UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
The Large Orders were often live for just a few seconds, and then cancelled shortly after the Small Order filled.
Mr Urra’s Large Orders in the ten Specified Instances that were Single Trader Instances were live for 1.899 seconds (in F7) to 46.3 seconds (in F47). The order that was live for 46.3 seconds in F47 is an outlier; it is the first of two Large Orders placed in F47, and when it was cancelled the Small Order had not traded; the second Large Order in that Instance was live for 2.13 seconds. The range without that first Large Order in F47 is from 1.899 seconds (in F7) to 4.815 seconds (in F12).
Most of the Specified Instances that were Single Trader Instances for Mr Sheth include Multiple Large Orders, and he would cancel the one closest to the touch first, and that is the one that had been placed most recently. In F55, F67 and F125 (each of which involved just one Large Order), the Large Orders were live for 1.646, 2.66 and 1.433 seconds respectively. There were three Large Orders in F103, live for 9.331, 6.679 and 1.478 seconds respectively. Illustrating this another way, F104 and F153 both involved Mr Sheth placing two Large Orders – the time from placing the first, to cancelling the second was 4.581 and 4.02 seconds (ie at that point the first Large Order was still live, and cancelled shortly afterwards, but this is the period of time for which Mr Sheth says he was testing the theory that a client was splitting its order).
We are not persuaded that these short periods of time were sufficient to test a theory that a Posited Trader might be looking or willing to trade in volume at that time, and reach a conclusion that there was no such Posited Trader. This is particularly apparent where, as in F104, there had already been a gap between the RFQ which triggered the use of the strategy and the placing of the Large Order – if it was thought that it was worth placing a Large Order around 45 seconds after the RFQ was received, it is inconsistent to then conclude that the Large Order need only be on the order book for less than five seconds.
This is supported by Mr Creaturo’s evidence that the variation in the length of time the Large Orders were left on the book is not explained by a desire to test whether clients were splitting orders. Instead, his opinion was that the linking factor in what drives the cancellation of the final Large Orders in the Instances seems to be the fill of the Small Orders on the opposite side of the book.
In the Single Trader Instances which were Specified Instances, the time from the fill of the Small Order to cancellation of the Large Order for Mr Urra ranged from 1.339 seconds (in F7) to 4.646 seconds (in F12). As noted above, the first Large Order in F47 was cancelled before the Small Order filled; the second Large Order in that Instance was cancelled 1.797 seconds after the Small Order filled. Mr Urra drew attention to the slightly longer cancellation times in the Instance Pool as a whole. However, from the Tribunal’s review of further Instances, the pattern remains the same, in that the length of time for which the Large Order was live varied significantly more than the cancellation time after the Small Order filled.
For Mr Sheth, the time at which he cancelled his Large Orders (or the Large Order closest to the touch where there were Multiple Large Orders) after the Small Order filled ranged from 0.14 seconds (in F175) to 2.529 seconds (in F176).
In his witness statement Mr Sheth referred to his activity in F52 (a Multi Trader Instance involving Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth, which was not a Specified Instance). Mr Sheth had placed a Large Order to sell 500 lots whilst Mr Lopez had a Small Order to buy seven lots, had reduced the price and then cancelled the Large Order, at a point at which Mr Lopez’s Small Order had not started to fill. Mr Sheth said his Large Order was placed for his strategy, and that if the Authority’s theory was correct he would not have cancelled the Large Order at that time.
We are not persuaded that the activity in this Instance supports this submission. Mr Sheth’s Large Order had been live at its amended price of 140.74 for 13.392 seconds. Mr Lopez also had a Large Order to sell 200 lots for 140.73. The Spread graph shows a spike in traded volumes and the market moved towards the Large Orders. Mr Sheth’s Large Order was at the touch, and he immediately cancelled the order, as did Mr Lopez. They cancelled their Large Orders within 0.2 seconds of each other. Whilst we recognise that Mr Lopez’s most recent Small Order had not traded, Mr Sheth cancelled his Large Order just at the moment when a sharp price movement meant he could have traded. Instead, he decided to cancel.
Giving evidence, Mr Sheth referred to F94 (a Multi Trader Instance involving Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth) as an Instance where he cancelled the Large Order he had placed before Mr Lopez’s Small Order had filled; and had also cancelled a Large Order after Mr Lopez’s Small Order had been filled. He sought to rely on this to show there was no correlation between the cancellation of the Large Order and the fill of the Small Order.
We do not find the activity in this Instance supportive of Mr Sheth’s explanation. There is various activity in this Instance:
Mr Sheth had placed a Small Order to buy ten lots and a Large Order to sell 500 lots. The Small Order filled and he cancelled the Large Order.
Mr Lopez placed a Small Order to buy five lots, which filled.
Mr Lopez then placed a Small Order to sell five lots. Mr Sheth placed a Large Order to buy 500 lots and cancelled that order more than six seconds later (without any fill on the Small Order). However, Mr Sheth’s next action was to place a new Large Order to buy 500 lots (at a higher price). Mr Lopez’s Small Order filled and Mr Sheth cancelled the Large Order just over one second later.
So here, the cancellation of the first (buy) Large Order by Mr Sheth, whilst that did take place when the Small Order had not traded, was followed by the placing of a new Large Order of the same size and in the same direction. We do not place any weight on the decision to cancel that first (buy) Large Order.
Mr Urra’s and Mr Sheth’s evidence was that in any of the Instances they may have cancelled the Large Order as the market was moving away from that order; and the fill of the Small Order and the cancellation of the Large Order may have been triggered by the same market event; and Mr Sheth also gave evidence that he may have cancelled the Large Order if the cash trade he had lined up to hedge his Futures position disappeared.
This is an issue where MTS data and market information from the Relevant Period would offer the potential to assist with explaining the timing of the decision to cancel the Large Orders (according to the evidence of Mr Urra and Mr Sheth).
However, even allowing for the possibility that some market information would support their explanations, the Tribunal considers there are difficulties:
There are various Instances where, having decided to cancel a Large Order, the Trader then placed another Large Order within a short period of time, eg F64 (Mr Urra), F94 (Mr Sheth in the Multi Trader Instance above) and F103 (Mr Sheth).
In other Instances, Mr Urra and Mr Sheth cancelled the Large Orders once the market seemed to be moving towards that Large Order, eg in F47 (Mr Urra), F52 (Mr Sheth), F104 (Mr Sheth) and F125 (Mr Sheth).
Three of the Large Orders in the Instance Pool traded in part. These were Mr Urra’s Large Orders in F16 (three lots out of 444), F30 (39 lots out of 500) and F167 (42 lots out of 444). In F16, Mr Urra amended the price of the Large Order away from the touch 0.531 seconds after it started to fill; once the Small Order traded he amended it further away again and then cancelled. In F30 he cancelled the Large Order 0.948 seconds after it started to fill, and in F167 he cancelled the Large Order 2.131 seconds after it started to fill. Mr George put it to Mr Creaturo that Mr Urra may have cancelled because these orders had not traded in one go, ie they were trading because of market movement and not a Posited Trader buying significant volume in one shot. This submission is difficult to accept – the reality is that Mr Urra would have no way of knowing who was acquiring the position or the size in which they were buying. Whilst volumes varied significantly, there were always other visible lots ahead of the Large Order at the time at which it was placed, with the uncertainty of how many iceberged lots could also be available. A trader looking to buy, eg, 400 lots, would trade through the visible and invisible lots on the stack, and may then only trade, eg 30 or 80 lots from the Large Order.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions