Smyths
Smyths
Mr Laughton also telephoned Smyths on either 23 or 24 May 2017, to find out whether they were stocking Worldeez. Mr Laughton accepted that this discussion – and his discussion with the other retailers he called then – would have been similar to his call with Mr Brocklehurst, and that he would have said that Mr Larian believed that the Worldeez globe infringed MGA’s patent. When asked whether he would have communicated Mr Larian’s policy of not supplying LOL Surprise to any retailers interested in stocking the Worldeez globe, Mr Laughton was initially evasive, but he eventually agreed that he would have done so.
Given the terms of Mr Laughton’s email to Mr Larian on 24 May 2017 claiming that he had spoken to all the major retailers (§136 above), it is in my judgment highly likely that Mr Laughton did indeed make very clear to Smyths (as he and Mr Larian had made clear to The Entertainer and TRU) that if Smyths stocked the Worldeez globe it would not receive supplies of LOL Surprise. It is also in my judgment likely, on the basis of that email, that Smyths agreed not to stock the globe. Mr Smyth’s evidence, in his witness statement, was that he did not recall any threat or coercion by MGA in relation to the stocking of Worldeez by Smyths; but as already noted that evidence needs to be treated with caution given that Mr Smyth was not cross-examined. The conduct of Mr Larian and Mr Laughton at the time renders it highly improbable that they would have exempted Smyths from the very clear line that was being taken in relation to The Entertainer and TRU.
Mr Cohen said in his first witness statement that Smyths cancelled the order it had placed for Worldeez, but (as set out above) he accepted in cross-examination that Smyths had not placed an order for Worldeez prior to MGA’s intervention; there was therefore nothing to cancel. It is, however, common ground thatSmythsdidnot go on to place any orders of the Worldeez globe; nor did it take the 5- or 10-pack Worldeez products.
Mr Smyth’s explanation, in his witness statement, was that this was because of Singleton’s history as a close-out company, and because the Worldeez product was not of sufficiently good quality. That explanation is not consistent with the contemporaneous emails up to 23 May 2017 (§§98–100 above) indicating ongoing discussions on an order to be placed for Worldeez, which then evaporated at precisely the time that MGA intervened. The more likely explanation is that although Smyths did not immediately confirm an order following the meeting with Cabo, it was about to do so around 23 May 2017, but then decided not to proceed after MGA had made it clear that LOL Surprise would not be supplied to any retailer that stocked the Worldeez globe.
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE EVIDENCE OF FACT
- MGA’s witnesses of fact
- Mr Larian’s breaches of purdah
- THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
- The economic and valuation experts: preliminary comments
- Assessment of the economic and valuation evidence
- The Decision Tree Model (DTM)
- ISSUES
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- The UK toy industry
- Table 1: NPD dolls classifications
- MGA and LOL Surprise
- Section 14
- The founding of Cabo and development of Worldeez
- Section 16
- The initial marketing of Worldeez
- Discussions with the launch retailers
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- Other retailers
- MGA’s intervention
- Contacts with Cabo and Singleton
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- B&M and other retailers
- AB Gee
- Worldeez repackaging and relaunch
- Launch of Worldeez globe in B&M
- Decline in B&M sales after August 2017
- Sales to other retailers
- Licensing and international distribution
- Nickelodeon advertising
- Demise of Cabo
- PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
- ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CLAIM
- The relevant market definition
- The parties’ submissions
- Mr Colley’s approach
- Mr Parker’s approach
- Section 44
- Conclusions on market definition
- Whether MGA was dominant on the relevant market
- The parties’ submissions
- Table 2: 2017 market shares for Colley and Parker markets (%)
- Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
- Table 4: 2017 market shares for extended Colley market (%)
- Market shares
- Figure 1: Colley diagram of 2017 MGA and competitor market shares
- Competition from products outside the relevant market
- Barriers to entry and expansion
- Countervailing buyer power
- MGA’s conduct
- Conclusions on dominance
- Whether MGA’s conduct amounted to an abuse
- The parties’ submissions
- The overall exclusionary campaign
- MGA’s “response to commercial attack” argument
- MGA’s passing off defence
- Section 63
- Conclusion on abuse of dominance
- UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS CLAIM
- Agreements with the toy traders
- Discussion and conclusions
- Anticompetitive object or effect
- Discussion and conclusions
- Exemption under the VBER
- Scope of the VBER
- Market share threshold
- Excluded restrictions
- Conclusion on the VBER
- Exemption under s. 9 / Article 101(3)
- Conclusion on the unlawful agreements claim
- PATENT THREATS CLAIM
- Threats of patent infringement proceedings
- The parties’ submissions
- Discussion
- “Person aggrieved”
- Conclusion on the patent threats claim
- CAUSATION AND QUANTUM
- Legal principles
- Quantification of the loss
- The approach to claims for lost profits
- Conclusions on the overarching approach
- Causative effect of MGA’s conduct
- Actionable damage and causation: Cabo’s heads of loss
- Whether Cabo would have traded profitably in the counterfactual case
- Product quality
- Section 92
- Marketing campaign
- Retailer support
- Business plan/financial projections
- Inventory management
- Working capital
- Toy expert evidence on commercial success
- Breakeven analysis
- Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017
- International sales
- Conclusions on whether Cabo would have traded profitably
- The parties’ quantum models
- Mr Colley’s quantum models
- Table 6: Cabo calculations of losses (£m)
- Assessment of Mr Colley’s models
- Mr Parker’s quantum models
- Table 7: MGA calculations of losses (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s significant success model
- Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s moderate success model
- Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)
- Conclusions on the quantum models
- DECLARATORY RELIEF
- Conclusions
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