The contract of employment
The contract of employment
The key terms of the contract of employment between the Appellant and his mother were as follows:
the Appellant was employed as a residential care giver and personal assistant – see part 1 clause 1;4;
the Appellant’s usual place of work would be the employer’s home address and employment accommodation would be provided free of charge to the Appellant at the employer’s home due to the high level of care needed for the patient – see part 2 clause 1;2;
the accommodation was being “provided for the better performance of the employees [sic] duties and is necessary in this type of employment when providing such high levels of care and flexibility for a patient needing 24–hour support and supervision.
Flexibility is a must due to the patients [sic] needs and for security reasons. It is impossible to say what time of the day or night you will be asked to work each week as it will depend on the health of the patient and the employer. Some weeks you may be asked to work several nights” – see part 2 clause 1;2;
the Appellant would be paid £9.15 for every hour he worked – see part 2 clause 2;1;
the number of hours of work required were not specified in the contract but the contract provided that these might vary from week to week. “There is a requirement for flexibility and these hours may be changed according to needs. In addition, you may be expected to work reasonable additional hours at the employers [sic] request…You may be required to work through the night, evenings and weekends” – see part 2 clause 3;1;
the Appellant’s post was funded subject to the employer’s assessed funded care needs at the time of the contract, which were subject to change by the employer – see part 2 clause 3;2;
the Appellant’s annual holiday entitlement was 5.6 weeks and, for that purpose, a week was described as “the equivalent of the number of hours/days usually worked per week” – see part 2 clause 6.1;
once the Appellant had been employed for a minimum of three months, if the Appellant’s father were to be admitted into hospital, the Appellant would be paid 100% of his standard contracted hours for a maximum of four weeks in any twelve–month period from 1 April to 31 March – see part 2 clause 11;2; and
the Appellant agreed that:
in times of emergency, he might agree to work additional paid hours as agreed with the employer; and
for the purposes of the Working Time Regulations 1998, he would work for longer than the maximum weekly working time limit of 48 hours when necessary for the requirements of the employment
– see the working hours opt–out schedule.
- Heading
- Introduction
- The FTT Decision
- The UT Decision
- Introduction to the issues
- issue one – the principal private residence exemption
- The legislation
- dwelling–house as his only or main residence
- where the accommodation is provided for the better performance of the duties of the employment, and it is one of the
- No part of a gain to which section 222 applies shall be a chargeable gain if the dwelling–house or part of a dwelling–house has been the individual's
- “The application of section 222(8) is to be determined by the FTT in relation to all four
- The reconsideration shall be on the basis of the findings of primary fact made in the
- Findings of fact in the FTT Decision
- The documentary evidence
- The medical evidence
- The contract of employment
- The Appellant’s email
- The photographs
- The Appellant’s evidence
- Mrs Campbell’s evidence
- Officer Weir’s evidence
- Our impression of the witnesses
- Our findings of fact
- we have reached the following relevant findings of fact for the purposes of this decision
- Was it necessary for the Appellant to stay in his parent’s home in order to provide care to his father
- The Appellant’s intention to occupy
- Concluding comments in relation to our findings of fact
- Discussion
- By reason of employment
- “There are many decisions on the meaning of “by reason of employment” including in particular Wicks v Firth 56 TC 318. In John Charman v HMRC [2021] EWCA Civ 1804 (“ Charman ”) the Court of Appeal sai
- There was little, if any, dispute between the parties as to the correct test to be applied to determine whether an interest is acquired “by reason of” employment. It is not necessary for HMRC to show
- In Charman , The Court of Appeal emphasised that the FTT’s evaluation of this issue can only be challenged on appeal on limited grounds, at [46]
- There are numerous other authorities to the same effect On 25 October 2023, the Supreme Court released its decision in HMRC v Vermilion
- “If one approaches the question by asking, as suggested by Oliver LJ in Wicks v Firth , what it was that enabled Mr Campbell to enjoy the ability to reside in the family home, we do consider that the
- Necessary for the performance of the duties of the employment
- The Intention Condition
- Conclusion
- issue two – the penalties
- The legislation
- The terms of the remittance
- “ We instruct the FTT to determine, by way of oral hearing (either in person or remote)
- The reconsideration shall be on the basis of the findings of primary fact made in the
- Findings of fact in the FTT Decision
- The evidence
- The correspondence
- The explanation of the Penalties
- The witness evidence
- Our findings of fact
- Discussion
- Reasonable excuse
- – see the UT decision in Perrin v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2018] UKUT 156 (TCC) (“ Perrin ”) at paragraphs [81] to [83]
- Special circumstances
- Conclusions
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