UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Prospect of a profitable position and risk
Prospect of a profitable position and risk
Mr Urra and Mr Sheth both gave evidence that if the Large Order traded, this would be a profitable position for the Desk, emphasising that the Large Orders were placed away from the touch. Mr Sheth’s evidence in his witness statement was that he would have sought Mr Urra’s help to exit the position.
As a matter of fact, it is clear that the Large Orders in the Specified Instances were placed away from the touch, generally two to three ticks away, although some of Mr Urra’s Large Orders were at the touch during the course of the Instance.
At the risk of stating the obvious, any order, including the Large Order can only trade once the market price, the touch, has moved to the Large Order.
All three Traders submitted that the price of Futures would deviate from and then revert to a long-term mean – and more particularly that the Large Order would trade and then the market would immediately revert to where it was before the execution of the Large Order - and that this price movement could then be traded profitably. This submission is particularly relevant to the Information Discovery Strategy, but Mr Jaffey also cross-examined Mr Creaturo on this in the context of the risks posed by the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy.
Mr Kasapis’s evidence was that Mr Urra’s belief that the market would revert to its previous levels after transacting with a Posited Trader was well-founded. In his view, in highly liquid markets, prices often exhibit “mean reversion”, ie a tendency to return to their average levels following temporary deviations or fluctuations. In this context, when a trade is executed away from the equilibrium, the large number of active participants and high traded volumes act as a stabilising force, with participants taking advantage of any mispricing until prices are restored to their prevailing levels.
In cross-examination, Mr Creaturo did accept that prices fluctuate in the market, and can move back towards their previous levels after an initial movement, by way of reversion to mean. He agreed that if a Posited Trader aggressively traded at a premium, the market could return to its previous level if there is no further demand or external factors driving a broader movement. However, Mr Creaturo also considered it to be very speculative that the market would revert just because one trader had traded, and described any expectation of being able to profit in this situation as “wishful thinking”.
The Tribunal recognises that there was no data before us showing what actually happened where an order of 200 or 450 lots did trade. However, based on the evidence of Mr Creaturo, the daily average high/low of the Futures market, the daily price graphs, the known directional risk, and MHI’s information disadvantage as a result of seeing only a minority of client flow which restricted its ability to ascertain any mean price to which the market was likely to revert (or the likelihood or timescale), or whether price variations in the market were an anomaly or client flow, we conclude that any trading based on the perception that there would be a mean reversion or correction immediately after a Large Order traded would have been speculative; Mr Urra or Mr Sheth may have been able to profit in this situation, but they could also have made a loss.
During cross-examination, Mr Sheth gave the more detailed explanation of his “exit strategy” in the event that the Large Order traded, namely that he would execute an offsetting cash trade; and if he could not exit within a few seconds, he would have sought Mr Urra’s assistance. Mr Sheth accepted that the cash market moves in line with the Futures, so if the Futures prices had moved to the price of the Large Order the cash would follow, but his evidence was that he observed that the cash market “moves with a lag” and that he would have a cash trade lined up as a hedge which he could execute before the cash market moved with the Futures (and that the disappearance of this cash hedge could explain the timing of some of his cancellations of the Large Orders). However, there was no expert evidence supporting the existence of such a lag or that such a lag would be sufficient to enable a (human) trader, trading manually, to take advantage of this given that the cash market is automated. This had not been addressed in any of Mr Kasapis’s four expert reports. At the hearing, Mr Creaturo’s evidence was that it was not realistic to expect that Mr Sheth would be able to trade up to €50m in cash bonds at an attractive price before the cash market moved. We accept that evidence, and recognise that in a relative value trade the trader would be expected to initiate the least liquid leg of the trade first, ie the cash trade, as the trader has more certainty on both liquidity and price in the more liquid instrument.
The Tribunal concludes that if the Large Order had traded the relevant Trader would have acquired a speculative directional position, with the prospect of making a profit or realising a loss, and this would have represented a considerable risk on the book pending unwinding the position, the execution of an offsetting trade or winning a suitably sized client order in the right direction against which the position could be used as a hedge.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions