Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
Cost/price model | January 2018 | UK total | International | Total |
MGA cost stack/Parker prices | -83,451 | -243,168 | 1,210,066 | 966,899 |
Cabo cost stack/Cabo prices | 84,578 | 464,658 | 1,882,979 | 2,347,636 |
Cabo cost stack/Parker prices | -8,554 | 114,753 | 1,882,979 | 1,997,731 |
For the reasons discussed above, Mr Parker’s wholesale price assumptions were reasonable and are to be preferred to Cabo’s assumed wholesale price of £1.52. The figures to consider are therefore the first and third rows of Table 8 above. Those figures show that on either Cabo’s or MGA’s cost stack, using Mr Parker’s wholesale price assumptions, even if Worldeez had enjoyed sales of the level of My Little Pony Fash’ems, it would have remained loss-making by January 2018. On Cabo’s cost stack it would have been minimally profitable if it had remained in the UK market in 2018 and beyond, but that would have been unlikely given Singleton’s lack of appetite to support a loss-making business. On MGA’s cost stack it would have been entirely loss-making in the domestic market.
Worldeez’ profitability as indicated by this model. Having addressed Cabo’s criticisms of Mr Parker’s significant success model, and corrected the model in respect of the errors in the cost and revenue assumptions, the final question is what therefore the extent to which Mr Parker’s model of significant success reflected the success which Cabo could reasonably have achieved for Worldeez in the UK and internationally, given that (like Mr Colley) Mr Parker was not qualified to opine on the likely commercial success of Worldeez as a product, on the basis of its product quality taken together with the other factors which are relevant to an assessment of likely commercial success.
The figures set out above therefore overstate the revenues that Cabo could realistically expect to have obtained in the UK, indicating that Cabo would in the counterfactual case have been even more loss-making in the domestic market than is set out in the first and third rows of Table 8 above, rendering it even less likely that Singleton would have been prepared to continue to invest beyond the end of 2017. On either Cabo or MGA’s cost stacks, therefore, Mr Parker’s significant success model indicates that Cabo would have remained loss-making and would have exited the market during 2018.
Mr Parker was therefore right, in my judgment, to disregard UK licensing revenues, on the basis that licensing would have been very unlikely on the levels of sales which his model predicted. Any significant profitability (albeit on a far lower scale than predicted by any of Mr Colley’s scenarios) would therefore have rested on international expansion, and the ability of Cabo to fund that.
As noted above, it was common ground that international revenues would likewise not have materialised if Worldeez was not profitable domestically. In any event, as discussed above, international distribution was not likely to have been viable for Worldeez given Cabo’s cost model and the competition from other similar products.
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE EVIDENCE OF FACT
- MGA’s witnesses of fact
- Mr Larian’s breaches of purdah
- THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
- The economic and valuation experts: preliminary comments
- Assessment of the economic and valuation evidence
- The Decision Tree Model (DTM)
- ISSUES
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- The UK toy industry
- Table 1: NPD dolls classifications
- MGA and LOL Surprise
- Section 14
- The founding of Cabo and development of Worldeez
- Section 16
- The initial marketing of Worldeez
- Discussions with the launch retailers
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- Other retailers
- MGA’s intervention
- Contacts with Cabo and Singleton
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- B&M and other retailers
- AB Gee
- Worldeez repackaging and relaunch
- Launch of Worldeez globe in B&M
- Decline in B&M sales after August 2017
- Sales to other retailers
- Licensing and international distribution
- Nickelodeon advertising
- Demise of Cabo
- PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
- ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CLAIM
- The relevant market definition
- The parties’ submissions
- Mr Colley’s approach
- Mr Parker’s approach
- Section 44
- Conclusions on market definition
- Whether MGA was dominant on the relevant market
- The parties’ submissions
- Table 2: 2017 market shares for Colley and Parker markets (%)
- Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
- Table 4: 2017 market shares for extended Colley market (%)
- Market shares
- Figure 1: Colley diagram of 2017 MGA and competitor market shares
- Competition from products outside the relevant market
- Barriers to entry and expansion
- Countervailing buyer power
- MGA’s conduct
- Conclusions on dominance
- Whether MGA’s conduct amounted to an abuse
- The parties’ submissions
- The overall exclusionary campaign
- MGA’s “response to commercial attack” argument
- MGA’s passing off defence
- Section 63
- Conclusion on abuse of dominance
- UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS CLAIM
- Agreements with the toy traders
- Discussion and conclusions
- Anticompetitive object or effect
- Discussion and conclusions
- Exemption under the VBER
- Scope of the VBER
- Market share threshold
- Excluded restrictions
- Conclusion on the VBER
- Exemption under s. 9 / Article 101(3)
- Conclusion on the unlawful agreements claim
- PATENT THREATS CLAIM
- Threats of patent infringement proceedings
- The parties’ submissions
- Discussion
- “Person aggrieved”
- Conclusion on the patent threats claim
- CAUSATION AND QUANTUM
- Legal principles
- Quantification of the loss
- The approach to claims for lost profits
- Conclusions on the overarching approach
- Causative effect of MGA’s conduct
- Actionable damage and causation: Cabo’s heads of loss
- Whether Cabo would have traded profitably in the counterfactual case
- Product quality
- Section 92
- Marketing campaign
- Retailer support
- Business plan/financial projections
- Inventory management
- Working capital
- Toy expert evidence on commercial success
- Breakeven analysis
- Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017
- International sales
- Conclusions on whether Cabo would have traded profitably
- The parties’ quantum models
- Mr Colley’s quantum models
- Table 6: Cabo calculations of losses (£m)
- Assessment of Mr Colley’s models
- Mr Parker’s quantum models
- Table 7: MGA calculations of losses (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s significant success model
- Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s moderate success model
- Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)
- Conclusions on the quantum models
- DECLARATORY RELIEF
- Conclusions
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