words in the scheme were intended to have their ordinary everyday meaning, contrary to other words which could have very specific legal meanings. The paragraph did permit discretion as to which facts
words in the scheme were intended to have their ordinary everyday meaning, contrary to other words which could have very specific legal meanings. The paragraph did permit discretion as to which facts to consider as relevant, thus indicating that a narrow interpretation was probably not appropriate or intended.
The Upper Tribunal should find that “other payments” and “other resultant losses” meant “distinct from parental services as previously mentioned” and so additional to payments for parental services.
If such a conclusion were reached, the fact that the Tribunal appeared to be encouraged or reassured as to its definition of “resultant from” by the examples in the Guidance was to be ignored. The footing was unsafe from the outset; some basis later in the reasoning did not make good such a foundational flaw.
For the avoidance of doubt when considering how the word “other” operates, the preceding concept was in paragraph 42(a) “parental services”. The scheme used the conjunction “and”, and so that was plainly the operative concept.
It could not be said that one should abandon paragraph 42(a) and look directly to the start of paragraph 42 and therefore read “other payments” and “other resultant losses” as following on from that. That was nonsensical. The words “other payment” and “other resultant losses” must therefore be with reference to the payment for parental services as set out at paragraph 42(a).
Further, paragraph 42 did not limit the scope of the compensation to losses which were resultant from the loss parental services. The text in paragraph 42 was a direction on eligibility, namely that if the claimant is a qualifying claimant, under the age of 18 years and in fact dependent on the deceased for parental services, then the paragraph was to be considered and applied to him. That was typical of the CICA scheme(s); one must first be eligible under a paragraph before it applied. It did not and could not mean that any one of those eligibility factors was the governing factor to which the remainder of the paragraph must be linked.
In summary, it was unclear how or why the Tribunal considered that a plain reading of “other resultant losses” meant “resultant from”. Firstly, it was contrary to the definition of ‘other’ within the ordinary everyday meaning of the word and the sentence structure of the paragraph. Secondly, removing paragraph 42(a) from the equation did not assist in finding the logic. Thirdly, the opening lines of paragraph 42 related to eligibility to claim under the paragraph; there was no evidence that the drafter of the scheme intended questions of eligibility to be the linking factor which must be established in the types of payment.
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Tribunal’s Decision
- Costs of appointing a deputy in the Court £16,710 of Protection
- The issues
- Whether the costs of administering a trust of any award and Court of Protection costs were compensable and Whether the costs of adaptation/ extension to Mrs Treacey’s house were recoverable
- Discussion
- The Decision
- The 2001 Scheme So far as a material, the 2001 Scheme provides that
- The 2012 Scheme So far as material, and as I explain at the end of this decision, the 2012 Scheme provides that
- The Applicant’s Submissions
- adaptation to accommodation – at [39] trust and Court of Protection costs – at [40-41]
- The First Ground – The interpretation of the word ‘other’
- words in the scheme were intended to have their ordinary everyday meaning, contrary to other words which could have very specific legal meanings. The paragraph did permit discretion as to which facts
- The Second Ground - Adaptation to accommodation
- The first line of reasoning was that
- The second and third line of reasoning was that
- the Concise Oxford English Dictionary read
- The first line of reasoning at [40] was that
- The second line of reasoning at [41] was that
- The Applicant repeated his submission that the Tribunal erred in finding that “other resultant losses” meant “ resultant from”
- The First Ground: The interpretation of the word ‘other’
- the phrase “ other resultant losses ” appeared in a paragraph specifically concerning loss of parental services (both the stem of paragraph 42 and paragraph 42(a)) and it was a natural reading to link
- the payment for loss of parental services at paragraph 42(a) was a tariff award; it made sense therefore that the Scheme should provide discretion to the claims officer under paragraph 42(b) to make “
- the interpretation of paragraph 42(b) contended for by the Applicant, that it concerned payments “ distinct from parental services as previously mentioned ”, was to read words into the scheme which we
- the wider reading contended for ignored the word “ resultant ” – if the Scheme were intended to refer to any heads of loss without restriction, the word “ resultant ” would not have been used
- The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
- the question was whether a loss or expense claimed was to meet “ other resultant losses ”, not whether the items were spent as part of the provision of parental services. Otherwise, the 2001 Scheme wo
- The Third Ground: Trust and Court of Protection costs
- they were described in the Applicant’s Grounds as “ administrative legal costs ”. Under that logic, any legal costs associated with the fatal injury could be captured by paragraph 42(b); that clearly
- the fact a decision maker would consider “ factors and contingencies ” when considering the appropriate multiplier to be applied to payments which fell under paragraph 42(b) was not relevant to the qu
- Analysis
- The Second Ground: Adaptation to accommodation
- The Third Ground: Trust and Court of Protection costs
- Coda: The 2012 Scheme
- Conclusions
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