Equally, the authority is entitled to question a person who claims that he is homeless at home, to clarify whether, in fact, there is reason to believe that the accommodation occupied by that person is such that it may not be reasonable for him to continue to occupy it. It is simply not the case that every complaint about the condition of a property of which the Council, and no doubt other housing authorities, receive very many gives rise to such a reason to believe, despite the lowness of the threshold.
Where the complaint is about the condition of the property, the authority will often be able to proceed on the basis that the condition (even as described to them by the complainant) is repairable, and it will not be unreasonable to expect the complainant and his family to continue to live in the property until the remedial works have been carried out.” (The bold sections are highlighted by me).On the Housing Authority’s choice of method of inquiry Hickinbottom J ruled as follows: “43Furthermore, even where a duty to inquire arises, the manner in which theauthority complies with that duty (including the form of the inquiries and timespent over them) is essentially a matter for the authority themself, subject to guidance and the usual public law constraints including the bounds of reasonableness. What is reasonable will of course depend upon all of the circumstances, including the urgency and vulnerability of the applicant inherent in homelessness applications. R. v Camden London Borough Council Ex p. Gillan [1988] 21 H.L.R. 114 (Gillan)—a case relied upon by Mr Nabi, which I consider further below (see [61])—is an example of how cautious the courts are in finding that a scheme designed to carry out their Pt VII duties and adopted by a housing authority is outside the generous ambit granted to an authority in such matters.”On deferring the decision on reason to believe Hickinbottom J ruled thus: “44What the authority cannot do is defer consideration and a decision on the issue of whether it has reason to believe that the person may be homeless or threatened with homelessness, whilst it conducts further, non-statutory inquiries designed to (or with the consequence of) defeating the intent of the statutory provisions by avoiding their immediate duty to make statutory inquiries.”On what can be considered to enable the HA to decide Hickinbottom J ruled thus: “45Whether an authority has, in a particular case, unlawfully avoided their duty to inquire will depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case. However: (i) whether it has unlawfully avoided their statutory duty to inquire will be assessed against the background that this duty is designed to protect particularly vulnerable people;(ii) the “reason to believe” threshold is necessarily low, and, in most cases, the authority will be bound to consider and decide whether the threshold has been met on the basis of
- The Parties
- Bundles
- Summary
- The Issues
- Procedural Rigour and duty of candour
- CPR r.8.5(1) states:
- “Rule 54.16—Evidence
- Documents and evidence
- The background facts
- The history from the Ombudsman’s report
- Medical assessment result
- The Claimant’s medical records
- The Ombudsman’s decision
- Facts from the revised Grounds of Response
- The OT reports
- Current facts including the pleadings and chronology of the action
- The Medical Assessment form
- Consent to share form
- Income form
- Factual chronology continued
- The Claimant’s witness statements
- The grounds for the claim for judicial review
- Findings of fact
- Overview
- The homelessness application may trigger inquiries
- Accepting the application
- Definition of “homeless at home”
- Priority Need
- The Assessment
- Code of Guidance
- Notification of the decision
- The Main Duty to accommodate
- The “Relief Duty” to help to secure temporary accommodation
- Duty to provide interim accommodation for priority need applicants
- Discharge of Duty under s188(1)
- Applicants who refuse offers of suitable alternative interim accommodation
- Communication of decision on S.188(1) application/duty
- Public sector equality duty
- Case law
- from the time the authority has a reason to believe the relevant matters, until they determine the homeless application.”
- an immediate duty under s.188 to ensure that suitable accommodation is available for the applicant
- or to engage in inquiries outside the statutory scheme into whether the applicant is indeed homeless
- they cannot engage in non-statutory inquiries designed to (or which in fact) emasculate, dilute or “short-cut” the statutory requirements
- In the vast majority of cases, the making of the application will mean that it is difficult if not impossible for the council not to believe that the applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness.
- Equally, the authority is entitled to question a person who claims that he is homeless at home, to clarify whether, in fact, there is reason to believe that the accommodation occupied by that person is such that it may not be reasonable for him to continue to occupy it. It is simply not the case that every complaint about the condition of a property of which the Council, and no doubt other housing authorities, receive very many gives rise to such a reason to believe, despite the lowness of the threshold.
- what the applicant says together with the past history of the applicant as known to the authority
- Applying the law to the facts
- Clarification before accepting the duty under S.188(1)
- Factors
- Homeless at home after acceptance of the duty
- Suitability of the Park West Flat
- Notification
- Ground 1
- Ground 2.
- The offer
- The Claimant’s refusal
- Delay
- Did the Claimant actually request suitable alternative interim accommodation after 26.9.2022?
- Ground 3: PSED.
- Conclusions on the parties’ agreed list of issues
- The need for constant supervision.
- The expense of enforcement.
- The need for precision.
- Morris v. Redland Bricks Ltd. [1970] A.C. 652
- Unjust enrichment of the Claimant.
- R. v. Islington London Borough Council, ex p. B (1997) 30 H.L.R. 706, Q.B.D.
- Conclusions