an immediate duty under s.188 to ensure that suitable accommodation is available for the applicant
(and his or her household)pending the completion of the authority’s inquiries and their decision as to what duty, if any, is owed to the applicant under Part VII of the Act. Chapter 7 provides guidance on the interim duty to accommodate. Authorities are reminded that ‘having reason to believe’ is a lower test than ‘being satisfied’.…6.6 Applications can be made by any adult to any department of the localauthority expressed in any particular form; they need not be expressed asexplicitly seeking assistance under Part VII ……7.3 The threshold for the duty [to provide interim accommodation] is low asthe local authority only has to have a reason to believe that the applicant maybe homeless, eligible for assistance and have a priority need. (See paragraph6.5 for guidance on the ‘reason to believe’ test.)”In relation to the threshold:“39Turning to the second threshold condition, paras 6.5 and 7.3 of the Codespecifically emphasise that the local authority only has to have a reason to believethat the applicant may be homeless to trigger the duty to inquire (under s.184), and reason to believe that the applicant may be homeless and in priority need to trigger the duty to provide interim accommodation pending those inquiries (under s.188). That threshold is low and, indeed, clearly low by design, in view of the vulnerable individuals it is intended to protect (see R. (M) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2008] UKHL 14 at [36] per Baroness Hale). It is a hurdle patently lower than the authority “being satisfied” as to the fact of those matters (which is the s.193 threshold in respect of the applicant in fact being homeless, in priority need and not intentionally homelessness, which triggers a final, full duty to accommodate).”In relation to delaying interim accommodation Hickinbottom J ruled thus: 40That low threshold has to be considered in the context of another propositionthat derives from both the Code (especially paras 6.5 and 6.16: quoted at paras33–34 above) and the authorities, that, once an effective application has been made and the authority has reason to believe that the applicant is or may be homeless or threatened with homelessness, s.183 is engaged and the provisions that follow (including the duties to inquire and, if the authority has reason to believe the applicant is or may be in priority need, to provide interim accommodation) become immediately effective (see, e.g. Rikha Begum at [49] per Neuberger LJ). An authority is not entitled to defer or delay these duties, to allow time (e.g.) to persuade the individual to mediate (Robinson v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2006] EWCA Civ 1122 at [42] per Jonathan Parker LJ, and at [45] per Jacob LJ),
- The Parties
- Bundles
- Summary
- The Issues
- Procedural Rigour and duty of candour
- CPR r.8.5(1) states:
- “Rule 54.16—Evidence
- Documents and evidence
- The background facts
- The history from the Ombudsman’s report
- Medical assessment result
- The Claimant’s medical records
- The Ombudsman’s decision
- Facts from the revised Grounds of Response
- The OT reports
- Current facts including the pleadings and chronology of the action
- The Medical Assessment form
- Consent to share form
- Income form
- Factual chronology continued
- The Claimant’s witness statements
- The grounds for the claim for judicial review
- Findings of fact
- Overview
- The homelessness application may trigger inquiries
- Accepting the application
- Definition of “homeless at home”
- Priority Need
- The Assessment
- Code of Guidance
- Notification of the decision
- The Main Duty to accommodate
- The “Relief Duty” to help to secure temporary accommodation
- Duty to provide interim accommodation for priority need applicants
- Discharge of Duty under s188(1)
- Applicants who refuse offers of suitable alternative interim accommodation
- Communication of decision on S.188(1) application/duty
- Public sector equality duty
- Case law
- from the time the authority has a reason to believe the relevant matters, until they determine the homeless application.”
- an immediate duty under s.188 to ensure that suitable accommodation is available for the applicant
- or to engage in inquiries outside the statutory scheme into whether the applicant is indeed homeless
- they cannot engage in non-statutory inquiries designed to (or which in fact) emasculate, dilute or “short-cut” the statutory requirements
- In the vast majority of cases, the making of the application will mean that it is difficult if not impossible for the council not to believe that the applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness.
- Equally, the authority is entitled to question a person who claims that he is homeless at home, to clarify whether, in fact, there is reason to believe that the accommodation occupied by that person is such that it may not be reasonable for him to continue to occupy it. It is simply not the case that every complaint about the condition of a property of which the Council, and no doubt other housing authorities, receive very many gives rise to such a reason to believe, despite the lowness of the threshold.
- what the applicant says together with the past history of the applicant as known to the authority
- Applying the law to the facts
- Clarification before accepting the duty under S.188(1)
- Factors
- Homeless at home after acceptance of the duty
- Suitability of the Park West Flat
- Notification
- Ground 1
- Ground 2.
- The offer
- The Claimant’s refusal
- Delay
- Did the Claimant actually request suitable alternative interim accommodation after 26.9.2022?
- Ground 3: PSED.
- Conclusions on the parties’ agreed list of issues
- The need for constant supervision.
- The expense of enforcement.
- The need for precision.
- Morris v. Redland Bricks Ltd. [1970] A.C. 652
- Unjust enrichment of the Claimant.
- R. v. Islington London Borough Council, ex p. B (1997) 30 H.L.R. 706, Q.B.D.
- Conclusions
