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The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
In the light of the conclusion which I have reached about the true construction of paragraph 42(b), I can take the second and third grounds quite shortly.
Whether they are to be characterised as an adaptation or an extension to the appointee’s property, the costs incurred cannot be characterised as a cost to replace the care of the Applicant by his mother. They are part of more general living expenses of a household, but the cost of them is not within the ambit of the Scheme.
I also agree with Ms Webb that the decisive question is whether a loss or expense claimed is to meet “other resultant losses” arising out of or resulting from the loss of parental services, not whether the items were spent as part of the provision of parental services. Otherwise, the 2001 Scheme would indeed potentially cover any expense (such as food, schooling, clothing) incurred by individuals who had taken over parenting of applicants in such circumstances.
Paragraph 35 of the Scheme is not relevant to the construction of paragraph 42 and Ms Webb rightly did not argue that it was, but that does not vitiate the Tribunal’s conclusion in paragraph [39] of its decision. The Tribunal itself noted that paragraph 35 of the Scheme was not directly relevant and its conclusion is set out in the first and last sentences of the paragraph which do not refer to, or rely on, paragraph 35.
I do not therefore need to consider whether the work done was an adaptation or an extension, since whichever description applied the cost of the work would fall outside the Scheme in any event.
Similarly, in the light of the conclusion which I have reached on the construction of paragraph 42(b), I do not need to lay down any guidance as to whether adaptation to accommodation would or would not include an extension as Ms Skander asked me to do. In any event, it is not clear to me that the problem is widespread one given that this is a case arising under the old 2001 Scheme rather than the present 2012 Scheme.
Ground two therefore also falls to be dismissed.
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Tribunal’s Decision
- Costs of appointing a deputy in the Court £16,710 of Protection
- The issues
- Whether the costs of administering a trust of any award and Court of Protection costs were compensable and Whether the costs of adaptation/ extension to Mrs Treacey’s house were recoverable
- Discussion
- The Decision
- The 2001 Scheme So far as a material, the 2001 Scheme provides that
- The 2012 Scheme So far as material, and as I explain at the end of this decision, the 2012 Scheme provides that
- The Applicant’s Submissions
- adaptation to accommodation – at [39] trust and Court of Protection costs – at [40-41]
- The First Ground – The interpretation of the word ‘other’
- words in the scheme were intended to have their ordinary everyday meaning, contrary to other words which could have very specific legal meanings. The paragraph did permit discretion as to which facts
- The Second Ground - Adaptation to accommodation
- The first line of reasoning was that
- The second and third line of reasoning was that
- the Concise Oxford English Dictionary read
- The first line of reasoning at [40] was that
- The second line of reasoning at [41] was that
- The Applicant repeated his submission that the Tribunal erred in finding that “other resultant losses” meant “ resultant from”
- The First Ground: The interpretation of the word ‘other’
- the phrase “ other resultant losses ” appeared in a paragraph specifically concerning loss of parental services (both the stem of paragraph 42 and paragraph 42(a)) and it was a natural reading to link
- the payment for loss of parental services at paragraph 42(a) was a tariff award; it made sense therefore that the Scheme should provide discretion to the claims officer under paragraph 42(b) to make “
- the interpretation of paragraph 42(b) contended for by the Applicant, that it concerned payments “ distinct from parental services as previously mentioned ”, was to read words into the scheme which we
- the wider reading contended for ignored the word “ resultant ” – if the Scheme were intended to refer to any heads of loss without restriction, the word “ resultant ” would not have been used
- The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
- the question was whether a loss or expense claimed was to meet “ other resultant losses ”, not whether the items were spent as part of the provision of parental services. Otherwise, the 2001 Scheme wo
- The Third Ground: Trust and Court of Protection costs
- they were described in the Applicant’s Grounds as “ administrative legal costs ”. Under that logic, any legal costs associated with the fatal injury could be captured by paragraph 42(b); that clearly
- the fact a decision maker would consider “ factors and contingencies ” when considering the appropriate multiplier to be applied to payments which fell under paragraph 42(b) was not relevant to the qu
- Analysis
- The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
- The Third Ground: Trust and Court of Protection costs
- Coda: The 2012 Scheme
- Conclusions