TC09585 - [2025] UKFTT 00867 (TC)

the Appellant’s father suffers from a serious medical condition for which he requires considerable care and assistance. At the original hearing before the FTT, the Appellant adduced evidence to that effect from a number of medical practitioners and from the Appellant’s mother – see paragraphs [88] to [92] of the FTT Decision. The medical evidence confirmed the diagnosis, prognosis and needs of the Appellant’s father and is summarised in paragraphs 43 and 44 below;

the Appellant had a contract of employment with his mother dated 5 April 2010 to provide care for his father – see paragraph [70] of the UT Decision. The terms of that contract are summarised in paragraph 45 below; and

at all times when he owned the Properties, the Appellant was residing in his parent’s home – see paragraphs [90] and [91] of the FTT Decision.

first, the FTT Decision contains no single identifiable section in which the FTT sets out its findings of primary fact. Instead, at various places in the decision, the FTT prefaces certain statements with the words “I find that…”;

secondly, in many of those cases, the finding which the FTT then goes on to express is simply to the effect that it has seen insufficient evidence of a particular assertion of fact made by the Appellant. This is particularly significant given:

It seems to us that, on that basis, where the FTT concluded in the FTT Decision that it had seen insufficient evidence of a particular assertion of fact made by the Appellant, we are entitled to, and indeed required to, consider whether any of the evidence which was provided to us in the course of the oral hearing before us gainsays that conclusion;

thirdly, some of the findings which the FTT goes on to express after the words ‘I find that…” are not findings of primary fact but instead inferences drawn by the FTT from its findings of primary fact or conclusions of law, neither of which falls within the scope of the UT’s instruction; and

finally, as the UT made clear in its analysis of the Intention Condition at paragraph [84] of its decision, the finding of primary fact at paragraph [109] of the FTT Decision – to the effect that the Appellant did not intend any of the Properties to be his main residence – was made in the context of the FTT’s determining the multi–factorial question of whether any of the Properties was the Appellant’s only or main residence for the purposes of Section 222(1) of the TCGA and not the question which we are here addressing of whether the Appellant satisfied the Intention Condition for the purposes of Section 222(8) of the TCGA. That, taken together with the two points set out in paragraphs 39(2)(a) and 39(2)(b) above, means that we consider that we are not bound to treat the finding of primary fact in paragraph [109] of the FTT Decision as binding on us in addressing this issue.

the Appellant was very active in the property market over a relatively short space of time but was not a professional property developer – see paragraphs [67] and [77];

as regards 10 Woodhouse Close:

– see paragraphs [68], [69], [110] and [117];

the Appellant purchased 28 Bramshill Close and 2 Bramshill Close within months of one another and within months of selling 10 Woodhouse Close – see paragraph [70];

2 Bramshill Close was purchased with the help of a mortgage although the evidence of that mortgage – the Appellant’s bank statements – did not shed any light on the length of the mortgage term – see paragraph [71];

28 Bramshill Close was modified before being sold relatively quickly after 2 Bramshill Close was sold – see paragraph [71];

the Appellant had provided no evidence of the actual expenditure required in order to make 8 Wigshaw Lane habitable – see paragraphs [72] and [73];

the Appellant’s parents would not have required the Appellant to leave their home if he had had nowhere else to reside – see paragraph [93];

by his own admission in his email to Officer Weir of 1 September 2017, the Appellant considered his residence in his parent’s property to be residing “at home” – see paragraph [94];

the Appellant did not intend any of the Properties to be his main residence – see paragraph [109]; and

the Appellant did not change his correspondence address to any of the Properties – see paragraphs [110], [117] and [127].

documentary evidence; and

witness evidence.