicant’s Submissions
- adaptation to accommodation – at [39] trust and Court of Protection costs – at [40-41]
- The First Ground – The interpretation of the word ‘other’
- words in the scheme were intended to have their ordinary everyday meaning, contrary to other words which could have very specific legal meanings. The paragraph did permit discretion as to which facts
- The Second Ground - Adaptation to accommodation
- The first line of reasoning was that
- The second and third line of reasoning was that
- the Concise Oxford English Dictionary read
- The first line of reasoning at [40] was that
- The second line of reasoning at [41] was that
- The Applicant repeated his submission that the Tribunal erred in finding that “other resultant losses” meant “ resultant from”
- The First Ground: The interpretation of the word ‘other’
- the phrase “ other resultant losses ” appeared in a paragraph specifically concerning loss of parental services (both the stem of paragraph 42 and paragraph 42(a)) and it was a natural reading to link
- the payment for loss of parental services at paragraph 42(a) was a tariff award; it made sense therefore that the Scheme should provide discretion to the claims officer under paragraph 42(b) to make “
- the interpretation of paragraph 42(b) contended for by the Applicant, that it concerned payments “ distinct from parental services as previously mentioned ”, was to read words into the scheme which we
- the wider reading contended for ignored the word “ resultant ” – if the Scheme were intended to refer to any heads of loss without restriction, the word “ resultant ” would not have been used
- The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
- the question was whether a loss or expense claimed was to meet “ other resultant losses ”, not whether the items were spent as part of the provision of parental services. Otherwise, the 2001 Scheme wo
- The Third Ground: Trust and Court of Protection costs
- they were described in the Applicant’s Grounds as “ administrative legal costs ”. Under that logic, any legal costs associated with the fatal injury could be captured by paragraph 42(b); that clearly
- the fact a decision maker would consider “ factors and contingencies ” when considering the appropriate multiplier to be applied to payments which fell under paragraph 42(b) was not relevant to the qu
- Analysis
- The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
- The Third Ground: Trust and Court of Protection costs
- Coda: The 2012 Scheme
- Conclusions