[2025] UKUT 00185 (TCC)
Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber

[2025] UKUT 00185 (TCC)

Fecha: 09-Abr-2025

The corporate veil

The corporate veil

514.

The issue discussed at [47] is that the Judge had found support for her (incorrect) view by reference to one of the purposes for which s 382 had been introduced. Taking it in stages:

(1)

Where a company is carrying on investment business in an unlawful manner, a customer’s right of action lies against the company: that is the effect of the corporate veil.

(2)

Where a company has no assets, that right of action is worthless.

(3)

In that situation, s 382 allows regulators to issue a restitution order so as to require the directors personally to pay compensation; in other words, it allows the corporate veil to be pierced.

(4)

Such an order can only be made if the director is “knowingly concerned” in the company’s breach. In other words, being “knowingly concerned” is a precondition for the making of a restitution order.

515.

Snowden LJ said that if the Judge were to be correct, restitution orders could be made against those who were simply “aware of the actions that their company was taking in the course of its business”, and the Judge was plainly wrong to have come to that conclusion. Instead, breaching the corporate veil by issuing a restitution order requires that the company is being used “as a sham or façade for the purposes of some fraud”.

516.

The passage on which Mr Pritchard relied therefore does not change the meaning of “knowingly concerned” from that which had already been set out earlier in Ferreira. Instead, the passage states that a restitution order can only be made if a person is both knowingly concerned andthe company is being used as a sham or façade for wrongdoing. In the case of the Applicants, the Authority have not sought a restitution order, so the passage is of no relevance.