Competition from products outside the relevant market
Competition from products outside the relevant market
The next question is whether there is evidence of significant competitive constraints on LOL Surprise from products outside the markets used for the market share analysis. Leaving aside the submissions on the materiality of the distinction between products with a single and multiple layers of surprise, which is addressed with the extended Colley market analysis, Mr Parker contended that Barbie in particular competitively constrained LOL Surprise. The evidence on this point was, however, largely discredited at the trial. Mr Parker attempted to address this in his brand-by-brand revenue analysis in his eighth and ninth reports, which I have described above at §215. That listed Barbie as being a close substitute for LOL Surprise, at least during 2018. Mr Parker eventually conceded, however, that this analysis was unreliable (see §§240–241).
Mr Parker also relied on the evidence of MGA’s toy expert Mr Harper to the effect that Barbie and LOL Surprise were competitors. Mr Harper’s assessment was, however, based on little more than the observation that the two products appeal to the same target audience, a point picked up in a 2018 internal MGA study. Ms Munt agreed that girls might own both brands and play with them together. She nevertheless took the view (in both her written and oral evidence) that collectibles such as LOL Surprise and fashion dolls such as Barbie have very different product features and play patterns, such that they should not be regarded as substitutable. Ms Munt’s reasoning was, in my judgment, more solidly based than that of Mr Harper.
MGA also relied on internal MGA emails comparing sales of LOL Surprise with other brands, including Barbie, and a comment from Mr Larian “Let’s crush that bitch like we did in 2005 once and for all”. That reflects Mr Larian’s continuing rivalry with Mattel, but does not come close to showing that Barbie acted as an “immediate and effective” competitive constraint on LOL Surprise.
MGA’s closing submissions eventually said little more than that Barbie and LOL Surprise “have a competitive interaction”. What MGA conspicuously did not say was that the closeness of the constraint was such that MGA could not be regarded as dominant in relation to the supply of LOL Surprise. This illustrates the importance of drawing a distinction between products that are close competitors of the focal product, and products for which there is some competitive interaction but which could not realistically be regarded as a sufficiently close substitute that they would constrain the market conduct of the supplier of the focal product. There was undoubtedly a degree of competitive interaction between LOL Surprise and Barbie, and indeed other products which were not in Mr Colley’s product market such as My Little Pony. That does not, however, mean that those products acted as effective competitive constraints on LOL Surprise: there was no evidence that they did so, or were likely to have done so by virtue of their characteristics.
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE EVIDENCE OF FACT
- MGA’s witnesses of fact
- Mr Larian’s breaches of purdah
- THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
- The economic and valuation experts: preliminary comments
- Assessment of the economic and valuation evidence
- The Decision Tree Model (DTM)
- ISSUES
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- The UK toy industry
- Table 1: NPD dolls classifications
- MGA and LOL Surprise
- Section 14
- The founding of Cabo and development of Worldeez
- Section 16
- The initial marketing of Worldeez
- Discussions with the launch retailers
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- Other retailers
- MGA’s intervention
- Contacts with Cabo and Singleton
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- B&M and other retailers
- AB Gee
- Worldeez repackaging and relaunch
- Launch of Worldeez globe in B&M
- Decline in B&M sales after August 2017
- Sales to other retailers
- Licensing and international distribution
- Nickelodeon advertising
- Demise of Cabo
- PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
- ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CLAIM
- The relevant market definition
- The parties’ submissions
- Mr Colley’s approach
- Mr Parker’s approach
- Section 44
- Conclusions on market definition
- Whether MGA was dominant on the relevant market
- The parties’ submissions
- Table 2: 2017 market shares for Colley and Parker markets (%)
- Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
- Table 4: 2017 market shares for extended Colley market (%)
- Market shares
- Figure 1: Colley diagram of 2017 MGA and competitor market shares
- Competition from products outside the relevant market
- Barriers to entry and expansion
- Countervailing buyer power
- MGA’s conduct
- Conclusions on dominance
- Whether MGA’s conduct amounted to an abuse
- The parties’ submissions
- The overall exclusionary campaign
- MGA’s “response to commercial attack” argument
- MGA’s passing off defence
- Section 63
- Conclusion on abuse of dominance
- UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS CLAIM
- Agreements with the toy traders
- Discussion and conclusions
- Anticompetitive object or effect
- Discussion and conclusions
- Exemption under the VBER
- Scope of the VBER
- Market share threshold
- Excluded restrictions
- Conclusion on the VBER
- Exemption under s. 9 / Article 101(3)
- Conclusion on the unlawful agreements claim
- PATENT THREATS CLAIM
- Threats of patent infringement proceedings
- The parties’ submissions
- Discussion
- “Person aggrieved”
- Conclusion on the patent threats claim
- CAUSATION AND QUANTUM
- Legal principles
- Quantification of the loss
- The approach to claims for lost profits
- Conclusions on the overarching approach
- Causative effect of MGA’s conduct
- Actionable damage and causation: Cabo’s heads of loss
- Whether Cabo would have traded profitably in the counterfactual case
- Product quality
- Section 92
- Marketing campaign
- Retailer support
- Business plan/financial projections
- Inventory management
- Working capital
- Toy expert evidence on commercial success
- Breakeven analysis
- Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017
- International sales
- Conclusions on whether Cabo would have traded profitably
- The parties’ quantum models
- Mr Colley’s quantum models
- Table 6: Cabo calculations of losses (£m)
- Assessment of Mr Colley’s models
- Mr Parker’s quantum models
- Table 7: MGA calculations of losses (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s significant success model
- Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s moderate success model
- Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)
- Conclusions on the quantum models
- DECLARATORY RELIEF
- Conclusions
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