Conclusions on market definition
Conclusions on market definition
As set out above, there were some problems with each of the experts’ evidence on the market definition. Overall, however, I consider that Mr Colley’s approach is to be preferred. Unlike Mr Parker, Mr Colley started (correctly) with the focal product, narrowly defined as the product under assessment, i.e. LOL Surprise. To that he added products based on an assessment of relevant product characteristics, i.e. characteristics that were meaningful for consumer choice. Mr Parker’s alternative approach, based on looking at negative revenue correlations between entire NPD segments, adopted a starting point that was unreliable for the reasons set out above.
The evidence supports a market definition reflective of the characteristics identified by Mr Colley in respect of the target age range and the focus on surprise collectible toys. The main problem with Mr Colley’s market definition was that it sought to draw too bright a line between products with a “sophisticated” unwrapping experience and products with a less sophisticated unwrapping experience, such as products with a simple blind bag or other “single element of surprise”, as Ms Munt put it.
The correct approach, as Mr Colley acknowledged in his cross-examination, is to recognise that the boundaries of the market definition in a highly differentiated product market will be difficult to draw, and should therefore not be regarded as hard-edged. The competitive analysis should therefore consider the extent of competition from products falling outside the defined boundary, and should if necessary test the effect of extending the market definition to some of those products, at least by way of sensitivity analysis.
In the present case, given the difficulty in drawing a bright line between products with a single and a double element of surprise, it is appropriate to consider whether the extension of Mr Colley’s market to all collectible toys targeted at girls aged 6–9 years, with at least a single element of surprise (e.g. a blind bag), would make a material difference to the assessment of dominance, in particular by considering the impact on the market share calculations. I will refer to this market as the extended Colley market.
In addition, the dominance assessment should consider whether there are other specific products falling further outside the relevant market which also act as competitive constraints in relation to LOL Surprise. MGA’s main argument in that regard was that LOL Surprise competed not only with collectible toys but also with fashion dolls such as Barbie. The dominance assessment should therefore consider the extent to which there is evidence of fashion dolls exerting a competitive constraint on LOL Surprise.
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE EVIDENCE OF FACT
- MGA’s witnesses of fact
- Mr Larian’s breaches of purdah
- THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
- The economic and valuation experts: preliminary comments
- Assessment of the economic and valuation evidence
- The Decision Tree Model (DTM)
- ISSUES
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- The UK toy industry
- Table 1: NPD dolls classifications
- MGA and LOL Surprise
- Section 14
- The founding of Cabo and development of Worldeez
- Section 16
- The initial marketing of Worldeez
- Discussions with the launch retailers
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- Other retailers
- MGA’s intervention
- Contacts with Cabo and Singleton
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- B&M and other retailers
- AB Gee
- Worldeez repackaging and relaunch
- Launch of Worldeez globe in B&M
- Decline in B&M sales after August 2017
- Sales to other retailers
- Licensing and international distribution
- Nickelodeon advertising
- Demise of Cabo
- PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
- ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CLAIM
- The relevant market definition
- The parties’ submissions
- Mr Colley’s approach
- Mr Parker’s approach
- Section 44
- Conclusions on market definition
- Whether MGA was dominant on the relevant market
- The parties’ submissions
- Table 2: 2017 market shares for Colley and Parker markets (%)
- Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
- Table 4: 2017 market shares for extended Colley market (%)
- Market shares
- Figure 1: Colley diagram of 2017 MGA and competitor market shares
- Competition from products outside the relevant market
- Barriers to entry and expansion
- Countervailing buyer power
- MGA’s conduct
- Conclusions on dominance
- Whether MGA’s conduct amounted to an abuse
- The parties’ submissions
- The overall exclusionary campaign
- MGA’s “response to commercial attack” argument
- MGA’s passing off defence
- Section 63
- Conclusion on abuse of dominance
- UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS CLAIM
- Agreements with the toy traders
- Discussion and conclusions
- Anticompetitive object or effect
- Discussion and conclusions
- Exemption under the VBER
- Scope of the VBER
- Market share threshold
- Excluded restrictions
- Conclusion on the VBER
- Exemption under s. 9 / Article 101(3)
- Conclusion on the unlawful agreements claim
- PATENT THREATS CLAIM
- Threats of patent infringement proceedings
- The parties’ submissions
- Discussion
- “Person aggrieved”
- Conclusion on the patent threats claim
- CAUSATION AND QUANTUM
- Legal principles
- Quantification of the loss
- The approach to claims for lost profits
- Conclusions on the overarching approach
- Causative effect of MGA’s conduct
- Actionable damage and causation: Cabo’s heads of loss
- Whether Cabo would have traded profitably in the counterfactual case
- Product quality
- Section 92
- Marketing campaign
- Retailer support
- Business plan/financial projections
- Inventory management
- Working capital
- Toy expert evidence on commercial success
- Breakeven analysis
- Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017
- International sales
- Conclusions on whether Cabo would have traded profitably
- The parties’ quantum models
- Mr Colley’s quantum models
- Table 6: Cabo calculations of losses (£m)
- Assessment of Mr Colley’s models
- Mr Parker’s quantum models
- Table 7: MGA calculations of losses (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s significant success model
- Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s moderate success model
- Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)
- Conclusions on the quantum models
- DECLARATORY RELIEF
- Conclusions
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