Toy expert evidence on commercial success
Toy expert evidence on commercial success
Ms Munt considered that there was a high chance (which she put at a 60% chance) that Worldeez would have been a “success”. What she meant by that was explored at the end of her cross-examination. She confirmed that she did not mean a 60% chance that Worldeez would have been profitable, and she candidly accepted that she did not have sufficient experience of the financial and operational side of running a toy business to opine on Cabo’s financial and operational competence. What she meant was “creating a buzz” or “noise” with customers wanting the product and children talking about it. In response to further questions from the court, she said this:
“Q. You are talking about consumer excitement, but you are not saying profitability?
A. I’m not necessarily saying profitability, but I am saying that … that noise …
Q. All right. But if something is successful in your definition, you would include something that wasn’t profitable but had a lot of buzz on social media and sales?
A. Yes.
Q. So when you say 60% chance of success, you mean 60% chance of making a lot of noise and having sales even if not necessarily profitable?
A. Correct.”
I consider that Ms Munt’s evidence on this point was vague and speculative. She did not have any concrete underpinning for her opinion on Cabo’s likely success. Nor was she able to provide any evidence on whether Cabo would in the counterfactual case have been able to turn a product which created a “buzz” in the marketplace (if it did indeed achieve that) into a profitable product.
Mr Harper did, however, give evidence on that point. He explained that even with an innovative product and an effective marketing strategy, success of a new product in the UK is determined by “achieving strong enough financials to deliver a profit, accurate forecasting/inventory management and good retail distribution”, and that strong UK results could then in turn be used to drive international and licensing revenue. His evidence was that Worldeez would not ultimately have been successful in the UK, whatever level of retail distribution it might have achieved.
That view was in part based on his assessment of the quality of the Worldeez product, but also (and importantly) took into account his assessment of Cabo’s marketing strategy and budget, and its overall operational capabilities. Put in percentage terms, Mr Harper estimated that the chances of Cabo securing sufficient sales in its first year in the UK market to secure year two retailer listings were well below 10% and probably as low as 1–3%, and said that this would have been likely to result in a “significant loss”, depending on the inventory commitment. He was not challenged on this latter point, nor was it suggested that he lacked the knowledge and/or experience to make this assessment.
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE EVIDENCE OF FACT
- MGA’s witnesses of fact
- Mr Larian’s breaches of purdah
- THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
- The economic and valuation experts: preliminary comments
- Assessment of the economic and valuation evidence
- The Decision Tree Model (DTM)
- ISSUES
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- The UK toy industry
- Table 1: NPD dolls classifications
- MGA and LOL Surprise
- Section 14
- The founding of Cabo and development of Worldeez
- Section 16
- The initial marketing of Worldeez
- Discussions with the launch retailers
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- Other retailers
- MGA’s intervention
- Contacts with Cabo and Singleton
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- B&M and other retailers
- AB Gee
- Worldeez repackaging and relaunch
- Launch of Worldeez globe in B&M
- Decline in B&M sales after August 2017
- Sales to other retailers
- Licensing and international distribution
- Nickelodeon advertising
- Demise of Cabo
- PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
- ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CLAIM
- The relevant market definition
- The parties’ submissions
- Mr Colley’s approach
- Mr Parker’s approach
- Section 44
- Conclusions on market definition
- Whether MGA was dominant on the relevant market
- The parties’ submissions
- Table 2: 2017 market shares for Colley and Parker markets (%)
- Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
- Table 4: 2017 market shares for extended Colley market (%)
- Market shares
- Figure 1: Colley diagram of 2017 MGA and competitor market shares
- Competition from products outside the relevant market
- Barriers to entry and expansion
- Countervailing buyer power
- MGA’s conduct
- Conclusions on dominance
- Whether MGA’s conduct amounted to an abuse
- The parties’ submissions
- The overall exclusionary campaign
- MGA’s “response to commercial attack” argument
- MGA’s passing off defence
- Section 63
- Conclusion on abuse of dominance
- UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS CLAIM
- Agreements with the toy traders
- Discussion and conclusions
- Anticompetitive object or effect
- Discussion and conclusions
- Exemption under the VBER
- Scope of the VBER
- Market share threshold
- Excluded restrictions
- Conclusion on the VBER
- Exemption under s. 9 / Article 101(3)
- Conclusion on the unlawful agreements claim
- PATENT THREATS CLAIM
- Threats of patent infringement proceedings
- The parties’ submissions
- Discussion
- “Person aggrieved”
- Conclusion on the patent threats claim
- CAUSATION AND QUANTUM
- Legal principles
- Quantification of the loss
- The approach to claims for lost profits
- Conclusions on the overarching approach
- Causative effect of MGA’s conduct
- Actionable damage and causation: Cabo’s heads of loss
- Whether Cabo would have traded profitably in the counterfactual case
- Product quality
- Section 92
- Marketing campaign
- Retailer support
- Business plan/financial projections
- Inventory management
- Working capital
- Toy expert evidence on commercial success
- Breakeven analysis
- Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017
- International sales
- Conclusions on whether Cabo would have traded profitably
- The parties’ quantum models
- Mr Colley’s quantum models
- Table 6: Cabo calculations of losses (£m)
- Assessment of Mr Colley’s models
- Mr Parker’s quantum models
- Table 7: MGA calculations of losses (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s significant success model
- Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s moderate success model
- Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)
- Conclusions on the quantum models
- DECLARATORY RELIEF
- Conclusions
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