UT (Tax & Chancery) UT/2023/000103 - [2025] UKUT 00102 (TCC)
Fecha: 22-Ene-2025
Mr Simpson’s submissions
Mr Simpson’s submissions
Mr Simpson submitted that the six year time limit set out in para 3(1)(a) of the Discharge Regs ran from the date on which HMRC made the assessment to the scheme sanction charge, because:
The word “it” in the sentence “not later than six years after the end of the accounting period to which it relates” was a reference to application for discharge, and that application “relates” to the assessment and seeks relief from it.
A person in receipt of a scheme sanction charge only becomes aware of that charge when it has been assessed, so if (for example) HMRC issued the assessment three years after the year in which the liability arose, the administrator would have only a further three years to apply for the discharge. That person would thus be deprived of half the statutory time limit, and “as a matter of general policy, time limits should not run when the person to whom they apply has no knowledge that they are running”.
Scheme sanction charge assessments do not inform recipients that they can apply for discharge of the liability under s 268. In contrast, where there is a statutory right of appeal, HMRC inform taxpayers of that right in the decision letter.
There is no equivalent in the Discharge Regs to TMA s 49, which allows HMRC or the Tribunal to allow a taxpayer to make a late appeal. As a result, there is no discretion for HMRC to allow a person to make a discharge application after the end of the time limits set out in Reg 3. This was a further reason why the provisions should be interpreted generously, so as to allow more time, not less time.
- Heading
- Introduction
- The appeal grounds
- The Pension Funding Deals and the Employers
- The Legislation
- Payments by registered pension schemes
- Employer loans
- Scheme administration employer payments
- Charges
- Applications for discharge
- Factual background
- MLT and its associated companies
- The Pension Funding Deals generally
- The period up to 2011
- Prisym
- The Formwise Pension Funding Deal
- Langford
- The HMRC meetings
- Fraser
- Ballards
- The credit committee
- Criticall
- Gannon
- Overall approach to documentation
- Lack of challenge to the valuations
- The assessments
- The FTT Decision and the Grounds
- Ground 1: Domain names and websites
- The background
- Formwise
- The Formwise Contract
- The FTT Decision
- Mr Simpson’s submission relating to Mr Morris’ evidence
- Construction of the Formwise contract
- Conclusion
- The Langford Contract
- The evidence and findings of fact
- Construction of the Langford Contract
- Conclusion
- Submissions and our conclusions
- Overall conclusion on Ground 1
- Ground 2: Ballards loan
- The FTT’s approach and the finding
- Edwards v Bairstow challenge
- The other submission
- Ground 3: Gannon database
- Discussion
- Ground 4: Ballards trademark
- The first part of this Ground
- The second part of this Ground
- Our view
- Ground 5: time limits
- The assessment provisions
- The discharge provisions
- Mr Simpson’s submissions
- The Tribunal’s view
- Ground 6: Sending of applications
- Ground 7: Reasonable belief
- The statutory test
- The FTT’s assessment of the reasonable person
- A value judgment
- The FTT’s findings about all three transactions
- MLT’s case
- Ballards
- Mr Simpson’s submissions
- Criticall
- The FTT Decision
- Mr Simpson’s submissions
- Discussion
- Gannon
- Overall
- Ground 8: Just and Reasonable
- The statutory scheme
- The FTT’s Decision
- Mr Simpson’s submissions
- Conclusions