UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Market direction and Small Order already trading
Market direction and Small Order already trading
We cannot know on the basis of the evidence before us whether there was any actual market impact; the submissions in relation to market direction and the Small Order trading are relevant to whether the Small Order would have traded in any event, and thus, potentially, the likelihood of a Trader deciding to commit market abuse to facilitate execution of the Small Order.
The Tribunal has addressed Mr Kasapis’s Market Trend Analysis and agreed with the Authority that the rounding of minutes and the absence of marking the time at which the Large Orders were placed are significant weaknesses in the approach taken by Mr Kasapis. The Tribunal also identified that in three Specified Instances for Mr Sheth the price graphs showed that the market was trending away from the Small Order until the Large Order was placed (in contrast to Mr Kasapis’s conclusion that the market was trending towards the Small Order in these Instances).
We are not persuaded that this analysis bears the weight attached to it by Mr Kasapis (and observe that Mr Kasapis did not conduct this analysis for the Multi Trader Instances). We do, however, recognise that there is a difference in the outcomes amongst the Traders, and in particular the conclusions he reached in respect of Mr Urra’s Small Orders in the Single Trader Instances. Mr Kasapis identified that the market was trending towards Mr Urra’s Small Order in seven of the ten Specified Instances, and was neutral in one further Instance, ie there were only two Instances where the market was trending away from Mr Urra’s Small Order.
In 22% of the Instances, and 20% of the Specified Instances, the Small Order had already started to fill before the Large Order was placed. We have looked at the activity in these Specified Instances:
F7 (Mr Urra) – 18 of the 40 lots had filled before the Large Order was placed. However, these 18 lots had filled within one second of the Small Order being placed, and there was then a pause of more than ten seconds. The Large Order was placed and within 0.2 seconds the Small Order started to trade again. (This was an Instance where the visible liquidity throughout the stack, not only at the touch but also up to four to five ticks away was multiples of the actual size of the Small Order.)
F64 (Multi Trader Instance) - Mr Lopez had placed a Small Order for 160 lots iceberged to six, 31 of which had traded over a period of almost 19 seconds, before Mr Urra placed a Large Order. The Small Order continued to fill relatively slowly, with some part fills being of one and two lots. 122 lots filled in total over a period of 2 minutes 30 seconds (after which Mr Lopez cancelled the remaining 38 lots).
F84 (Multi Trader Instance) - Mr Sheth’s Small Order was 200 lots iceberged to 25 and Mr Lopez’s Small Order was 55 lots iceberged to six. Both were selling at 141.22 and had started to trade – 25 lots for Mr Sheth, six for Mr Lopez. They both filled in this Instance (in 20 seconds and 16 seconds respectively) and the trading was alternating between them as the slices of their iceberged orders were placed in the queue. At the time the Large Order was entered, the visible volume at the touch on the buy-side was about ten lots. The Large Order was just one tick from the touch (ie two ticks from the Small Orders) and there were about 90 visible lots ahead of it in the queue.
F150 (Mr Urra) – The Small Order of 90 lots was not iceberged. 29 lots traded within 0.5 seconds of the Small Order being placed. There was then a pause of more than seven seconds before the Large Order was placed. At the time the Large Order was placed, the visible volume on the buy-side of the stack was about ten lots, with about 35 lots visible one tick away. After the Large Order was placed, the Small Order started to trade again within 0.1 seconds.
F194 (Mr Urra) – The Small Order was 25 lots iceberged to four. Eight lots had traded before the Large Order was placed. The first four lots had traded 0.741 seconds after the order was placed, the next slice was entered and there was a pause of more than 10 seconds. The next part fill of four lots occurred before the Large Order was placed, but these two events were within 0.5 seconds of each other. The Small Order continued to trade, and it filled in 12.774 seconds. This is an Instance where there was better volume available by reference to the size of the Small Order – there were about 45 lots visible at the touch on the buy-side at the time the Large Order was placed.
F201 (Mr Sheth) – One lot of the Small Order of ten lots had traded within one second of the Small Order being placed. It then paused and Mr Sheth amended the price of the Small Order 50 seconds later (increasing it twice). Having amended the price, Mr Sheth placed his first Large Order more than eight seconds later. Mr Sheth placed two Large Orders, cancelled both, made two further increases to the price of the Small Order, placed a third Large Order, then reduced the price of that order twice, and the remaining nine lots of the Small Order filled in one go. These nine lots filled nearly four minutes after the Small Order had been placed. The market was moving away from his Small Order throughout this Instance – whilst one lot had traded, at the time he placed the first Large Order the Small Order was two ticks from the touch at the back of the queue at that price point (with more than 80 lots ahead of it at that price, and around 110 lots better priced).
F232 (Mr Urra) – Mr Urra had placed a Small Order for 25 lots, uniceberged. Five lots traded within 0.5 seconds of the order being placed, and a further single lot more than eight seconds later. The Large Order was placed two seconds later. The remaining 19 lots filled within 0.2 seconds. That the Small Order had started to trade shows that the whole of the uniceberged order was at the front of the queue. There were about 40 lots visible at the touch on the sell-side.
The above are all the Specified Instances in which the Small Order had started to trade before the Large Order was placed. It can be seen that the position is different across the Traders (none of Mr Lopez’s Small Orders in the individual Specified Instances had started to trade, although all of those were at the touch when he placed the Large Orders). It is notable that some of Mr Urra’s Small Orders were already trading.
However, taking account of the Market Trend Analysis (whilst bearing in mind the identified weaknesses), and looking at the actual trading activity in these Specified Instances where the Small Order was already trading, including the pace at which the Small Orders were filling, the pauses in trading before the Large Orders were placed, and the visible volumes on the stack, we are not persuaded that a Trader who had placed the relevant Small Order could necessarily have been confident of it filling swiftly at the price at which it had been placed.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions