Was it necessary for the Appellant to stay in his parent’s home in order to provide care to his father
Was it necessary for the Appellant to stay in his parent’s home in order to provide care to his father
Relevant finding – we find that the Appellant could not have carried out all of his caring responsibilities for his father unless he had living accommodation in his parent’s home.
Reasons – we base this conclusion on the terms of the medical evidence and the testimony of the Appellant and Mrs Campbell. It is clear from that evidence that the Appellant’s caring responsibilities were considerable, albeit highly unpredictable in terms of timing. The nature and extent of the Appellant’s responsibilities at any time depended on how the Appellant’s father was doing at that time and the extent to which Mrs Campbell was able to care for her husband herself. However, when those caring responsibilities are viewed as a whole, we consider that the Appellant would not have been able to carry out all of them without being able to live in his parent’s home.
The conclusion we have reached above is not gainsaid by the fact that:
the Appellant chose to purchase the Properties and claims that he intended to live in them;
the Properties were selected in large part for their proximity to the Appellant’s parent’s home so that the Appellant could attend to his father at short notice from them; or
the hours of care for which the Appellant was paid under the employment contract were a relatively small fraction of the hours in a week as a whole.
As regards the first of these, the mere fact that the Appellant decided to buy a Property in which to live at those times when his caring responsibilities under the employment contract allowed him to do so does not mean that he was not required to live in his parent’s home in order to carry out those responsibilities as a whole. Those responsibilities did not take up all of his time and some of the responsibilities could be performed when he was not living in his parent’s home. However, the mere fact that the Appellant was able to live in an alternative location for some of the time despite the existence of those responsibilities does not mean that there were no times when the Appellant’s responsibilities required him to live in his parent’s home. To pick up an analogy that was mentioned at the hearing, just as a housemaster at a boarding school who is necessarily required to live on the school premises when he is on duty can live in alternative accommodation when he is not performing his duties (such as during school holidays), so too the Appellant could necessarily be required to live in his parent’s home when he was carrying out some of his caring responsibilities but able to live in alternative accommodation either when he was performing other caring responsibilities or not performing caring responsibilities at all.
As regards the second of these, the mere fact that the Appellant was able to carry out some of his caring responsibilities under the employment contract by being on call at a Property located nearby did not mean that his caring responsibilities under the employment contract, when viewed as a whole, did not require him to have accommodation in his parent’s home. The critical question to ask is whether the Appellant would have been able to carry out all of his caring responsibilities under the employment contract whilst living away from his parent’s home and, in our opinion, it is clear from the evidence that he would not have been able to do so.
As regards the third of these, we do not think that the overall quantum of the hours for which the Appellant was paid under the employment contract is determinative of this question given the evidence which has been presented to us in relation to the nature and timing of the work which he was required to provide. This was not a case where the Appellant could “clock on” for a working shift with any sort of regularity like a hospital worker or a security guard. Instead, he needed to be available on short notice and on an ongoing basis to carry out his duties.
In short, the situation here was very different from that applicable to a night shift worker who lives away from his or her place of employment but works in that place of employment through the night. The evidence makes it clear that, whilst certain duties of the employment could be carried out when the Appellant was living away from his parent’s home, he could not carry out all the duties of his employment on that basis.
We therefore conclude that the Appellant could not have carried out his caring responsibilities under the employment contract without having living accommodation in his parent’s home. We would add that this conclusion is entirely consistent with part 2 clause 1;2 of the employment contract, which specified that the provision of the accommodation in his parent’s home was “necessary in this type of employment when providing such high levels of care and flexibility for a patient needing 24 hour support and supervision”.
- Heading
- Introduction
- The FTT Decision
- The UT Decision
- Introduction to the issues
- issue one – the principal private residence exemption
- The legislation
- dwelling–house as his only or main residence
- where the accommodation is provided for the better performance of the duties of the employment, and it is one of the
- No part of a gain to which section 222 applies shall be a chargeable gain if the dwelling–house or part of a dwelling–house has been the individual's
- “The application of section 222(8) is to be determined by the FTT in relation to all four
- The reconsideration shall be on the basis of the findings of primary fact made in the
- Findings of fact in the FTT Decision
- The documentary evidence
- The medical evidence
- The contract of employment
- The Appellant’s email
- The photographs
- The Appellant’s evidence
- Mrs Campbell’s evidence
- Officer Weir’s evidence
- Our impression of the witnesses
- Our findings of fact
- we have reached the following relevant findings of fact for the purposes of this decision
- Was it necessary for the Appellant to stay in his parent’s home in order to provide care to his father
- The Appellant’s intention to occupy
- Concluding comments in relation to our findings of fact
- Discussion
- By reason of employment
- “There are many decisions on the meaning of “by reason of employment” including in particular Wicks v Firth 56 TC 318. In John Charman v HMRC [2021] EWCA Civ 1804 (“ Charman ”) the Court of Appeal sai
- There was little, if any, dispute between the parties as to the correct test to be applied to determine whether an interest is acquired “by reason of” employment. It is not necessary for HMRC to show
- In Charman , The Court of Appeal emphasised that the FTT’s evaluation of this issue can only be challenged on appeal on limited grounds, at [46]
- There are numerous other authorities to the same effect On 25 October 2023, the Supreme Court released its decision in HMRC v Vermilion
- “If one approaches the question by asking, as suggested by Oliver LJ in Wicks v Firth , what it was that enabled Mr Campbell to enjoy the ability to reside in the family home, we do consider that the
- Necessary for the performance of the duties of the employment
- The Intention Condition
- Conclusion
- issue two – the penalties
- The legislation
- The terms of the remittance
- “ We instruct the FTT to determine, by way of oral hearing (either in person or remote)
- The reconsideration shall be on the basis of the findings of primary fact made in the
- Findings of fact in the FTT Decision
- The evidence
- The correspondence
- The explanation of the Penalties
- The witness evidence
- Our findings of fact
- Discussion
- Reasonable excuse
- – see the UT decision in Perrin v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2018] UKUT 156 (TCC) (“ Perrin ”) at paragraphs [81] to [83]
- Special circumstances
- Conclusions
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