Appellant
Appellant
The First-tier Tribunal’s error is disclosed in paragraph 147 of its reasons. While the Tribunal was not required to take into account the private interests of requestors that do not accord with the public interest in general, it was required to take into account the public interest of parents as members of the public. The Tribunal failed to take into account that the public interest in parents seeing sex education materials must be given significant weight which follows from Parliament’s special treatment of parents regarding sex education for their children.
The First-tier Tribunal failed to recognise the ongoing public interest of parents after sex education has been provided (paragraph 153). The fact that, at the point at which the Appellant made her request for information, her daughter could not have been withdrawn from the SoSE Session (it had already taken place), did not mean that she ceased to have a legitimate interest in her daughter’s sex education.
The First-tier Tribunal further erred by taking into account SoSE’s purported commitment to show the Slides to the Appellant when the evidence disclosed that no offer was put to the Appellant, by either the school or SoSE. All that was communicated to the Appellant regarding SoSE’s position was a false accusation of harassment.
The First-tier Tribunal erred by failing to take into account, or give sufficient weight to, evidence that the so-called ‘run through’ of the Slides would not allow a parent to rely on the material displayed to make a complaint to the school or OFSTED, nor have meaningful discussions with their child.
In all the circumstances, the First-tier Tribunal wrongly concluded that the weight to be accorded to a commercial confidentiality interest outweighed the interests of parents in being able to know what is being taught in schools. Even if the Slides were confidential (not conceded), the public interest was clearly in favour of disclosure. An exceptional case is not required in order to override a duty of confidence that would otherwise exist (London Regional Transport v Mayor of London [2001] EWCA Civ 1491; [2003] EMLR 88). The recognised test is whether there is a public interest in disclosure which overrides the competing public interest in maintaining the duty of confidence. In this respect, there is a strong public interest in ensuring that public authorities are transparent, accountable and open to scrutiny. These considerations are of particular public importance in the context of children’s education given the need to safeguard children from inappropriate materials and the statutory obligations under sections 406 and 407 of EA 1996 to provide non-partisan teaching. A mechanism must exist for parents, and the public, to keep materials under review and holds providers of such materials to account. The Tribunal failed to afford sufficient weight to this consideration. The need for accountability and transparency is ‘compounded’ in the case of sex education given the right of parents to withdraw children “in part” from such education.
The First-tier Tribunal accepted that there was a very strong public interest in curriculum and lesson materials on sex education being shared with parents in advance so that they may make an informed decision as to whether to withdraw their children, in whole or in part (paragraph 153). However, it went on to hold that, as the Session had already taken place, that public interest no longer applied. In this respect, the Tribunal failed to appreciate that SoSE presumably intended to present the Session at other schools, and that post-Session receipt of the Materials would enable parents thoroughly to discuss the subject matter with the children. These factors meant that the public interest remained ‘live’.
The First-tier Tribunal also accepted a “particularly strong public interest in parents having access to teaching materials” (paragraph 156). However, it went on erroneously to conclude that the public interest would be served by the availability of a ‘run through’ of the Slides despite having acknowledged that this would not be convenient for all parents, and that taking copies of the Slides home would enable more detailed parent/child discussions and make it easier to make a complaint (paragraph 158). Given the Tribunal’s acceptance of some ‘residual public interest’ not served by a run-through (paragraph 158), it was surprising that it went on to rule against disclosure, a ruling which further undermined its conclusion that the balance of public interests favoured preserving confidentiality.
The First-tier Tribunal failed to take into account that the Appellant’s formal complaint about the School was, in part successful, and led to changes in practice. This undermined the Tribunal’s public interest analysis.
- Heading
- Introduction
- Secretary of State for Education’s involvement in these proceedings
- Factual background
- Appellant’s interaction with the School / Trust before she made her FOIA request
- Informing Parents
- Discussions between the School / Trust and SoSE about access to the Slides
- Appellant’s concerns about, and interaction with, SoSE
- Evidence about the potential determent for SoSE were the Slides to be disclosed
- The outcome of the Appellant’s complaint about the School
- The School of Sexuality Education
- Failure to be transparent about lessons taught to children
- The Appellant’s FOIA request
- identities of SoSE staff were withheld under section 40 FOIA (personal information)
- The Information Commissioner’s decision
- The Commissioner’s decision notice (ref. IC-171936-C9H8)
- was not trivial and had the necessary quality of confidence
- any reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the Trust, should have realised attracted an obligation of confidence
- First-tier Tribunal’s decision
- The Appellant’s arguments
- the Commissioner erred in holding that the Slides could be withheld in reliance upon s.41 of the FOIA the Commissioner erred in holding that the identities of SoSE’s facilitators were exempt as personal data; and
- Whether section 405 of EA 1996 carries an implied obligation to provide parents with sex education teaching materials: Ground 1
- The law of confidence
- Disclosing identities of SoSE facilitators
- Observations on the Appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal
- The First-tier Tribunal’s decision
- Section 41 FOIA / law of confidence: disclosure of the Slides
- Section 40 FOIA: disclosure of identities of SoSE’s facilitators
- the legitimate interest was not simply ‘knowing who is teaching her child sex education’ (paragraph 168)
- in relation to the Appellant’s particular legitimate interests
- Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled—
- if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.”
- Information accessible by other means
- Personal information
- Information is exempt information if—
- “First, the information itself, in the words of Lord Greene, M.R. in [ Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd. (1948) 65 R.P.C. 203] on page 215, must “have the necessary quality
- “Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party communicating it”
- Commissioner’s guidance about section 41 of FOIA
- Education
- sex education comprised in the National Curriculum
- Statutory Guidance
- “typical policies are likely to include sections covering…
- subjects. Schools should ensure that parents know what will be taught and when, and
- of Relationships Education and RSE. Good communication and opportunities for parents
- sex education delivered as part of statutory RSE. Before granting any such request it
- or visiting organisation’s credentials. Schools should also ensure that the teaching
- the second conditions the way in which the State provides education
- Copyright
- Grounds of appeal and arguments
- Ground 1 – whether section 405 EA 1996 imposes an implied obligations to provide information
- Appellant
- The Commissioner
- Ground 2 – Tribunal’s assessment of the law of confidence, and application of section 41 of FOIA
- Appellant: principles of the law of confidentiality
- disclosure of the information in question would constitute a breach of confidence, contrary to the principles expounded in Coco v Clark ; and
- UKUT 313 (AAC) at [38]. For this purpose, the test is one of proportionality: HRH The Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Limited [2008] Ch 57 at [67] and [69])
- the information must be inaccessible (Arnold LJ in The Racing Partnership Ltd & Ors v Sports Information Services Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 1300 , [2021] Ch. 233 at [48]), and “the claimant…must demonstrate
- the information must be worthy of confidentiality by virtue of a quality central to it, which is of particular relevance where component parts, but not the information itself, may be in the public dom
- the industry/sphere in which the parties operate may be relevant because “whether information should be treated as confidential will be judged in the light of the usage and practices of the particular
- Appellant: First-tier Tribunal’s application of the law
- SoSE published a book in September 2021 Sex Ed: An Inclusive Teenage Guide to Sex and Relationships . The book was in the public domain at the date of the Appellant’s FOIA request and contained a chap
- The Commissioner
- assuming the Appellant is correct that the Slides drew on a variety of sources, and included information replicated in the public domain, it does not follow that the Slides did not merit protection un
- the argument that the First-tier Tribunal (and previously the Commissioner) confused confidentiality and copyright is misplaced. The law of confidence often looks to the originality of information in
- SoSE
- Appellant
- Commissioner
- SoSE
- Appellant
- Commissioner
- Ground 5
- Appellant
- Commissioner
- Ground 6
- Appellant
- failed to take into account the primacy of parental rights to determine what education their child receives
- expectations of privacy) against the public interest in disclosure (see AB v A Chief Constable [2014] EWHC 1965 (QB) at [75]). A question to be asked is whether an individual had a reasonable expectat
- is the data controller, or third parties to whom data is disclosed, pursuing a legitimate interest?
- is the processing unwarranted because the legitimate interests are outweighed by the rights and freedoms of the data subject? The Commissioner submits that this is a balancing exercise to be applied s
- SoSE
- Proceedings before the Upper Tribunal
- Additional evidence
- Hearing
- The Upper Tribunal’s analysis
- Ground 1
- The First-tier Tribunal’s analysis
- Section 405 EA 1996 : Upper Tribunal’s analysis
- Ground 2
- The Appellant’s case on the law of confidence before the First-tier Tribunal
- Whether disclosure would constitute an actionable breach of confidence: matters of fact and law
- Determination of Ground 2: analysis
- the Appellant criticises the Tribunal for failing properly to consider whether the first condition in Coco v Clark was met (information must have the necessary quality of confidence), and simply assum
- the Appellant submits that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that disclosure of the information within the Slides at the Session destroyed any confidentiality they might previously have possessed. The
- Ground 2: conclusion
- Ground 3
- Ground 4
- Ground 5
- Ground 6
- the balance of interests fell plainly in favour of disclosing identities of the SoSE facilitators (notice of appeal)
- Conclusions
![[2025] UKUT 308 (AAC)](https://backend.juristeca.com/files/emisores/logo_3a2BKne.png)