B. Procedural matters
B. Procedural matters
As mentioned above, these are Part 8 proceedings. Two points arise from this.
The first is that CPR Part 8 is only appropriate where a claimant “seek[s] the court’s decision on a question which is unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact.” Claims involving estoppel are generally not suitable for Part 8. In ING Bank NV v Ros Roca SA [2012] 1 WLR 472, the Court of Appeal explained at [77] that:
“In general Part 8 proceedings are wholly unsuitable for the trial of an issue of estoppel. Once such a claim is disputed, save in exceptional cases, the proceedings will cease to comply with CPR r 8.1(2)(a), since they will cease to be proceedings in which the parties do not seek the court’s decision only on questions which are unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact. A disputed claim of estoppel should be carefully pleaded.”
Secondly, VCL’s principal argument (the “Interim Valuation Date” point) was not pleaded in the Amended Details of Claim and emerged for the first time in Mr Bowling’s skeleton argument, served on the Friday before the hearing. I indicated to the parties that they should address me both on whether this new case should be allowed, and the merits of the case.
Counsel duly did so, and Mr Bowling applied to reamend the Details of Claim during the course of his submissions. Mr Frampton, at least to some extent, resisted this application, but fully engaged with the new case. It seems to me that it is appropriate to permit VCL to run this new case. It raises matters of law on the documents, and Gypcraft have had a full opportunity to deal with the case, including the submission of a supplemental skeleton. I therefore grant permission to VCL to make the proposed reamendments, on the usual terms as to costs.
- Heading
- Adrian Williamson KC
- The Subcontract fails to adequately identify a relevant “Interim Valuation Date” for Payment Cycle #23, meaning that clause 4 must be substantially re-written by Part II of the Scheme. The necessary m
- There was a course of conduct between the parties under which a convention arose that Gypcraft would accept VCL’s Payment Notice #23 out of time. This involves looking how the parties treated the othe
- Lastly, if VCL’s Payment Notice #23 was out of time to serve as a payment notice, it was (indisputably) nevertheless in time to serve as a Pay Less Notice. It contained all the relevant information to
- 110APayment notices: contractual requirements
- This section applies in a case where, in relation to any payment provided for by a construction contract— (a)the contract requires the payer or a specified person to give the payee a notice complying with section 110 A (2) not later than five days af
- Subject to subsection (4), the payee may give to the payer a notice complying with section 110 A (3) at any time after the date on which the notice referred to in subsection (1)(a) was required by the
- Where pursuant to subsection (2) the payee gives a notice complying with section 110 A (3), the final date for payment of the sum specified in the notice shall for all purposes be regarded as postpone
- If— (a)the contract permits or requires the payee, before the date on which the notice referred to in subsection (1)(a) is required by the contract to be given, to notify the payer or a specified person o
- that notification is to be regarded as a notice complying with section 110A (3) given pursuant to subsection (2) (and the payee may not give another such notice pursuant to that subsection)”
- B. Procedural matters
- The relevant facts
- D. The Interim Valuation Date
- E. Estoppel
- F. Payment Notices and Pay Less Notices
- Conclusions
![HT-2025-000036 - [2025] EWHC 2707 (TCC)](https://backend.juristeca.com/files/emisores/logo_yJUntHA.png)