The correspondence
The correspondence
We have already described much of the correspondence between the Appellant (and his agents) and Officer Weir in the course of the dispute at paragraphs 3 to 12, 46 and 47 above. For present purposes we would add the following:
on 26 January 2018, after the receipt of the Schedule 36 notice dated 24 January 2018, the Appellant sent an email to Officer Weir in which he said that, following Officer Weir’s email of 19 December 2017, he had contacted HH and told them to send Officer Weir the information and documents requested and that he had now contacted HH again to chase things up;
on 1 February 2018, the Appellant wrote to Officer Weir once again, this time attaching an email exchange between the Appellant and HH in which:
the Appellant had made it clear that he was dissatisfied with the service he was receiving from HH and wished to end their engagement; and
HH sought to excuse their delay by reference to pressure of other work and said that they would be able to meet the deadline in the Schedule 36 notice for the provision of the requested information and documents.
The Appellant assured Officer Weir that he had been trying to resolve the dispute as soon as possible. To that end, he had retained HH and given HH the relevant information and documents months ago. Finally, he said that HH would be in touch with Officer Weir over the next two days;
also on 1 February 2018, HH responded to Officer Weir’s letter of 19 December 2017, enclosing the statement by the Appellant to which we have referred in paragraph 47 above, disagreeing with certain parts of Officer Weir’s analysis and suggesting as a compromise that the Appellant be liable to CGT instead of income tax on the gain made on each of the Properties apart from 28 Bramshill Close;
on 6 February 2018, wrote to the Appellant to explain why he had issued the Schedule 36 notice and to ask the Appellant for evidence to support both the computation of the gains and the view that neither income tax nor CGT was payable on them;
on 12 February 2018, Officer Weir responded to the points made in HH’s letter of 1 February 2018 and reiterated his request for information and documents;
on 22 February 2018, HH wrote to Officer Weir, responding to the points which Officer Weir had made and enclosing a considerable amount of information and documents, including the Appellant’s bank statements, but no invoices or receipts in respect of the expenditure which the Appellant had claimed to have incurred;
on 28 March 2018, Officer Weir wrote to HH to say that, in the absence of any invoices or receipts, there was nothing for him to review. It was not possible for him to identify costs from the bank statements which had been sent to him because the costs were not referred to in those statements. Officer Weir informed HH that he was disappointed by the lack of information provided to support the Appellant’s claim to have incurred the costs and that he wished to move the dispute forward and would be issuing assessments and penalties shortly after 27 April 2018;
on 20 April 2018, Brabners wrote to Officer Weir to say that they had recently been instructed by the Appellant in place of HH and to ask for some additional time to review the correspondence before responding to Officer Weir’s most recent letter;
on 10 May 2018, Brabners wrote to Officer Weir to respond to the points made by Officer Weir in his most recent letter and to reiterate that the Appellant had not retained any invoices or receipts in relation to the costs incurred and that, in making his calculations, the Appellant had largely used estimated numbers from memory;
on 30 May 2018, Officer Weir responded to Brabners’ letter of 10 May 2018. He apologised for the delay in his response, set out his views on the points made by Brabners and said that he could not allow costs for which no evidence had been produced;
on 29 June 2018, Brabners emailed Officer Weir to respond to various points which Officer Weir had made in his most recent letter and to reiterate that the Appellant had nothing more to provide to evidence his costs; and
on 13 July 2018, Officer Weir wrote to the Appellant to set out his final views on the matter and to explain that the Closure Notice, the Discovery Assessments and the Penalties would shortly be issued.
- Heading
- Introduction
- The FTT Decision
- The UT Decision
- Introduction to the issues
- issue one – the principal private residence exemption
- The legislation
- dwelling–house as his only or main residence
- where the accommodation is provided for the better performance of the duties of the employment, and it is one of the
- No part of a gain to which section 222 applies shall be a chargeable gain if the dwelling–house or part of a dwelling–house has been the individual's
- “The application of section 222(8) is to be determined by the FTT in relation to all four
- The reconsideration shall be on the basis of the findings of primary fact made in the
- Findings of fact in the FTT Decision
- The documentary evidence
- The medical evidence
- The contract of employment
- The Appellant’s email
- The photographs
- The Appellant’s evidence
- Mrs Campbell’s evidence
- Officer Weir’s evidence
- Our impression of the witnesses
- Our findings of fact
- we have reached the following relevant findings of fact for the purposes of this decision
- Was it necessary for the Appellant to stay in his parent’s home in order to provide care to his father
- The Appellant’s intention to occupy
- Concluding comments in relation to our findings of fact
- Discussion
- By reason of employment
- “There are many decisions on the meaning of “by reason of employment” including in particular Wicks v Firth 56 TC 318. In John Charman v HMRC [2021] EWCA Civ 1804 (“ Charman ”) the Court of Appeal sai
- There was little, if any, dispute between the parties as to the correct test to be applied to determine whether an interest is acquired “by reason of” employment. It is not necessary for HMRC to show
- In Charman , The Court of Appeal emphasised that the FTT’s evaluation of this issue can only be challenged on appeal on limited grounds, at [46]
- There are numerous other authorities to the same effect On 25 October 2023, the Supreme Court released its decision in HMRC v Vermilion
- “If one approaches the question by asking, as suggested by Oliver LJ in Wicks v Firth , what it was that enabled Mr Campbell to enjoy the ability to reside in the family home, we do consider that the
- Necessary for the performance of the duties of the employment
- The Intention Condition
- Conclusion
- issue two – the penalties
- The legislation
- The terms of the remittance
- “ We instruct the FTT to determine, by way of oral hearing (either in person or remote)
- The reconsideration shall be on the basis of the findings of primary fact made in the
- Findings of fact in the FTT Decision
- The evidence
- The correspondence
- The explanation of the Penalties
- The witness evidence
- Our findings of fact
- Discussion
- Reasonable excuse
- – see the UT decision in Perrin v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2018] UKUT 156 (TCC) (“ Perrin ”) at paragraphs [81] to [83]
- Special circumstances
- Conclusions
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