[2025] UKUT 181 (AAC)

In its statement of reasons the Tribunal stated that

“Introduction

1.

The issue in this appeal is whether the period for claiming a payment of compensation can be extended beyond the two-year long-stop as set out in paragraph 87 of the 2012 scheme. Under paragraph 89 of the scheme, a claims officer (and this Tribunal) may extend that period if satisfied that “(a) due to exceptional circumstances the applicant could not have applied earlier; and (b) the evidence presented in support of the application means that it can be determined without further extensive enquiries by a claims officer.”

2.

The appeal fails on both accounts.

Findings of Fact

3.

On the 04 October 2019, the Appellant made a claim to compensation for domestic abuse suffered between 06 January 2014 and 04 January 2016. His application stated that the incident was reported to police on the 08 August 2016 and that, as a result, he was suffering from trauma and PTSD. That application was refused on the 12 October 2020 under paragraphs 87 and 89 of the scheme; a decision which was confirmed at review on the 11 February 2022. On the 12 May 2022, the Appellant appealed the review decision with the support of an organisation called “Hestia”, and included a written letter in which it is confirmed that the Appellant had been diagnosed with PTSD. It is that appeal which concerns this Tribunal.

4.

The Appellant has made a prior claim to compensation on the 03 August 2016, because of a single assault which occurred on the 28 March 2015, during the period when he was subject to domestic abuse. That assault was reported to Croydon Police on the same day as it happened. The Appellant was awarded £6500 on the 02 February 2018 for disabling mental illness, A7 and significant scarring to torso A1. Following an appeal against that decision, a Tribunal decided that the Appellant should be awarded £17,250, which included an award at A13 (£27,000) for a seriously disabling permanent mental injury, reduced by 40% to account for a pre-existing condition - i.e. £16,200. There was also a payment for scarring at £3,500 payable at 30%. We also note that the previous Tribunal mention, at the end of paragraph 9, a suggested third injury but in paragraph 12, that the Appellant did not pursue that third injury. It is not clear what that third injury might have been.

5.

We note that at that time, the Appellant had the support of solicitors and counsel, Ms Titus-Cobb, and that it was readily apparent that the Appellant was the subject of domestic abuse. In fact, a psychiatric report had been obtained in which there is mention of “chronic domestic violence/abuse by his then girlfriend” and that the attack (the subject of that appeal) exacerbated the Appellant’s PTSD by 60%. As mentioned above, it is not possible to ascertain what the third injury might have been but it is feasible that an award for domestic violence might have been canvassed and discounted at that time as none of the prescribed criteria were met (healed wounds; minor disfigurement or lasting longer than three years). However, we recognised that this is conjecture and played no part in our decision to refuse the appeal.

6.

In his witness statement on pages TG6 through to TG10, the Appellant sets out in more detail the circumstances of the domestic abuse and the controlling behaviour he was subjected to. We accept the history of that abuse entirely. The abuse seems to have ended in or around April 2016, although the exact date was a little unclear. In his compensation claim the Appellant stated it ended in January 2016, but it appears to have continued via the telephone until May 2016 when the Appellant blocked the number.

7.

The domestic abuse was reported to the police in August 2016 by the Appellant although the police report also mentions a “Domestic incident reported by a neighbour” on 26 October 2015. No action was taken by the police due to the time limit for prosecution having expired. The Tribunal noted that it was possible that the Appellant might have made a claim at this point, having previously made a claim at roughly the same time and that all claims might have been brought together. In fact, it was not for a further three years that the Appellant made the claim, and it is this delay which has ostensibly resulted in the refusal of the claim.

[The next two paragraphs dealt with an adjournment application]

The Submissions

10.

The Authority submit that the application is some 4 years and 10 months since the start of the domestic abuse and that a claim should be made as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the abuse but in any event within a long-stop period of two years. It submits that time can only be extended if there are exceptional circumstances and that this means “something out of the ordinary” must have existed throughout the whole period which accounts for the delay. The Authority accept that up to the report to the police in August 2016 exceptional circumstances existed but since then there has been nothing exceptional which impeded the Appellant’s ability to make a claim. The Authority points out that there has been little in relation to the Appellant’s mental health which had prevented him from pursuing another application and that despite the diagnosis, he was able to progress, and present up to appeal stage, that application. The Authority point out that he was aware of the scheme at that time and that if, as was suggested he did not consider himself the victim of a crime, that in itself was not a sufficient factor. The Authority further submits that even if there were exceptional circumstances, this claim could not be determined without further extensive enquiries into the Appellant’s mental health as the Appellant is claiming an additional mental disability arising out of the domestic abuse as opposed to his pre-existing condition and those associated with the single incident in 2015.

11.

Mr Mandagere’s submissions were set out in his skeleton arguments of the 06 November 2022. He asked two main questions: why was the Appellant unable to make the application earlier than he did and can those circumstances be characterised as exceptional. He reminds the Tribunal that exceptional circumstances exclude those routinely encountered and that the phrase “could not have applied earlier” can encompass both physical and mental incapacity, preventing such an application through to distress or other societal objections. Mr Mandegere reminds us that although ignorance of the scheme in itself is not a reason, it might be relevant as part of the wider picture and he asks a further, subsidiary question, whether “a person, who is reluctant to speak to anyone about the incident let alone report matters to the authorities, could reasonably be expected to make enquiries about a compensation scheme which depended upon them telling others about that had happened.”

12.

Mr Mandagere submits that in the context of this Appeal the impact of the abuse itself has been a factor in the Appellant’s inability to appreciate that domestic violence is not limited to purely violent acts, drawing in support, in the context of civil litigation, that it is recognised that the “psychological and physical impact of abuse has the tendency to inhibit a victim from complaining or reporting a matter to the authorities”.

13.

We took all of those submissions into account when making our findings of fact and in assessing the substantive issues in this appeal.

14.

We also had the Appellant’s medical records and a number of psychological reports which were referred to during the course of submissions. We considered those reports, during the course of our deliberations.

Our Assessment of the Evidence

15.

During the hearing, the Appellant told us that he felt ashamed of the domestic abuse and that it caused a lot of trauma. He told us that he separated out the stabbing from the rest of the abuse and that he was not aware that he was going through domestic abuse until much later. He told us that it was not until he went to Mankind that he appreciated he was the male victim of domestic abuse and that an award of compensation would provide him with justice and clarity. We can accept this up to a point but the difficulty for the Appellant is that he reported a crime of domestic violence to the police in August 2016, some three months after it ended. It is simply not reasonably possible for the Appellant to claim that he was unaware that he was the victim of a crime after reporting it to the police. In our assessment, we thought that the Appellant knew he was the victim of a crime of violence when it was reported to the police.

16.

However, Mr Mandagere’s argument is slightly more subtle than that. As we understood it, what is submitted is that even though the Appellant had reported the matter as a crime some three years before the claim, it was the Appellant’s psychological injury arising out of the domestic abuse which prevented him from knowing that even though a crime had been committed it was not one which might give rise to an award of compensation. Again, we do not accept that argument. We note that the Appellant had already embarked on a process of claiming for the single stabbing incident; that domestic abuse was mentioned during that claim process; that he would have had access to a copy of the 2012 scheme at that time and that he had access to legal advice during the course of the prior appeal. It seems to us entirely possible that at any point from August 2016 down to October 2019 when the claim was made, the Appellant might have easily been able to find out about domestic abuse and its place within the scheme. Accordingly, we do not accept that his mental health throughout that period prevented him from making a claim for domestic violence.

17.

Accordingly, it seems to us that there was little to prevent the Appellant from making a claim for domestic violence as a separate claim to the one he made in August 2016 for the stabbing incident and that there are no exceptional circumstances we could see preventing the Appellant from making a claim earlier than he did.

18.

Further, we are satisfied that even if he were able to come within paragraph 89(a), he also fails at sub-paragraph (b). The Appellant cannot bring himself within the scope of domestic violence in itself as none of the qualifying factors apply to his claim, as mentioned above. The only way he might qualify for an award of compensation is if there is a further mental injury attributable to the domestic abuse as distinct from the 2015 incident and the pre-existing condition. That would require a considerable amount of additional evidence from a consultant psychiatrist/clinical psychologist to separate the pre-existing mental ill health and 2015 incident from the mental ill health arising out of the domestic abuse. We would foresee the input of a highly experienced specialist with access to all of the preceding reports and the Appellant’s medical records. The terms of the instructions and the commissioning of that report would require significant input from the Appellant’s advisers and the Authority, and the report would require a detailed consultation with the Appellant. Thereafter consideration of that report would be necessary.

19.

It strikes us as clearly evident that the above matters cumulatively would constitute “further extensive enquiries” – and it is hard to see how commissioning and considering such a report would be anything other than further extensive enquiries.