Lack of knowledge of the 2012 Scheme
Lack of knowledge of the 2012 Scheme
This is not a case where it was claimed that the Applicant did not know about the existence of the Scheme: he obviously knew about the Scheme because he applied for compensation for a different assault in August 2016. The cases of MM and JA, which were cases where the applicant did not know about the Scheme at all, are not therefore directly applicable.
If, however, this were a case about an applicant not knowing about the existence of the Scheme, then the Tribunal would need to consider why he did not know about the existence of the Scheme.
That is because not knowing about the Scheme is not of itself an exceptional circumstance. That is because any person can make enquiries, such as researching on the internet and seeking advice, in order to find out about the Scheme and make an application in time.
That is made clear in MM at [45], where Lord Glennie said (emphasis added) that:
“… In para.15 of its decision, the FtT conclude that such ignorance of the scheme could not reasonably be described as an exceptional circumstance insofar as the petitioner was not a child at the date of the incident, did not suffer from any intellectual or cognitive deficit and who was intelligent, educated and socially aware … Taken by itself this reasoning is unexceptional. As counsel for the respondent pointed out, the petitioner could have made enquiries and found out about the scheme. But this is to take too narrow a view. The petitioner’s ignorance of the scheme has to be taken as part of the bigger picture, which is that of a victim of rape manifesting the reticence commonly seen amongst such victims as described in the authorities to which I have referred. The question is whether such a person, who is ex hypothesi reluctant to speak to anyone about the incident let alone report matters to the authorities, could reasonably be expected to make enquiries about a compensation scheme which depended upon her telling others about what had happened.”
Hence, in MM the Court of Session held that:
of itself, ignorance of the existence of the Scheme could not reasonably be described as an exceptional circumstance. No objection could be taken to that statement
however, where a person is not aware of existence of the Scheme, the question is whether she could reasonably have been expected to make enquiries about compensation so as to enable her to make a complaint sooner
given that the victim was a victim of rape (whose victims are often deterred from reporting the matter as a result of the psychological and emotional trauma of the crime (at [44]), if that did prevent her from making the necessary
enquiries sooner because she would have to have told others she had been raped, then that could be said to be an exceptional circumstance preventing her from applying sooner.
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Tribunal’s Decision
- Conclusion
- The 2012 Scheme
- The Applicant’s Submissions
- The Tribunal Hearing
- General Principles
- can the circumstances preventing an earlier application be characterised as exceptional?
- the focus should be on the impact of the error on the decision-making process which the decision-maker undertook to ascertain whether it is highly likely that the decision taken would not have been su
- the Court should (in proper evidence) be given a full accurate and clear explanation of the decision-making process used by the public authority concerned and should not have to depend upon submission
- Grounds of Review
- Ground Two: The Tribunal made findings of fact which were erroneous on the basis they (i) had no evidential basis or (ii) were unreasonable
- Ground Three: Failure to take proper account of the impact of the abuse
- Ground Four: With respect to paragraph 89(b) the Tribunal made a finding of fact which was erroneous on the following bases: (i) it made material errors of fact giving rise to unfairness, (ii) a finding
- Alleged Adequate Alternative Remedy
- Conclusion
- CICA’s Submissions
- The 2012 Scheme
- Paragraph 89(a)
- whether the circumstances are exceptional is a question of fact (at [15])
- in R(JR) v FtT and CICA [2016] JR/1523/2016 at [6] Upper Tribunal Judge Ward suggested that the focus should be on what prevented the applicant applying sooner and then a Tribunal will be able to cons
- in MM v CICA at [33] the Outer House was content to adopt the two-part process formulation in BC , but said
- Lack of knowledge of the 2012 Scheme
- Lack of knowledge of suffering a crime
- Challenging factual decisions
- S.31 (2A) of the SCA 1981 provides that
- Gathercole v Surrey County Council [2021] PTSR 359 (Court of Appeal) at [38-39]
- R (Glatter) v North Herts Valleys CCG [2021] EWHC 12 (Admin) at [96]
- most recently, Bradbury at [74]
- Process/alternative remedy
- Ground 1
- he was able to, and did, make an application under the Scheme
- is not in any way, and cannot be suggested, that that was not put to him
- Ground 2
- Ground 3
- Ground 4
- the Level B3 award to which he refers requires there to have been (emphasis added) “ intermittent physical assaults resulting in an accumulation of healed wounds, burns or scalds, but with no apprecia
- Conclusion
- Analysis
- Ground 1
- Ground 2
- Ground 3
- Ground 4
- Alternative Remedy
- The Transcript
- Conclusions
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