TC09585 - [2025] UKFTT 00867 (TC)

Fecha: 15-Jul-2025

“If one approaches the question by asking, as suggested by Oliver LJ in Wicks v Firth , what it was that enabled Mr Campbell to enjoy the ability to reside in the family home, we do consider that the

“If one approaches the question by asking, as suggested by Oliver LJ in Wicks v Firth, what it was that enabled Mr Campbell to enjoy the ability to reside in the family home, we do consider that the FTT was justified in considering whether this was merely a “family arrangement”. However, we agree with Mr Gordon that there is nothing in the JRA condition which precludes accommodation in a family home from being provided by reason of employment.”

91.

Although the paragraphs from the UT Decision set out above appeared to us to provide comprehensive and clear guidance on how to approach this question, during the course of their submissions at the hearing, both parties took us to the Court of Appeal decision in Wicks v Firth 56 TC 318 (“Wicks”) and Ms Inglis, on behalf of the Respondents, took us to the Supreme Court decision in The Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Vermilion Holdings Ltd [2023] UKSC 37 (“Vermilion”). It became clear that the reason for this was that, in Wicks, the proper interpretation of the phrase “by reason of employment” was addressed by both Lord Denning MR and Oliver LJ but in slightly different ways.

92.

Lord Denning MR was of the view that, in order to determine whether a benefit had been provided “by reason of employment”, one needed to consider whether employment was one of the operative causes of the benefit’s being provided, in the sense that it was a condition of the benefit’s being provided – see Wicks at 363. In contrast, Oliver LJ was of the view that, in order to determine whether a benefit had been provided “by reason of employment”, one needed to consider what it was that had enabled the person concerned to enjoy the benefit – see the extract from the UT Decision set out in paragraph 89 above and Wicks at 371.

93.

The difference between the two approaches is that, in a case where the receipt of a benefit has multiple causes, only one of which is employment, Lord Denning MR’s test would automatically be satisfied whereas Oliver LJ’s test would require a more forensic analysis of the causation.

94.

Be that as it may, it is clear from the extracts from the UT Decision set out above and paragraph [12] of the decision in Vermilion that, insofar as the two tests would produce different results in any case, it is Oliver LJ’s test which is to be preferred.

95.

With that in mind, we turn to consider whether, on the facts in this case, the Appellant’s accommodation in his parent’s home on and after 5 April 2010 was “by reason of his employment” in the sense described by Oliver LJ in Wicks.

96.

In that regard, we have already found as a fact that that accommodation was provided because the Appellant was providing care to his father and not simply because of family ties – see paragraphs 64 to 68 above.

97.

Ms Inglis submitted that, as:

(1)

the care was provided from 2007, when the Appellant’s father first became ill, and therefore well before the employment contract was executed; and

(2)

even after the employment contract was executed, much of the care was provided voluntarily in that the contract made no provision for care in excess of the hours for which the Appellant was paid,

it was clear that the reason for the provision of the accommodation was either family ties or the fact that the Appellant was providing care but that, in any event, it was not because the Appellant had an employment contract which made provision for it.