The need for constant supervision.
Lord Hoffman stated:“The most frequent reason given in the cases for declining to order someone to carry on a business is that it would require constant supervision by the court. In J. C. Williamson Ltd. v. Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 C.L.R. 282, 297-298, Dixon J. said flatly: 'Specific performance is inapplicable when the continued supervision of the court is necessary in order to ensure the fulfilment of the contract.'”And further:“… The judges who have said that the need for constant supervision was an objection to such orders were no doubt well aware that supervision would in practice take the form of rulings by the court, on applications made by the parties, as to whether there had been a breach of the order. It is the possibility of the court having to give an indefinite series of such rulings in order to ensure the execution of the order which has been regarded as undesirable.”174.
- The Parties
- Bundles
- Summary
- The Issues
- Procedural Rigour and duty of candour
- CPR r.8.5(1) states:
- “Rule 54.16—Evidence
- Documents and evidence
- The background facts
- The history from the Ombudsman’s report
- Medical assessment result
- The Claimant’s medical records
- The Ombudsman’s decision
- Facts from the revised Grounds of Response
- The OT reports
- Current facts including the pleadings and chronology of the action
- The Medical Assessment form
- Consent to share form
- Income form
- Factual chronology continued
- The Claimant’s witness statements
- The grounds for the claim for judicial review
- Findings of fact
- Overview
- The homelessness application may trigger inquiries
- Accepting the application
- Definition of “homeless at home”
- Priority Need
- The Assessment
- Code of Guidance
- Notification of the decision
- The Main Duty to accommodate
- The “Relief Duty” to help to secure temporary accommodation
- Duty to provide interim accommodation for priority need applicants
- Discharge of Duty under s188(1)
- Applicants who refuse offers of suitable alternative interim accommodation
- Communication of decision on S.188(1) application/duty
- Public sector equality duty
- Case law
- from the time the authority has a reason to believe the relevant matters, until they determine the homeless application.”
- an immediate duty under s.188 to ensure that suitable accommodation is available for the applicant
- or to engage in inquiries outside the statutory scheme into whether the applicant is indeed homeless
- they cannot engage in non-statutory inquiries designed to (or which in fact) emasculate, dilute or “short-cut” the statutory requirements
- In the vast majority of cases, the making of the application will mean that it is difficult if not impossible for the council not to believe that the applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness.
- Equally, the authority is entitled to question a person who claims that he is homeless at home, to clarify whether, in fact, there is reason to believe that the accommodation occupied by that person is such that it may not be reasonable for him to continue to occupy it. It is simply not the case that every complaint about the condition of a property of which the Council, and no doubt other housing authorities, receive very many gives rise to such a reason to believe, despite the lowness of the threshold.
- what the applicant says together with the past history of the applicant as known to the authority
- Applying the law to the facts
- Clarification before accepting the duty under S.188(1)
- Factors
- Homeless at home after acceptance of the duty
- Suitability of the Park West Flat
- Notification
- Ground 1
- Ground 2.
- The offer
- The Claimant’s refusal
- Delay
- Did the Claimant actually request suitable alternative interim accommodation after 26.9.2022?
- Ground 3: PSED.
- Conclusions on the parties’ agreed list of issues
- The need for constant supervision.
- The expense of enforcement.
- The need for precision.
- Morris v. Redland Bricks Ltd. [1970] A.C. 652
- Unjust enrichment of the Claimant.
- R. v. Islington London Borough Council, ex p. B (1997) 30 H.L.R. 706, Q.B.D.
- Conclusions