Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
2018 | 2019 | |
Playset dolls & accessories (segment) | 54.9 | 55.1 |
Playset dolls & collectibles (class) | 63 | 60 |
As already explained, the relevant market in this case is the wholesale market. It was common ground that market shares on that market could be derived from the retail market shares, but the experts differed as to what adjustment that would require.
Mr Colley said that the time lag of 2–4 months between placing a wholesale order and delivery to the retailer meant that, in order to assess MGA’s market share on the wholesale market during the main period of the alleged abuse, namely from May to December 2017, it is necessary to consider MGA’s retail share from July 2017 onwards. On that basis, and on Mr Colley’s market definition, MGA’s market share was well above 50%. Cabo’s submission was, therefore, that on a correct market definition and with an appropriate time lag MGA’s market shares were strongly indicative of dominance. Given that MGA’s market shares were even higher in 2018, Cabo said that this showed a position of market power which was sustained and therefore not ephemeral.
Cabo also relied on further factors which in its submission supported the conclusion that MGA was dominant during the relevant period: (i) the fact that the key retailers regarded LOL Surprise as a “must-stock” product during the relevant period, and therefore lacked bargaining power in negotiations with MGA; (ii) the barriers to entry and expansion in the toy market, which Cabo said are high; (iii) MGA’s conduct, which Cabo said was probative of dominance.
MGA’s starting point was that on the basis of Mr Parker’s market definition, MGA’s market shares were not at any point high enough to support a finding of dominance: its highest monthly market share was 26.69% for October 2017. In addition, MGA contended that in order to establish dominance, it is necessary to show a high market share over a sustained period. If MGA’s market share during 2017 were to be calculated using rolling averages for the previous 12-month period, that would give even lower market share figures.
Mr Parker had not applied a wholesale to retail time lag in his market share calculations. At the trial, however, MGA did not seriously dispute the necessity to take account of a time lag, although it said that the better view was that the time lag should be closer to a month on the basis of the factual evidence. On Mr Parker’s market definition that did not make any difference to the conclusion.
As to the other relevant factors, MGA said that barriers to entry were low, and that there was countervailing buyer power from strong retailers. Mr Parker’s view was that being a “must stock” product added nothing to the market share assessment. MGA’s conduct was, in MGA’s submission, simply an example of relative bargaining power: that LOL Surprise was simply more attractive than Worldeez, such that retailers preferred to stock LOL Surprise when given a choice.
In relation to the court’s request, after the trial, for the parties to provide estimated market shares for the extended Colley market described at §253 above, the parties agreed that a robust calculation would need evidence from the industry experts to identify the additional collectible toys to include in that market. As a proxy, BRG (instructed by MGA) added into Mr Colley’s market all toys in brands identified by Ms Munt as “surprise collectible brands”, whether or not the specific toys had a surprise element or not, and also added all toys in the playset dolls and accessories subsegment with a name indicating a surprise element (i.e. products containing the words “mystery”, “surprise” or “blind” in their names).
Cabo objected that these additions were too wide, because they included toys which did not have any surprise element, as well as toys falling under the playset doll accessories subclass which were therefore categorised as accessories rather than dolls. Cornerstone Research (instructed by Cabo) therefore provided an alternative calculation that was limited to the addition of toys in the playset dolls and collectibles class, with product names indicating a surprise element.
The two sets of market share figures produced on these bases were as follows:
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE EVIDENCE OF FACT
- MGA’s witnesses of fact
- Mr Larian’s breaches of purdah
- THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
- The economic and valuation experts: preliminary comments
- Assessment of the economic and valuation evidence
- The Decision Tree Model (DTM)
- ISSUES
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- The UK toy industry
- Table 1: NPD dolls classifications
- MGA and LOL Surprise
- Section 14
- The founding of Cabo and development of Worldeez
- Section 16
- The initial marketing of Worldeez
- Discussions with the launch retailers
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- Other retailers
- MGA’s intervention
- Contacts with Cabo and Singleton
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- B&M and other retailers
- AB Gee
- Worldeez repackaging and relaunch
- Launch of Worldeez globe in B&M
- Decline in B&M sales after August 2017
- Sales to other retailers
- Licensing and international distribution
- Nickelodeon advertising
- Demise of Cabo
- PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
- ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CLAIM
- The relevant market definition
- The parties’ submissions
- Mr Colley’s approach
- Mr Parker’s approach
- Section 44
- Conclusions on market definition
- Whether MGA was dominant on the relevant market
- The parties’ submissions
- Table 2: 2017 market shares for Colley and Parker markets (%)
- Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
- Table 4: 2017 market shares for extended Colley market (%)
- Market shares
- Figure 1: Colley diagram of 2017 MGA and competitor market shares
- Competition from products outside the relevant market
- Barriers to entry and expansion
- Countervailing buyer power
- MGA’s conduct
- Conclusions on dominance
- Whether MGA’s conduct amounted to an abuse
- The parties’ submissions
- The overall exclusionary campaign
- MGA’s “response to commercial attack” argument
- MGA’s passing off defence
- Section 63
- Conclusion on abuse of dominance
- UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS CLAIM
- Agreements with the toy traders
- Discussion and conclusions
- Anticompetitive object or effect
- Discussion and conclusions
- Exemption under the VBER
- Scope of the VBER
- Market share threshold
- Excluded restrictions
- Conclusion on the VBER
- Exemption under s. 9 / Article 101(3)
- Conclusion on the unlawful agreements claim
- PATENT THREATS CLAIM
- Threats of patent infringement proceedings
- The parties’ submissions
- Discussion
- “Person aggrieved”
- Conclusion on the patent threats claim
- CAUSATION AND QUANTUM
- Legal principles
- Quantification of the loss
- The approach to claims for lost profits
- Conclusions on the overarching approach
- Causative effect of MGA’s conduct
- Actionable damage and causation: Cabo’s heads of loss
- Whether Cabo would have traded profitably in the counterfactual case
- Product quality
- Section 92
- Marketing campaign
- Retailer support
- Business plan/financial projections
- Inventory management
- Working capital
- Toy expert evidence on commercial success
- Breakeven analysis
- Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017
- International sales
- Conclusions on whether Cabo would have traded profitably
- The parties’ quantum models
- Mr Colley’s quantum models
- Table 6: Cabo calculations of losses (£m)
- Assessment of Mr Colley’s models
- Mr Parker’s quantum models
- Table 7: MGA calculations of losses (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s significant success model
- Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s moderate success model
- Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)
- Conclusions on the quantum models
- DECLARATORY RELIEF
- Conclusions
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