Concluding comments in relation to our findings of fact
Concluding comments in relation to our findings of fact
We do not think that we are precluded from making any of the above three findings of fact by any finding of primary fact in the FTT Decision.
As regards the first two findings – to the effect that the Appellant was provided with living accommodation because he was caring for his father and that it was necessary for him to live in his parent’s home in order to do so – it is true that they sit rather uncomfortably with the conclusion drawn by the FTT in the FTT Decision to the effect that the Appellant had not been provided with living accommodation by reason of employment but rather by reason of family ties. However:
we consider that that conclusion was not a finding of primary fact but rather a conclusion of law;
alternatively, even if it was not a conclusion of law but rather an inference of fact based on the primary facts found by the FTT, in remitting the case to us, the UT have instructed us to disregard inferences which were drawn by the FTT from the primary facts in the FTT Decision;
furthermore, in remitting the case to us, the UT have given the parties permission to adduce additional evidence so that it follows that we are entitled, and indeed obliged, to take that additional evidence into account in making our findings of fact, even if our findings of fact contradict a finding of primary fact in the FTT Decision; and
finally, in any event, the UT cannot have thought that the first two findings of fact which we have made were unsustainable in the light of the terms on which it has remitted the case to us because, had it considered that to be the case, that would have been determinative of the issue in relation to Section 222(8) of the TCGA and there would thus have been no need for the UT to have made that remission.
Our third finding of fact – to the effect that, when the Appellant acquired each Property, his intention was that in due course he would occupy the relevant Property as his only or main residence and that intention subsisted for a specified period of time – is much more obviously contrary to a finding of primary fact made by the FTT in the FTT Decision because, in paragraph [109] of the FTT Decision, the FTT found that the Appellant did not intend that any of the Properties would be his main residence. However, as we have already noted in paragraph 39(4) above, in paragraph [84] of the UT Decision, the UT noted that the finding of primary fact made by the FTT in paragraph [109] of the FTT Decision had been made in the context of the FTT’s consideration of the exemption in Section 222(1) of the TCGA and that, whilst it appeared to be unhelpful to the Appellant’s case in relation to the Intention Condition in Section 222(8) of the TCGA, the finding could not simply be read across from one exemption regime to the other. In addition, similar points to those set out in paragraphs 82(3) and 82(4) above can be made in relation to that third finding of fact. So far as concerns the point made in paragraph 82(3) above in this context, we note in particular the reservations expressed by the UT in paragraph [85] of the UT Decision as regards the determination by the FTT of the Appellant’s intentions without an oral hearing.
For the reasons set out in paragraphs 82 and 83 above, we consider that we are entitled to make each of the three findings of fact set out above.
- Heading
- Introduction
- The FTT Decision
- The UT Decision
- Introduction to the issues
- issue one – the principal private residence exemption
- The legislation
- dwelling–house as his only or main residence
- where the accommodation is provided for the better performance of the duties of the employment, and it is one of the
- No part of a gain to which section 222 applies shall be a chargeable gain if the dwelling–house or part of a dwelling–house has been the individual's
- “The application of section 222(8) is to be determined by the FTT in relation to all four
- The reconsideration shall be on the basis of the findings of primary fact made in the
- Findings of fact in the FTT Decision
- The documentary evidence
- The medical evidence
- The contract of employment
- The Appellant’s email
- The photographs
- The Appellant’s evidence
- Mrs Campbell’s evidence
- Officer Weir’s evidence
- Our impression of the witnesses
- Our findings of fact
- we have reached the following relevant findings of fact for the purposes of this decision
- Was it necessary for the Appellant to stay in his parent’s home in order to provide care to his father
- The Appellant’s intention to occupy
- Concluding comments in relation to our findings of fact
- Discussion
- By reason of employment
- “There are many decisions on the meaning of “by reason of employment” including in particular Wicks v Firth 56 TC 318. In John Charman v HMRC [2021] EWCA Civ 1804 (“ Charman ”) the Court of Appeal sai
- There was little, if any, dispute between the parties as to the correct test to be applied to determine whether an interest is acquired “by reason of” employment. It is not necessary for HMRC to show
- In Charman , The Court of Appeal emphasised that the FTT’s evaluation of this issue can only be challenged on appeal on limited grounds, at [46]
- There are numerous other authorities to the same effect On 25 October 2023, the Supreme Court released its decision in HMRC v Vermilion
- “If one approaches the question by asking, as suggested by Oliver LJ in Wicks v Firth , what it was that enabled Mr Campbell to enjoy the ability to reside in the family home, we do consider that the
- Necessary for the performance of the duties of the employment
- The Intention Condition
- Conclusion
- issue two – the penalties
- The legislation
- The terms of the remittance
- “ We instruct the FTT to determine, by way of oral hearing (either in person or remote)
- The reconsideration shall be on the basis of the findings of primary fact made in the
- Findings of fact in the FTT Decision
- The evidence
- The correspondence
- The explanation of the Penalties
- The witness evidence
- Our findings of fact
- Discussion
- Reasonable excuse
- – see the UT decision in Perrin v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2018] UKUT 156 (TCC) (“ Perrin ”) at paragraphs [81] to [83]
- Special circumstances
- Conclusions
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