Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)
Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)

As set out in Table 7 above, the moderate success model indicated that Worldeez would have been significantly loss-making, including on international sales. The further calculation provided with MGA’s closing submissions assumed that Worldeez would have been twice as successful as the average product in Mr Parker’s basket of comparators, and on that basis suggested (limited) profitability on international sales, but overall losses over three years when domestic losses were taken into account.
Other than the various points on Mr Parker’s costs and revenue assumptions which were corrected in the updated figures provided with MGA’s closing submissions, Cabo’s main criticism of this model was that by basing itself on an average of the performance of the top products in all newly-launched brands post-July 2018, it took no account of what was known about Worldeez’ performance. Given that the vast majority of the products in the comparator set generated less revenue in year 1 than Cabo’s actual performance, in a situation where Cabo’s market access was impeded by MGA’s conduct, a straight average across all of the comparator products would not (Cabo submitted) provide a reasonable picture of what Cabo might have expected had it been able to pursue its original launch plans unimpeded by MGA.
Mr Parker maintained that his moderate success model was more reliable than his significant success model, because “that is the expected outcome of a product you don’t know anything about”. But that misses the point that the commercial success of Worldeez was not a complete unknown. In addition to the extensive evidence discussed above regarding the quality of Worldeez as a product and the operational abilities of Cabo, the evidence in the trial included detailed sales figures for all the retail outlets where Worldeez was sold.
Accordingly, while the moderate success model provides some insight as to the average trajectory of a typical product in the playset toys and collectibles class which enjoyed some degree of initial commercial success, it cannot be regarded as a useful proxy for the revenues of a product for which there is considerable real world post-launch information, including data showing revenues in a competitively constrained situation to have been better than that of most of the products in the comparator set.
MGA’s attempt to address that issue, by providing a further analysis which assumed that Worldeez would have been twice as successful as the average from the comparator set, did not really resolve the problem. As Mr Kuppen put it in his closing submissions on this point, taking an average that is meaningless and multiplying it by two “may give a bigger number but it doesn’t solve the problem with this scenario”. I do not, therefore, consider Mr Parker’s moderate success model to be informative as a model of Worldeez’ expected performance in the counterfactual scenario. Notably, while MGA’s written closing submissions relied on both Mr Parker’s significant success and moderate success models, MGA did not in its oral closing submissions suggest that any significant weight could be given to the moderate success model.
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE EVIDENCE OF FACT
- MGA’s witnesses of fact
- Mr Larian’s breaches of purdah
- THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
- The economic and valuation experts: preliminary comments
- Assessment of the economic and valuation evidence
- The Decision Tree Model (DTM)
- ISSUES
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- The UK toy industry
- Table 1: NPD dolls classifications
- MGA and LOL Surprise
- Section 14
- The founding of Cabo and development of Worldeez
- Section 16
- The initial marketing of Worldeez
- Discussions with the launch retailers
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- Other retailers
- MGA’s intervention
- Contacts with Cabo and Singleton
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- B&M and other retailers
- AB Gee
- Worldeez repackaging and relaunch
- Launch of Worldeez globe in B&M
- Decline in B&M sales after August 2017
- Sales to other retailers
- Licensing and international distribution
- Nickelodeon advertising
- Demise of Cabo
- PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
- ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CLAIM
- The relevant market definition
- The parties’ submissions
- Mr Colley’s approach
- Mr Parker’s approach
- Section 44
- Conclusions on market definition
- Whether MGA was dominant on the relevant market
- The parties’ submissions
- Table 2: 2017 market shares for Colley and Parker markets (%)
- Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
- Table 4: 2017 market shares for extended Colley market (%)
- Market shares
- Figure 1: Colley diagram of 2017 MGA and competitor market shares
- Competition from products outside the relevant market
- Barriers to entry and expansion
- Countervailing buyer power
- MGA’s conduct
- Conclusions on dominance
- Whether MGA’s conduct amounted to an abuse
- The parties’ submissions
- The overall exclusionary campaign
- MGA’s “response to commercial attack” argument
- MGA’s passing off defence
- Section 63
- Conclusion on abuse of dominance
- UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS CLAIM
- Agreements with the toy traders
- Discussion and conclusions
- Anticompetitive object or effect
- Discussion and conclusions
- Exemption under the VBER
- Scope of the VBER
- Market share threshold
- Excluded restrictions
- Conclusion on the VBER
- Exemption under s. 9 / Article 101(3)
- Conclusion on the unlawful agreements claim
- PATENT THREATS CLAIM
- Threats of patent infringement proceedings
- The parties’ submissions
- Discussion
- “Person aggrieved”
- Conclusion on the patent threats claim
- CAUSATION AND QUANTUM
- Legal principles
- Quantification of the loss
- The approach to claims for lost profits
- Conclusions on the overarching approach
- Causative effect of MGA’s conduct
- Actionable damage and causation: Cabo’s heads of loss
- Whether Cabo would have traded profitably in the counterfactual case
- Product quality
- Section 92
- Marketing campaign
- Retailer support
- Business plan/financial projections
- Inventory management
- Working capital
- Toy expert evidence on commercial success
- Breakeven analysis
- Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017
- International sales
- Conclusions on whether Cabo would have traded profitably
- The parties’ quantum models
- Mr Colley’s quantum models
- Table 6: Cabo calculations of losses (£m)
- Assessment of Mr Colley’s models
- Mr Parker’s quantum models
- Table 7: MGA calculations of losses (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s significant success model
- Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s moderate success model
- Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)
- Conclusions on the quantum models
- DECLARATORY RELIEF
- Conclusions
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