Mr Parker’s approach
Mr Parker’s approach
As set out above, unlike Mr Colley, Mr Parker placed very heavy reliance on an analysis of NPD revenue data. His central observation was that over the period 2017–2021, when the fashion dolls segment grew, the playset dolls segment shrank, and vice versa (see §214 above). He also noted that the combined size of the two market segments was broadly constant during that period. He contended that this demonstrated “a pattern of demand being substituted between Playset Dolls and Fashion Dolls”. On that basis he concluded that fashion dolls and playset dolls were in the same relevant product market during that period, and that there was not, during the relevant period, a narrower relevant market for substitutes for LOL Surprise. As explained at §215 above, Mr Parker’s alternative analysis of individual product substitutes for LOL Surprise likewise rested on considering the brands which lost sales at the period of LOL’s growth in revenue.
There are several fundamental problems with that approach. The first is the point discussed above in relation to Mr Colley’s comments on sales revenues: that a correlation (even a very strong correlation) between revenue patterns does not establish causation and therefore demand substitution, given the numerous other factors that could have influenced those revenue changes. That problem undermines both Mr Parker’s primary correlation analysis, and his alternative analysis of individual brands.
This issue was particularly evident on examination of Mr Parker’s alternative analysis of individual brands. That analysis produced lists of brands within the playset dolls category which Mr Parker considered were the “strongest economic substitutes” for LOL Surprise, on the sole basis that their sales fell during periods in 2017 and/or 2018 in which the sales of LOL Surprise increased. One obvious problem was that this analysis produced the incoherent result that some products would be regarded as close substitutes in one year but not the next, e.g. Num Noms and Barbie (on the list of close substitutes for 2018, but not for 2017). Both the 2017 and 2018 lists also notably excluded Hatchimals Colleggtibles, on the basis that during both periods the sales of this product increased rather than decreased. The toy experts agreed, however, that Hatchimals Colleggtibles was a surprise collectible product that offered a sophisticated unwrapping experience (featuring a small animal toy that “hatched” from an egg: see the first picture below). Its product characteristics therefore indicated that it was a close substitute for LOL Surprise – and at least as close a substitute as some of the other products in Mr Parker’s lists (e.g. Num Noms, which are scented food-related collectibles in the form of mini lip glosses contained within a pot designed to look like a yoghurt pot: see the second picture below).
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE EVIDENCE OF FACT
- MGA’s witnesses of fact
- Mr Larian’s breaches of purdah
- THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
- The economic and valuation experts: preliminary comments
- Assessment of the economic and valuation evidence
- The Decision Tree Model (DTM)
- ISSUES
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- The UK toy industry
- Table 1: NPD dolls classifications
- MGA and LOL Surprise
- Section 14
- The founding of Cabo and development of Worldeez
- Section 16
- The initial marketing of Worldeez
- Discussions with the launch retailers
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- Other retailers
- MGA’s intervention
- Contacts with Cabo and Singleton
- The Entertainer
- Toys R Us
- Smyths
- B&M and other retailers
- AB Gee
- Worldeez repackaging and relaunch
- Launch of Worldeez globe in B&M
- Decline in B&M sales after August 2017
- Sales to other retailers
- Licensing and international distribution
- Nickelodeon advertising
- Demise of Cabo
- PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
- ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CLAIM
- The relevant market definition
- The parties’ submissions
- Mr Colley’s approach
- Mr Parker’s approach
- Section 44
- Conclusions on market definition
- Whether MGA was dominant on the relevant market
- The parties’ submissions
- Table 2: 2017 market shares for Colley and Parker markets (%)
- Table 3: Parker market share estimates for 2018–19 (%)
- Table 4: 2017 market shares for extended Colley market (%)
- Market shares
- Figure 1: Colley diagram of 2017 MGA and competitor market shares
- Competition from products outside the relevant market
- Barriers to entry and expansion
- Countervailing buyer power
- MGA’s conduct
- Conclusions on dominance
- Whether MGA’s conduct amounted to an abuse
- The parties’ submissions
- The overall exclusionary campaign
- MGA’s “response to commercial attack” argument
- MGA’s passing off defence
- Section 63
- Conclusion on abuse of dominance
- UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS CLAIM
- Agreements with the toy traders
- Discussion and conclusions
- Anticompetitive object or effect
- Discussion and conclusions
- Exemption under the VBER
- Scope of the VBER
- Market share threshold
- Excluded restrictions
- Conclusion on the VBER
- Exemption under s. 9 / Article 101(3)
- Conclusion on the unlawful agreements claim
- PATENT THREATS CLAIM
- Threats of patent infringement proceedings
- The parties’ submissions
- Discussion
- “Person aggrieved”
- Conclusion on the patent threats claim
- CAUSATION AND QUANTUM
- Legal principles
- Quantification of the loss
- The approach to claims for lost profits
- Conclusions on the overarching approach
- Causative effect of MGA’s conduct
- Actionable damage and causation: Cabo’s heads of loss
- Whether Cabo would have traded profitably in the counterfactual case
- Product quality
- Section 92
- Marketing campaign
- Retailer support
- Business plan/financial projections
- Inventory management
- Working capital
- Toy expert evidence on commercial success
- Breakeven analysis
- Table 5: Volumes and working capital required to break even in 2017
- International sales
- Conclusions on whether Cabo would have traded profitably
- The parties’ quantum models
- Mr Colley’s quantum models
- Table 6: Cabo calculations of losses (£m)
- Assessment of Mr Colley’s models
- Mr Parker’s quantum models
- Table 7: MGA calculations of losses (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s significant success model
- Table 8: Loss calculation for significant success model, comparing MGA and Cabo cost stacks (£)
- Assessment of Mr Parker’s moderate success model
- Figure 2: Parker moderate success model: average monthly revenue (£)
- Conclusions on the quantum models
- DECLARATORY RELIEF
- Conclusions
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