UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Introduction and summary
Introduction and summary
On 31 October 2022 the Financial Conduct Authority (the “Authority”) through its Regulatory Decisions Committee (“RDC”) issued Decision Notices to each of Diego Urra (“Mr Urra”), Jorge Lopez Gonzalez (“Mr Lopez”) and Poojan Sheth (“Mr Sheth”) (together, the “Traders”). In those Decision Notices the Authority decided to make orders prohibiting each of the Traders from performing any function in relation to any regulated activity carried on by an authorised person, exempt person or exempt professional firm pursuant to s56 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA 2000”), and imposed penalties on each of them pursuant to s123(1) FSMA 2000.
Each of the Traders referred their respective Decision Notices to the Tribunal. This decision concerns the subject matter of those references, which were heard together.
The Traders were traders at Mizuho International Plc (“MHI”). The Authority’s case is that the Traders pursued an abusive trading strategy in relation to Long-Term Italian Government Bond Futures (“Futures” or “BTP Futures”) on 233 occasions (between the three of them) between 1 June 2016 and 29 July 2016 (the “Relevant Period”). This abusive strategy is alleged to have involved placing orders of at least 200 lots (the “Large Orders”) which gave the false or misleading impression and/or signal that the Traders wanted to buy or sell a specified number of Futures, when in fact their objective was to facilitate the execution of other (genuine) smaller orders (generally of fewer than 200 lots) on the opposite side of the order book (the “Small Orders”). The Authority’s case is that this constituted market abuse within s118 FSMA 2000 and market manipulation within Article 12 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (the “Market Abuse Regulation”). The Tribunal uses “market abuse” to refer to both market abuse and market manipulation within these regimes.
Each of the 233 occasions is referred to as an “Instance”, ie that is the term used to capture the trading activity on which the Authority relies. The 233 Instances are together the “Instance Pool”, those Instances involving orders placed by one Trader are “Single Trader Instances”, and those where orders (whether Small Orders or Large Orders) are placed by more than one of the Traders are “Multi Trader Instances”. There are a total of 341 Large Orders in the Instance Pool.
The Traders do not dispute the details of the activity within the Instances. They deny they committed deliberate market abuse, and submit they did not act dishonestly or lack integrity, as alleged by the Authority. The Traders each say that they placed each large order (ie the Large Orders and other large orders outside the Instance Pool) in pursuit of a legitimate trading strategy, they intended to trade their Large Orders and there was no collaboration (such that the Authority’s approach of identifying and relying on Multi Trader Instances is misguided). They have put forward their explanations for their trading strategy (for Mr Urra and Mr Sheth, the Information Discovery Strategy, and for Mr Lopez, the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy) and sought to explain their trading by reference to available evidence (and drawing attention to information that is no longer available).
The parties have produced a Statement of Agreed Background Facts (“SOABF”) which is set out at Appendix 1 and forms part of this decision. We use the terms as defined in the SOABF in this decision. The SOABF covers the cash BTP market, client RFQs, hedging and trading in Futures on the Eurex Exchange (“Eurex” or “the Exchange”), MHI and the EGB Desk, and includes a glossary.
On terminology in relation to the orders placed by the Traders, the parties have at various times used different defined terms for what we have referred to above as the Small Orders and Large Orders (which was adopted by the Authority and Mr Bailin by the time of the hearing, with Mr George and Mr Jaffey referring to the Large Orders as “Larger Orders” and “Relevant Orders” respectively). The Authority had previously defined these as the “Genuine Orders” and the “Misleading Orders”, and that is the language used in their statements of case (and subsequent amendments thereto). The Tribunal recognises that the terms Small Orders and Large Orders are not neutral – the Traders’ position is that the orders which are relied upon by the Authority as having given a false impression and/or signal, whether of 200, 450 lots or 500 lots, are not “large” but medium-sized.
The Tribunal has recognised throughout that whilst the Authority’s case is that the Traders individually and acting together committed market abuse by placing orders they did not wish to trade but whose purpose was to facilitate the execution of the Small Orders, we need to reach a conclusion in relation to each of the Traders. We have taken account of and assessed the activity of each trader individually as well as alongside that of the other Traders in the Instances when assessing their explanations for their trading.
For the reasons set out below, the Tribunal has concluded that the Traders each deliberately engaged in market abuse, and that this conduct was dishonest and lacked integrity. The Traders’ references against the prohibition orders are dismissed. The Tribunal determines that the appropriate action for the Authority to take is to impose a financial penalty of the following amount on each of the Traders and the references are remitted to the Authority with the direction that effect be given to our determinations:
Mr Urra - £223,400;
Mr Lopez - £100,000; and
Mr Sheth - £57,600.
The Tribunal is grateful to the parties for their written and oral submissions. We have not found it necessary to refer expressly in this decision to all of the evidence and submissions but we have taken them all into account.
There was, as is to be expected, some overlap between the submissions made on behalf of each of the Traders, albeit that some submissions were distinct (eg the difference in the trading strategies between Mr Urra and Mr Sheth on the one hand and Mr Lopez on the other, the size and number of Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez, the issue of Mr Sheth’s level of experience and the submissions in relation to Mr Sheth’s placing of multiple overlapping Large Orders). We do specifically refer to some of the submissions as having been made by counsel for one of the Traders; we do not lose sight of the fact that the same or a similar submission was also made on behalf of another Trader.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions