Demise of Cabo
Demise of Cabo
By September 2017 Singleton was not willing to commit to significant further spending for further stock or marketing. Mr Sivner and Mr Lazarus were trying to recoup Singleton’s loans from any funds received by Cabo, and were exploring options to extricate themselves from the business. On 20 September, without discussion with the Cabo founders, they had a meeting with the toy company Creata to discuss the possibility of Creata taking over production and international distribution of Worldeez, with an option to buy out the brand. When that offer was (some days later) communicated to the Cabo founders, they rejected it. Mr Cohen’s only explanation for this in his evidence was that he thought that they “wanted to cling on” to the product.
There was, nevertheless, by then no consensus between the Cabo founders and Singleton on how the Cabo business was going to be funded and managed going forward. This was apparent from a September 2017 document with notes prepared by Mr Michaelson and Mr Cohen for a meeting with Mr Sivner, setting out a litany of complaints by the Cabo founders regarding Singleton’s participation in the business. The comments in that document made clear that the Cabo founders blamed Singleton for mismanaging the distribution of Worldeez, and felt that Mr Sivner and Mr Lazarus were being unrealistic in their expectations of profitability, were charging Cabo for sums not previously agreed, and were being too pessimistic about the future of the product.
On 6 December 2017, Avrom Bishop, Singleton’s finance director, emailed Mr Cohen, informing him that Cabo’s balance stood at £700 and that any money coming in had been directed to Singleton. The Cabo founders nevertheless continued to explore options for the continuation of the Worldeez. In a WhatApp conversation with the Cabo founders, the Cabo licensing agent Russell Dever reported on discussions regarding a retailer rollout programme for 2018, including the launch of seasons two and three of the product. A new potential packaging design (with a tube rather than a globe) was discussed, and a sample presented at a meeting with Mr Sivner and Mr Lazarus in April 2018. Mr Singleton and Mr Lazarus were, however, by then no longer enthusiastic. Mr Lazarus said in his evidence that he had already started to lose interest by that point, and was focused on not losing further money. As he put it, “I was checked out of the project at this point”. He and Mr Sivner therefore decided not to invest further in Worldeez.
On 14 May 2018 Mr Bishop emailed the Cabo founders to say that Singleton was unwilling to put any further money into Cabo, that it would exercise a lien on the stock and bank account, and that Mr Sivner and Mr Lazarus would not have any further involvement in the company. That effectively marked the end of the Cabo founders’ relationship with Singleton. What the Cabo founders did not know at the time (and did not discover until later in the year) was that on 9 May 2018 Mr Sivner and Mr Lazarus’ other company Sinco had agreed a merchandising and licensing agreement with MGA, which entitled Sinco to sell LOL branded watches and jewellery. That was no doubt a trigger for the decision by Mr Sivner and Mr Lazarus to cut ties with Cabo.
On 12 July 2019, the Cabo founders agreed to pay Singleton £52,496.00 in full settlement of Singleton’s claimed outstanding debt to the company of £361,918.75, and Mr Sivner and Mr Lazarus sold their shares in Cabo to the Cabo founders for a total of £504. Mr Lazarus resigned as a Cabo director, and in his place Mrs Michaelson and Mr and Mrs Cohen were appointed as directors.
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE EVIDENCE OF FACT
- MGA’s witnesses of fact
- Mr Larian’s breaches of purdah
- THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
- The economic and valuation experts: preliminary comments
- Assessment of the economic and valuation evidence
- The Decision Tree Model (DTM)
- ISSUES
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- The UK toy industry
- Table 1: NPD dolls classifications
- MGA and LOL Surprise
- Section 14
- The founding of Cabo and development of Worldeez
- Section 16
- The initial marketing of Worldeez
- Discussions with the launch retailers
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- Other retailers
- MGA’s intervention
- Contacts with Cabo and Singleton
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- B&M and other retailers
- AB Gee
- Worldeez repackaging and relaunch
- Launch of Worldeez globe in B&M
- Decline in B&M sales after August 2017
- Sales to other retailers
- Licensing and international distribution
- Nickelodeon advertising
- Demise of Cabo
- PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
- ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CLAIM
- The relevant market definition
- The parties’ submissions
- Mr Colley’s approach
- Mr Parker’s approach
- Section 44
- Conclusions on market definition
- Whether MGA was dominant on the relevant market
- The parties’ submissions
- Table 2: 2017 market shares for Colley and Parker markets (%)
- Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
- Table 4: 2017 market shares for extended Colley market (%)
- Market shares
- Figure 1: Colley diagram of 2017 MGA and competitor market shares
- Competition from products outside the relevant market
- Barriers to entry and expansion
- Countervailing buyer power
- MGA’s conduct
- Conclusions on dominance
- Whether MGA’s conduct amounted to an abuse
- The parties’ submissions
- The overall exclusionary campaign
- MGA’s “response to commercial attack” argument
- MGA’s passing off defence
- Section 63
- Conclusion on abuse of dominance
- UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS CLAIM
- Agreements with the toy traders
- Discussion and conclusions
- Anticompetitive object or effect
- Discussion and conclusions
- Exemption under the VBER
- Scope of the VBER
- Market share threshold
- Excluded restrictions
- Conclusion on the VBER
- Exemption under s. 9 / Article 101(3)
- Conclusion on the unlawful agreements claim
- PATENT THREATS CLAIM
- Threats of patent infringement proceedings
- The parties’ submissions
- Discussion
- “Person aggrieved”
- Conclusion on the patent threats claim
- CAUSATION AND QUANTUM
- Legal principles
- Quantification of the loss
- The approach to claims for lost profits
- Conclusions on the overarching approach
- Causative effect of MGA’s conduct
- Actionable damage and causation: Cabo’s heads of loss
- Whether Cabo would have traded profitably in the counterfactual case
- Product quality
- Section 92
- Marketing campaign
- Retailer support
- Business plan/financial projections
- Inventory management
- Working capital
- Toy expert evidence on commercial success
- Breakeven analysis
- Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017
- International sales
- Conclusions on whether Cabo would have traded profitably
- The parties’ quantum models
- Mr Colley’s quantum models
- Table 6: Cabo calculations of losses (£m)
- Assessment of Mr Colley’s models
- Mr Parker’s quantum models
- Table 7: MGA calculations of losses (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s significant success model
- Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s moderate success model
- Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)
- Conclusions on the quantum models
- DECLARATORY RELIEF
- Conclusions
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