Public sector equality duty
(1)A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to—(a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act;(b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it;(c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.”105.In addition by S6(1) Equality Act 2010. P has a disability if—(a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and(b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.106.The general principles underlying the public sector equality duty are summarised by Briggs LJ in Hackney LBC v Haque [2017] EWCA Civ 4; [2017] HLR 14. That case concerned the suitability of accommodation. The PSED was intended to bring equality issues into the mainstream. The duty is to have ‘due regard’ to the equality goals which are: (i) the need to eliminate discrimination, (ii) to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a protected characteristic and those who do not, and (iii) to foster good relations. Having ‘due regard’ to these aims is not a tick-box exercise, but is one of substance. It can be performed even when a public officer does not know of its existence. The obligation is to have ‘due regard’ to the broad aims, it is not a duty to achieve a particular result. Its purpose is to encourage public authorities to keep in mind the PSED goals.107.In Lomax v Gosport Borough Council [2018] EWCA Civ 1849; [2019] PTSR 167 Lewison LJ at para. 43 and Coulson LJ, at para. 57, held that when considering whether it would be reasonable for a disabled person to continue to occupy accommodation, the local housing authority should demonstrate a sharp focus on: the extent of the disabilities; the likely effect of the disabilities when taken together with any other features so long as they continue to occupy the property; the applicant’s particular needs in relation to accommodation which arise from their disabilities and the extent to which their current accommodation meets those needs. There should also be a comparison between the applicant’s accommodation needs and the accommodation needs of people without their particular disabilities. Finally there should be a recognition that when considering whether it was reasonable for him to continue to occupy a property the applicant might need to be treated more favourably than others without their disabilities.
- The Parties
- Bundles
- Summary
- The Issues
- Procedural Rigour and duty of candour
- CPR r.8.5(1) states:
- “Rule 54.16—Evidence
- Documents and evidence
- The background facts
- The history from the Ombudsman’s report
- Medical assessment result
- The Claimant’s medical records
- The Ombudsman’s decision
- Facts from the revised Grounds of Response
- The OT reports
- Current facts including the pleadings and chronology of the action
- The Medical Assessment form
- Consent to share form
- Income form
- Factual chronology continued
- The Claimant’s witness statements
- The grounds for the claim for judicial review
- Findings of fact
- Overview
- The homelessness application may trigger inquiries
- Accepting the application
- Definition of “homeless at home”
- Priority Need
- The Assessment
- Code of Guidance
- Notification of the decision
- The Main Duty to accommodate
- The “Relief Duty” to help to secure temporary accommodation
- Duty to provide interim accommodation for priority need applicants
- Discharge of Duty under s188(1)
- Applicants who refuse offers of suitable alternative interim accommodation
- Communication of decision on S.188(1) application/duty
- Public sector equality duty
- Case law
- from the time the authority has a reason to believe the relevant matters, until they determine the homeless application.”
- an immediate duty under s.188 to ensure that suitable accommodation is available for the applicant
- or to engage in inquiries outside the statutory scheme into whether the applicant is indeed homeless
- they cannot engage in non-statutory inquiries designed to (or which in fact) emasculate, dilute or “short-cut” the statutory requirements
- In the vast majority of cases, the making of the application will mean that it is difficult if not impossible for the council not to believe that the applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness.
- Equally, the authority is entitled to question a person who claims that he is homeless at home, to clarify whether, in fact, there is reason to believe that the accommodation occupied by that person is such that it may not be reasonable for him to continue to occupy it. It is simply not the case that every complaint about the condition of a property of which the Council, and no doubt other housing authorities, receive very many gives rise to such a reason to believe, despite the lowness of the threshold.
- what the applicant says together with the past history of the applicant as known to the authority
- Applying the law to the facts
- Clarification before accepting the duty under S.188(1)
- Factors
- Homeless at home after acceptance of the duty
- Suitability of the Park West Flat
- Notification
- Ground 1
- Ground 2.
- The offer
- The Claimant’s refusal
- Delay
- Did the Claimant actually request suitable alternative interim accommodation after 26.9.2022?
- Ground 3: PSED.
- Conclusions on the parties’ agreed list of issues
- The need for constant supervision.
- The expense of enforcement.
- The need for precision.
- Morris v. Redland Bricks Ltd. [1970] A.C. 652
- Unjust enrichment of the Claimant.
- R. v. Islington London Borough Council, ex p. B (1997) 30 H.L.R. 706, Q.B.D.
- Conclusions