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The second line of reasoning at [41] was that
The second line of reasoning at [41] was that
“we find that the costs of the Court of Protection applications arise as a direct result of Dominic’s pre-existing disability and not as a result of loss of parental services.”
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Tribunal’s Decision
- Costs of appointing a deputy in the Court £16,710 of Protection
- The issues
- Whether the costs of administering a trust of any award and Court of Protection costs were compensable and Whether the costs of adaptation/ extension to Mrs Treacey’s house were recoverable
- Discussion
- The Decision
- The 2001 Scheme So far as a material, the 2001 Scheme provides that
- The 2012 Scheme So far as material, and as I explain at the end of this decision, the 2012 Scheme provides that
- The Applicant’s Submissions
- adaptation to accommodation – at [39] trust and Court of Protection costs – at [40-41]
- The First Ground – The interpretation of the word ‘other’
- words in the scheme were intended to have their ordinary everyday meaning, contrary to other words which could have very specific legal meanings. The paragraph did permit discretion as to which facts
- The Second Ground - Adaptation to accommodation
- The first line of reasoning was that
- The second and third line of reasoning was that
- the Concise Oxford English Dictionary read
- The first line of reasoning at [40] was that
- The second line of reasoning at [41] was that
- The Applicant repeated his submission that the Tribunal erred in finding that “other resultant losses” meant “ resultant from”
- The First Ground: The interpretation of the word ‘other’
- the phrase “ other resultant losses ” appeared in a paragraph specifically concerning loss of parental services (both the stem of paragraph 42 and paragraph 42(a)) and it was a natural reading to link
- the payment for loss of parental services at paragraph 42(a) was a tariff award; it made sense therefore that the Scheme should provide discretion to the claims officer under paragraph 42(b) to make “
- the interpretation of paragraph 42(b) contended for by the Applicant, that it concerned payments “ distinct from parental services as previously mentioned ”, was to read words into the scheme which we
- the wider reading contended for ignored the word “ resultant ” – if the Scheme were intended to refer to any heads of loss without restriction, the word “ resultant ” would not have been used
- The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
- the question was whether a loss or expense claimed was to meet “ other resultant losses ”, not whether the items were spent as part of the provision of parental services. Otherwise, the 2001 Scheme wo
- The Third Ground: Trust and Court of Protection costs
- they were described in the Applicant’s Grounds as “ administrative legal costs ”. Under that logic, any legal costs associated with the fatal injury could be captured by paragraph 42(b); that clearly
- the fact a decision maker would consider “ factors and contingencies ” when considering the appropriate multiplier to be applied to payments which fell under paragraph 42(b) was not relevant to the qu
- Analysis
- The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
- The Third Ground: Trust and Court of Protection costs
- Coda: The 2012 Scheme
- Conclusions