Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber

UT (Tax & Chancery) UT/2023/000103 - [2025] UKUT 00102 (TCC)

Fecha: 22-Ene-2025

The evidence and findings of fact

The evidence and findings of fact

131.

At [44] the FTT found as a fact in relation to all three Employers that “at best there was some confusion about the differentiation between a website and a domain name”, and this finding therefore applies to Langford. The FTT also recorded at [40] and [41] the evidence given by Mr Dowding and Mr Carwithen about this Pension Funding Deal, but placed no weight on that evidence as neither was involved in the negotiation and drafting of the Langford Contract [42].

132.

Mr Simpson submitted that reliance should have been placed on:

(1)

the evidence given by Mr Carwithen and Mr Dowding;

(2)

the wording of the valuation provided by Pinstripe; and

(3)

Mr Langford’s oral evidence that the money received from the SSAS was “something to do with the domain name and the website”.

133.

In relation to those three points:

(1)

The FTT was plainly entitled not to place weight on the evidence of Mr Carwithen and Mr Dowding for the reasons it gave.

(2)

In Mr Langford’s witness statement he said he “did not recall receiving the valuation for our domain name”, while in oral evidence he said “I don’t recall Pinstripe” and confirmed that he had no interaction with Pinstripe at all. It follows that there was no evidence before the FTT that Mr Langford had seen Pinstripe’s valuation at the time he signed the Langford Contract.

(3)

The oral evidence relied on by Mr Simpson was in the following context:

“Mr Simpson: So what was the purpose of [the Langford Contract]?
Mr Langford: To raise some money against my pension.
Mr Simpson : Are you aware how the money was raised?
Mr Langford: No. This is something to do with the domain name and the website.”

He was then asked “at the time…what did you think then a domain name actually was?” to which he replied “a company name, company logo, company website”, adding that all he recalled was that Clifton had told him what “could be done with a domain name and what could be raised”. Under cross-examination he said the website was dealt with by an employee, not by him.

134.

The FTT therefore had evidence “sufficient to support the finding which it made” that “at best there was some confusion about the differentiation between a website and a domain name”.

135.

We have already set out the case law relating to challenging findings of fact. This is not a case where there is no evidence to support the FTT’s finding, nor is it one where the evidence is inconsistent with, and contradictory of, the determination, or where the true and only reasonable conclusion contradicts the determination. It is instead a finding which is capable of being “rationally or reasonably justified” by the evidence.

136.

We thus find that MLT has failed to show that FTT’s findings of fact about the Langford Contract contained an error of law.