Conclusions
CONCLUSIONS
For the reasons set out above, my conclusions are as follows:
MGA’s conduct was an abuse of its dominant position, contrary to the Chapter II prohibition and Article 102 TFEU, in the form of an exclusionary campaign based on threats to withdraw supply of LOL Surprise to existing customers, accompanied and reinforced by threats of litigation and disparaging claims that Worldeez was a “knock off” of LOL Surprise.
MGA’s conduct involved agreements with The Entertainer, TRU and Smyths which were in principle restrictive of competition by object; but those agreements were exempt under the VBER and therefore not prohibited by the Chapter I prohibition or Article 101(1) TFEU.
MGA made unjustified threats of patent infringement proceedings, within the meaning of s. 70 of the 1977 Act, to The Entertainer, TRU, Smyths and other retailers. If necessary, I would have found those threats to be causative of any loss suffered by Cabo as a result of MGA’s conduct.
Cabo’s damages claim ultimately turned on a claim that Cabo would have traded profitably but for MGA’s conduct. Having regard to all the evidence before the court, including in particular, the evidence of Worldeez’ quality as a product, the strength of Cabo’s marketing campaign, the extent of retailer support for Worldeez, Cabo’s financial projections and operational abilities, the working capital available to Cabo, the toy expert evidence on Cabo’s likely commercial success, and the analysis of the sales required to break even in 2017, I consider that Cabo would not have traded profitably in the counterfactual case.
It is therefore not strictly necessary to consider the quantification of Cabo’s loss. Nevertheless, an assessment of the quantum models of Mr Colley and Mr Parker, for Cabo and MGA respectively, supports the conclusion that Cabo would not have been profitable in the counterfactual case.
Cabo’s claim for damages therefore fails. It is, however, appropriate to make a declaration that MGA’s conduct constituted unjustified threats of patent infringement proceedings.
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE EVIDENCE OF FACT
- MGA’s witnesses of fact
- Mr Larian’s breaches of purdah
- THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
- The economic and valuation experts: preliminary comments
- Assessment of the economic and valuation evidence
- The Decision Tree Model (DTM)
- ISSUES
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- The UK toy industry
- Table 1: NPD dolls classifications
- MGA and LOL Surprise
- Section 14
- The founding of Cabo and development of Worldeez
- Section 16
- The initial marketing of Worldeez
- Discussions with the launch retailers
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- Other retailers
- MGA’s intervention
- Contacts with Cabo and Singleton
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- B&M and other retailers
- AB Gee
- Worldeez repackaging and relaunch
- Launch of Worldeez globe in B&M
- Decline in B&M sales after August 2017
- Sales to other retailers
- Licensing and international distribution
- Nickelodeon advertising
- Demise of Cabo
- PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
- ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CLAIM
- The relevant market definition
- The parties’ submissions
- Mr Colley’s approach
- Mr Parker’s approach
- Section 44
- Conclusions on market definition
- Whether MGA was dominant on the relevant market
- The parties’ submissions
- Table 2: 2017 market shares for Colley and Parker markets (%)
- Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
- Table 4: 2017 market shares for extended Colley market (%)
- Market shares
- Figure 1: Colley diagram of 2017 MGA and competitor market shares
- Competition from products outside the relevant market
- Barriers to entry and expansion
- Countervailing buyer power
- MGA’s conduct
- Conclusions on dominance
- Whether MGA’s conduct amounted to an abuse
- The parties’ submissions
- The overall exclusionary campaign
- MGA’s “response to commercial attack” argument
- MGA’s passing off defence
- Section 63
- Conclusion on abuse of dominance
- UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS CLAIM
- Agreements with the toy traders
- Discussion and conclusions
- Anticompetitive object or effect
- Discussion and conclusions
- Exemption under the VBER
- Scope of the VBER
- Market share threshold
- Excluded restrictions
- Conclusion on the VBER
- Exemption under s. 9 / Article 101(3)
- Conclusion on the unlawful agreements claim
- PATENT THREATS CLAIM
- Threats of patent infringement proceedings
- The parties’ submissions
- Discussion
- “Person aggrieved”
- Conclusion on the patent threats claim
- CAUSATION AND QUANTUM
- Legal principles
- Quantification of the loss
- The approach to claims for lost profits
- Conclusions on the overarching approach
- Causative effect of MGA’s conduct
- Actionable damage and causation: Cabo’s heads of loss
- Whether Cabo would have traded profitably in the counterfactual case
- Product quality
- Section 92
- Marketing campaign
- Retailer support
- Business plan/financial projections
- Inventory management
- Working capital
- Toy expert evidence on commercial success
- Breakeven analysis
- Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017
- International sales
- Conclusions on whether Cabo would have traded profitably
- The parties’ quantum models
- Mr Colley’s quantum models
- Table 6: Cabo calculations of losses (£m)
- Assessment of Mr Colley’s models
- Mr Parker’s quantum models
- Table 7: MGA calculations of losses (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s significant success model
- Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s moderate success model
- Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)
- Conclusions on the quantum models
- DECLARATORY RELIEF
- Conclusions
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