The PRA and capital requirements
The PRA and capital requirements
In relation to its compliance with prudential regulation and supervision, the Bank is, and was at the time, regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority (“the PRA”), part of the Bank of England. The PRA’s role is to promote the safety and soundness of the firms it regulates, focusing primarily on the harm that firms can cause to the stability of the UK financial system.
At the relevant time, the UK had adopted the EU’s prudential rules, in accordance with the Capital Requirements Regulation No. 575/2013 (“the CRR”) and the Capital Requirements Directive 2013/36/EU (“the CRD”). Banks were required to satisfy the requirements of the three Pillars in the CRD as follows.
Pillar 1 set out the minimum capital requirements firms were required to meet for credit, market and operational risk; these requirements were binding in nature.
Pillar 2 related to the supervisory review process, and required the PRA to take a view on whether a firm needed to hold additional capital to protect against risks not adequately covered in Pillar 1. A firm’s Pillar 2 requirements therefore involved supervisory judgment and depended on the circumstances of the individual firm.
As part of the Pillar 2 requirements, banks were required to carry out Internal Capital Adequacy Assessments (“ICAAP”), while the PRA carried out a supervisory review and evaluation process, which included consideration of the bank’s ICAAP.
The PRA could impose a Pillar 2A capital requirement so as to cover risks which were (a) not adequately addressed by the Pillar 1 requirements and/or (b) not addressed at all under Pillar 1. Pillar 2A requirements varied from bank to bank, and a bank’s combined Pillar 1 and Pillar 2A requirements represented its total capital requirement.
In somecases, the above “standardised” approach to calculating Pillar 1 capital requirements overestimated the overall level of capital required, given the risks of the particular bank. Any overcapitalisation in the calculation of Pillar 1 requirements might be used to reduce a bank’s Pillar 2A requirements; this was called the “unders/overs principle”. The PRA set out its approach to allowing that type of offset in a Policy Statement issued in October 2017, known by its reference number PS22/17.
The PRA also determined each bank’s Pillar 2B requirement: this was the amount of additional capital a bank had to maintain in order to absorb losses that might arise in a severe but plausible stress scenario.
Pillar 3 related to market discipline: firms were required to publish certain details of their risks, capital and risk management in order to improve market discipline. Those details included each banks’ Pillar 1 and 2A requirements, but not Pillar 2B.
A bank had to meet a minimum “capital ratio”, being the amount of its regulatory capital divided by its RWAs. Regulatory capital is the sum of its ordinary shares, retained earnings, perpetual subordinated debt instruments and unsecured subordinated debt. RWAs are a bank’s assets and credit exposures, weighted (i.e. multiplied by a percentage factor) according to the potential to suffer loss. Safer assets were attributed a lower allocation of capital, while riskier assets were given a higher risk weight. In other words, the riskier its assets, the more capital a bank had to set aside in relation to the risk of loss.
One of the types of risk which a bank had to consider was “credit risk”, namely the risk that a borrower fails to repay a loan. There were two approaches to calculating RWAs for credit risk:
A standardised approach, under which banks allocated a prescribed risk weight percentage to their assets.
An internal ratings-based (“IRB”) approach, under which banks used their own internal models for calculating the credit risk in their portfolios (i.e. using internal estimates of borrower creditworthiness), but with certain risk parameters determined by the PRA. The advanced internal ratings-based (“AIRB”) approach allowed a bank to estimate those risk parameters.
The IRB/AIRB approach could result in lower capital requirements, but Article 143(1) of the CRR provided that it could only be used if the PRA had given permission. At the relevant time, the Bank used the standardised approach for the calculation of its RWAs, but was hoping to move to an IRB or AIRB approach.
For financial institutions using the standardised approach to credit risk, such as the Bank, Article 112 of the CRR set out the different asset or exposure classes and the risk weights to be assigned to each. The risk weighting requirements in that Article were directly applicable in the UK, so the PRA did not have the discretion to amend them.
Article 501 of the CRR related to small and medium sized businesses (“SMEs”) and was headed “Capital requirements deduction for credit risk on exposures to SMEs”; it was commonly referred to as “the SME supporting factor”, and included the following provisions:
“1. Capital requirements for credit risk on exposures to SMEs shall be multiplied by the factor 0,7619.
2. For the purpose of this Article:
(a) the exposure shall be included either in the retail or in the corporates or secured by mortgages on immovable property classes. Exposures in default shall be excluded;
(b) an SME is defined in accordance with Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Among the criteria listed in Article 2 of the Annex to that Recommendation only the annual turnover shall be taken into account;
(c) the total amount owed to the institution and parent undertakings and its subsidiaries, including any exposure in default, by the obligor client or group of connected clients, but excluding claims or contingent claims secured on residential property collateral, shall not, to the knowledge of the institution, exceed EUR 1,5 million. The institution shall take reasonable steps to acquire this knowledge.”
- Heading
- Introduction
- The jurisdiction of the Tribunal
- The burden and standard of proof
- The PRA and capital requirements
- The Bank’s lending
- CRE loans
- CLIP loans
- PBTL loans
- COREP reporting
- The Authority
- Listing Rule 1.3.3R
- The MAR
- The evidence
- Approach to the evidence
- Mr Arden
- Mr Donaldson
- Ms Gillan
- Ms Roberts
- Mr Somers and Mr Dransfield
- Mr Sutherland
- Mr Lane
- Mr Brierley
- Individuals who were not called as witnesses
- Findings of fact
- The early years
- Linklaters
- Key personnel during the period from March 2018
- Relationship with the PRA and the Authority
- 2016 and 2017
- The COREP audit and the CRE loans
- Mr Arden, the Board and the committees
- KPMG appointed
- April to June 2018
- July 2018
- The 2018 capital raise and half year results
- August 2018: PBTL and CLIP
- Communicating with the PRA
- KPMG decision trees
- PBTL classification
- Annual Review of Commercial Lending
- September Audit Committee
- September NEDs meeting
- September Board meeting
- Engagement of Deloitte
- Internal work in support
- Communications with the PRA
- Meeting with Linklaters
- Disclosure Committee meeting
- Mr Somers’ email
- Meetings with Mr Hill and Mr Bernau
- The October CRPAC meeting
- RWA Report
- Business and Commercial Lending
- The October Audit Committee meeting
- The Q3 Update
- Accounting, reporting and control report
- The October ROC meeting
- Chief Risk Officer’s Report
- The RWA Report
- Business and Commercial Lending Review
- The October Board meeting
- Linklaters Governance Update
- Audit Committee Update
- The Q3 Update
- 2019 Budget Paper
- Whether the RWA issue was discussed
- Chief Risk Officer’s Report
- Response to PSM Letter
- The Q3 Update and analyst calls
- Deloitte’s reports
- Discussions with Linklaters
- Discussions with the PRA and the January announcement
- Subsequently
- The PRA
- The Authority
- Mr Donaldson’s and Mr Arden’s careers
- The common ground
- The Parties’ cases
- The Authority’s case
- The Applicants’ case
- ISSUE ONE: WHETHER THE BANK BREACHED LR 1.3.3R
- The PRA and the COREP Returns
- Findings of fact
- The Applicants’ position
- The Tribunal’s view
- The PRA and confidentiality
- Findings of fact
- The Applicants’ position
- The Authority’s position
- The Tribunal’s view
- Mr Lane’s advice
- Findings of fact not in dispute
- Who was at the meeting
- How long was the meeting
- Linklaters’ practice when giving advice
- Knowledge of the impending Q3 Update
- What was said by Mr Arden at the meeting
- Confidential matter?
- The Tribunal’s finding
- The purpose of the meeting
- Reasonable to rely?
- Overall conclusion on legal advice
- No breach if uncertain and under investigation?
- Mr Jaffey’s submissions
- Mr Stanley’s submissions
- The Tribunal’s view
- No material breach if unknown
- The knowledge issue
- Key findings already made
- The Authority’s overall position on the knowledge issue
- The Applicants’ overall position on the knowledge issue
- Rules on classification
- Data issues
- Nature of the data issues
- Extent of the data issues
- Effect on materiality
- SME supporting factor
- Residential property
- Conclusion on data issues
- The mitigants overall
- The AIRB application
- Pillar 2A Offset
- Submissions
- Findings of fact
- Conclusion on Pillar 2A offset
- Phasing in
- PRA discretion
- Taking all the above into account
- Overall conclusion on the Knowledge Issue
- The PBTL Loans
- Findings of fact
- Submissions and the Tribunal’s view
- Whether the alternatives were unreasonable
- The Applicants’ position
- The Authority’s submissions
- The Tribunal’s view
- Reliance on the board and the Committees
- Findings of fact
- September
- October Audit Committee
- October ROC meeting
- October Board meeting
- The position of the parties
- The Tribunal’s view
- The Audit Committee
- The Board
- Reliance on Ms James
- Findings of fact
- Submissions
- Discussion
- Overall conclusion on Issue one
- The legal principles
- The statutory provisions
- Burton v Bevan
- Scandex
- Capital Alternatives
- Avacade
- Ferreira
- Submissions on Ferreira
- The words of the provision
- The ratio of Ferreira
- The corporate veil
- Forster: meaning of “knowingly concerned”
- Forster: reliance on legal advice
- The Applicants’ submissions
- The Authority’s submissions
- The Tribunal’s view
- The principles summarised and the issues remaining
- Mr Arden
- Mr Donaldson
- The position of the parties
- The Tribunal’s view
- ISSUE THREE: PENALTIES
- The Tribunal’s approach
- The DEPP
- The Authority’s position
- The Applicants’ position
- The Tribunal’s view
- The penalty framework
- Applying the Steps
- Step 2(1)-(3): Earnings
- The Tribunal’s view
- Step 2(4)-(7): Seriousness
- Step 3: Mitigation
- DEPP
- Submissions and discussion
- Co-operation
- Remediation
- Compliance with the PRA’s requirements
- Communications with the Authority
- No negative factors
- Other consequences
- Difference between the Applicants?
- Conclusions
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