UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
The overlap between a Large Order and a Small Order in the opposite direction is one of the Criteria. The Authority challenged Mr Urra’s and Mr Sheth’s explanation that the two orders were often prompted by the same client activity, and that the overlap was thus a feature of the Information Discovery Strategy. This was on the basis that:
the client activity that has been identified does not justify the size of the Large Orders;
they have not identified triggers for many of the Specified Instances, and such failure cannot be explained by reference to missing information, as the list of actual trades that would lead to a Small Order is comprehensive; and
the Small Orders were not always prompted by a client RFQ or trade in any event, eg in F174 Mr Sheth identified a €5m cash trade that Mr Lopez had executed as the trigger for his Large Order, but Mr Lopez’s evidence (as is clear from the cash trade data) was that this was not a client trade but Mr Lopez buying a bond for his book on MTS. There was no “client” who could be splitting orders.
The Tribunal considers that the above submission raises several different issues.
We agree with the Authority on the first of their reasons – whether it be the identity of the client, the size of the RFQ, or the prospect of there being size in the market at the relevant time of day, the “triggers” identified by Mr Urra and Mr Sheth (or suggested by Mr Kasapis and agreed by them to be plausible) are inherently implausible. They would involve a client splitting an order on a bizarre basis, unseen in the market.
We consider the Authority’s second reason in support of its submission does not fully address the explanations provided by Mr Urra and Mr Sheth as to Large Orders being prompted by Voice RFQs or Bloomberg/Chat RFQs which traded away, and thus where there was no cash trade executed by MHI. However, if a Large Order was placed to test the theory of clients splitting orders in relation to an RFQ which had traded away, this itself raises a different question as to the overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders, including as to the very fact of the overlap (separate from the coincidence in timing of cancellation of the Large Orders).
As to whether they have identified a trigger, Mr Sheth has identified the activity which he says could have triggered his use of the strategy for most of the Specified Instances. It was Mr Urra who has not reconstructed this information, and only considered that three of the cash bonds identified by Mr Kasapis were plausible. It was, however, Mr Sheth who had tested the strategy having identified that Mr Lopez had bought a bond on MTS, as in F174, where there had been no client RFQ. The fact of an overlap in that situation can be attributed to Mr Lopez placing a Small Order to hedge that cash transaction; however, we consider it almost incredible that in this situation Mr Sheth would hypothesise from this that a client might be splitting orders. This is made even more unlikely by the fact that this was one of the two Instances identified by Eurex at the end of July 2016, so Mr Sheth would have been well-placed at that time, having been interviewed by Compliance on 3 August 2016, to have investigated the activity to be able to provide as much evidence as possible to Compliance at his second interview on 10 August 2016.
In addition, Mr Sheth identified that the Authority had challenged a Large Order he had placed in an Instance that did not overlap with a Small Order. In his witness statement Mr Sheth referred to his placing of two Large Orders in F151, both of which were relied on by the Authority. The second Large Order in that Instance was placed 2.655 seconds after Mr Lopez’s Small Order filled. He said this was not consistent with the Authority’s case theory (and drew attention to Mr Lopez’s Small Order to buy 97 lots already having started to trade when he placed the first Large Order). Mr Sheth’s review of the cash trades led him to suggest that the Large Orders may have been placed to test the theory against Banca Carige, who had submitted a sell-side RFQ for €25m ten-year bonds which had been won by Mr Urra.
In F151 the first Large Order did overlap with the Small Order, and the stack at the time that Large Order was placed shows about 15 lots visible at the touch on the sell-side, when Mr Lopez still had 73 lots remaining of his Small Order. Mr Shivji submitted that Mr Lopez’s Small Order was a hedge for Mr Urra’s book and submitted that the market had been rallying significantly and Mr Sheth’s orders were trying to cool the market down. Mr Sheth’s response in cross-examination was that it was preposterous to suggest that the two Large Orders would have caused the market to cool down by 20 cents. We agree with Mr Sheth that, whilst the remaining activity in this Instance meets the Criteria and fits with the pattern relied upon by the Authority, the second Large Order, which is relied upon as a misleading order, does not overlap with an order on the opposite side of the book, and there was no evidence in support of Mr Shivji’s submission that the placing of this order may have been to cool the market in case there was more to do.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions