UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
Mr Lopez was responsible for seeking to win this business in a very competitive market and with an information disadvantage compared to larger market makers. MHI only saw a small portion of medium-sized RFQs which were being sent by clients to market makers, and had rarely been successful in winning medium-sized RFQs.
Mr Creaturo had expressed his opinion in his report that the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy described by Mr Lopez appeared highly speculative and unsupported by the Desk’s usual client flow. Mr Jaffey’s cross-examination of Mr Creaturo focused on this opinion and the 93 RFQs.
The Tribunal makes the following findings in relation to the 93 RFQs:
Banca d’Italia sent 47 of these RFQs, all of which were for MHI to sell, they were received throughout the Relevant Period, and on most (but not all) of the trading days;
Banco Popular sent 15 of these RFQs, 13 of which were for MHI to sell, two for MHI to buy;
71 of the RFQs were for MHI to sell to the client, with the remaining 22 being for MHI to buy; and
these RFQs would all require hedging with more than 200 lots of Futures.
Mr Jaffey put it to Mr Creaturo that there was a predictable pattern (of size, direction and duration), particularly from Banca d’Italia and that Mr Lopez would want to put himself in a position to provide a competitive price for these trades. Mr Creaturo accepted that he could see this backdrop to the client flows and that he could understand the concept of anticipatory hedging in this regard to try to get ahead of these flows, anticipate the next client trade and be properly positioned to meet it (although he did not accept that this was “pre-positioning” as that is generally with a specific order in mind). However, Mr Creaturo made clear that this acceptance of a predictable pattern was subject to caveats:
Being asked about the predictability of the RFQs being sent by Banca d’Italia, Mr Creaturo immediately asked about the times of day at which they were sent. Giving evidence, Mr Creaturo repeatedly emphasised that we don’t have (on the list of 93 RFQs) the timing of the trades (and the Tribunal records that he wasn’t taken to the timing at any point by Mr Jaffey).
He said he was trying to understand why it was, if these RFQs were predictable and Mr Lopez had identified a support and resistance level, there was never a trade, why Mr Lopez never took duration, even of smaller size.
As well as seeing no trade, he saw the cancellation time on the Large Orders coinciding with the Small Order being filled.
The Tribunal did have information as to the timing of these RFQs on the full list of Electronic RFQs received during the Relevant Period, but it was not set out on the list of 93 RFQs itself to which Mr Creaturo was taken during cross-examination. The Tribunal has identified that the RFQs sent by Banca d’Italia were generally received between 11.00 and 13.00. There were occasional outliers, eg at 10.10.53, 10.59.31, 13.24.04 and 13.33.21, but this range was apparent from the beginning of the Relevant Period, which would have been the data that Mr Lopez had available to him when he was starting to consider whether there were patterns.
Based on this evidence, the Tribunal finds that the RFQs the Desk received from Banca d’Italia were predictable in size, duration and direction, and that Banca d’Italia sent RFQs to MHI most days (and sometimes two or three times in a day), but there was a wide variation in the timing of these. We accept Mr Creaturo’s evidence that it is the timing of the next client trade that might justify the risk of taking a directional position, but each day Mr Lopez could not know if the next client trade is coming in five minutes, 15 minutes or an hour. There was no data supporting imminent client activity at any particular point in time, and in this situation it would be taking a speculative position in the market to take directional risk based on the possibility of these one, two or three RFQs per day.
The RFQs from Banca d’Italia represented about half of the 93 RFQs. Whilst Banco Popular also regularly sent RFQs of this size, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the fact that RFQs were received of this size nearly every day (none were received on 10 June 2016) of itself meant that it could be said there was any predictable pattern overall, particularly in a situation where not only the timing of the receipt could not be known but more importantly the direction of the potential client trade.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions