HP-2020-000016 - [2025] EWHC 1451 (Ch)
Chancery Division of the High Court

HP-2020-000016 - [2025] EWHC 1451 (Ch)

Fecha: 16-Jun-2025

Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017

Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017

Cost stack/
wholesale prices

Breakeven volumes (all Worldeez)

Globe breakeven volumes

Working capital required (£)

MGA cost stack/£1.20

2,678,431

2,299,050

3,910,679

MGA cost stack/£1.35

1,313,330

1,127,306

2,076,039

MGA cost stack/£1.50

869,948

746,726

1,480,152

Cabo cost stack/£1.20

917,026

787,136

1,273,711

Cabo cost stack/£1.35

686,227

589,027

1,035,955

Cabo cost stack/£1.52

554,009

475,427

938,162

578.

When considering the competing cost stacks, it should be noted that by the end of the trial there remained significant disputes between the parties on numerous points which led to the very different breakeven figures set out above. The disputed issues included not only the wholesale prices and cost of goods, which I have addressed above, but also a dispute as to the payments that would have been due to Nickelodeon had a TV advertising contract been agreed on the basis discussed by Cabo and Nickelodeon. The latter point had a particularly significant effect on the cost figures, because MGA’s contention was that Cabo would have agreed a profit-share contract which provided for Nickelodeon to receive 6.5% of retail revenue less Cabo’s costs of manufacture and distribution, whereas Cabo contended that the agreement would have been for Nickelodeon to receive 6.5% of wholesale revenue less costs. In addition, there were various other disputes on smaller points such as whether Singleton was entitled to a management charge, and the costs of product test, samples and depreciation. It was not, however, possible to assess the impact of any individual specific disputed cost items on the breakeven analysis, because MGA’s calculations were simply provided on the basis of a binary choice between its cost stack and Cabo’s cost stack.

579.

Fortunately, however, that does not matter, because the figures set out above show that even on assumptions favourable to Cabo, Worldeez would have had to be a highly successful product in order to break even during 2017. The evidence does not, however, indicate that Worldeez could have achieved success of that magnitude. In particular:

i)

On Cabo’s cost stack and an average wholesale price for the globe of £1.52 (which I consider to be too high for the reasons set out at §§551–555 above), Cabo would have needed to sell over 475,000 globes during 2017. That translates to an average of over 15,000 globes a week throughout June to December 2017. As described above, even in the immediate aftermath of a hugely successful marketing video with Tiana, resulting in peak sales at B&M during the August summer holiday period, the best that Cabo achieved was sales of around 4,500 a week at B&M. There is no evidence supporting the suggestion that even if Cabo had been on sale in the three main specialist toy retailers, it could have achieved (on average) over treble those sales for the entirety of June to December 2017.

ii)

At a more realistic average wholesale price of £1.35 (see §555 above), and again using Cabo’s cost stack, Cabo would have had to sell over 589,000 globes in 2017, or on average over 19,000 a week, which would have been an even more unattainable figure.

iii)

On any of the assumptions in the table above, Cabo would have needed very considerable capital (i.e. cashflow) funding from Singleton just to break even during 2017. Notwithstanding Mr Sivner’s apparent enthusiasm for Worldeez, and the family ties between Mr Sivner and Mr Michaelson, it is very improbable (particularly considering the evidence set out at §§563–568 above) that Singleton would have committed sums of a million pounds or more just to break even in 2017, let alone the larger capital sums that would have been required to tip the business into profitability.