UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
The Traders have each emphasised in their witness statements and during cross-examination that they no longer have access to the full range of information that would have been available to them during the Relevant Period and which would have formed part of the rationale for their trading activity and that this, as well as the delays by the Authority in disclosing the information which is now available, has hindered their ability to recall matters.
The Traders have referred to having requested information from the Authority at various times during the Authority’s investigation, eg Mr Urra asked for specified categories of information on 4 April 2018. Similar requests have been made by Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth. Some, but not all, information that has been requested has been provided by the Authority. The Traders have not made an application to the Tribunal for disclosure by the Authority.
The Authority’s disclosure obligations are set out in the Upper Tribunal Rules. Paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 3 requires that the Authority provide a list of any documents on which the Authority relies in support of the referred action and any further material which in the opinion of the Authority might undermine the decision to take that action; and the secondary disclosure obligation in paragraph 6(1) then requires that the Authority disclose any further material which might reasonably be expected to assist the applicant’s case as disclosed by the applicant’s reply.
In late 2020, the Authority provided to the Traders:
Electronic RFQs received by the Desk for BTPs in the Relevant Period;
a record of all orders for Futures placed by the Traders during the Relevant Period – this includes orders which filled or partially filled as well as those which were cancelled, and identifies the Trader who placed the order, timing, direction (ie buy/sell), size and amendments made to the order; and
records of executed cash trades in BTPs entered into by the Desk in the Relevant Period.
On 1 August 2023, the Authority provided to the Traders a copy of the full Eurex dataset it had received from BaFin. This dataset listed all orders, including enters, fills, partial fills, amendments and cancellations, in Futures by all market participants during the Relevant Period.
In their written skeleton arguments and in their opening submissions the Traders referred to information that is not available. This includes the following categories:
records of RFQs received over the phone (“Voice RFQs”);
records of RFQs sent electronically through Bloomberg message/chat functionality (“Bloomberg/Chat RFQs”);
records of the information broadcast to the Traders on the squawk box;
records of the cash bond market, including interdealer market order books from Euro MTS (multiproduct), MTS Spain (Spanish bonds), Brokertec (multiproduct) and SENAF (Spanish bonds);
content of the Traders’ books of inventory at MHI; and
records of communications, including telephone calls, emails and messages, including with the sales team.
In their written closing submissions the Traders adopted different positions from each other in relation to the disclosure which had been made by the Authority:
Mr George set out a chronology of Mr Urra’s requests for information, summarising responses and what had been received, and, when outlining the “considerable amount” of information that is not before the Tribunal, said it is “not clear” whether any of this information is available to the Authority and has not been shared.
Mr Jaffey submitted that the Authority has never produced a range of relevant secondary disclosure that is “understood to be in its possession” including evidence of voice orders placed with the Desk, the squawk box data and the relevant part of MTS (most relevantly the Eurobond book), which would have provided information on a number of issues, including the cash position at any given period of time.
Mr Bailin submitted that there is now a question as to whether the Authority has properly discharged its obligations of disclosure, referring to the Enforcement Submissions Document which had been submitted to the RDC which confirmed that various communications were provided by MHI and reviewed by the EMO, namely telephone calls on fixed office lines, audio recordings from a dealer board system, emails and Bloomberg messages. EMO’s review of these had been aimed at finding any communications that explained the rationale behind the placing of the Large Orders. None of this information has been disclosed. Mr Bailin submitted that it seems clear that the communications review has not been undertaken in respect of all of the Instance Pool, or all of the Specified Instances, and did not look at the rationale for the Small Orders. The current position, he submitted, was that the Authority “simply do not know with regard to the communications review whether there is material which meets the statutory test for disclosure”.
In his oral closing submissions (which were delivered the afternoon after the exchange of lengthy written closing submissions), Mr Shivji submitted it had not been said by the Traders that the Authority has material and has failed to comply with its disclosure obligations. Mr Shivji acknowledged that it was not possible to recreate the exact trading environment, referring to the difficulties experienced by MHI in seeking to retrieve information.
The Tribunal considers that these differences between the Traders, and Mr Shivji’s submission at the hearing that it was not said by the Traders that the Authority has failed to comply with its disclosure obligations, whereas both Mr Bailin and Mr Jaffey did in fact come close (at the very least) to taking such a position in their written closing submissions, illustrate the difficulty which is faced by this Tribunal where an applicant has not made an application for disclosure before the start of the hearing. Such an application would require the applicant to set out the basis on which it considers that the Authority had material which was required to be disclosed pursuant to the Upper Tribunal Rules, and the Authority would then be expected to make representations and potentially adduce witness evidence from those who had conducted the investigation and could speak to the disclosure exercise which had been undertaken, which would include identifying material which has not been obtained by the Authority, and, separately, explaining why the Authority considers that it is not required to disclose material which is in its possession.
In the absence of an application for disclosure having been made which would have enabled the matters to which the Traders now refer (so far as they comprise allegations or suggestions of non-compliance rather than drawing attention to material to which none of the parties have access) being assessed with the benefit of submissions and witness evidence, the Tribunal is not persuaded that it would be procedurally fair to the Authority for the Tribunal to reach a conclusion that the Authority has failed to comply with its disclosure obligations in these proceedings.
The Tribunal does, however, address the range of information that is not in fact available to the Traders and its potential relevance.
The Tribunal finds that the categories of information at [92] above would have been available to the Traders at the time of the Instances. The Tribunal also finds that this information was potentially relevant to their trading activity and to the decisions which they made at that time. This is apparent from the evidence of the Traders, where they each made repeated references to this information and in relation to which they were cross-examined:
Mr Urra described his trading as being multidimensional. Mr Urra said he only had access to a fraction of the relevant information he would have had access to at the time – specifically identifying his general book positioning strategy, his views on the market (direction and curve views), what was taking place in the voice broker markets, who were the clients making enquiries or orders to work on and the MTS and Brokertec bond trade data.
Mr Lopez frequently referred in his evidence to market movements in the cash bond market on MTS, explaining that this was vital to his assessment of the market position at the time and would have informed his placing and cancellation of orders. During the day he would use the Bund futures market as a reference point as there is more liquidity and typically less price movement in the Bund futures market than in Futures.
Mr Sheth explained that cash bonds were his primary exit strategy, and referred to information from brokers and the sales team as indicators of client activity.
The Authority has produced an explanation from MHI for the absence of Voice RFQs and Bloomberg/Chat RFQs, set out in the Enforcement Submissions Document for each Trader its review of communications data (which the Tribunal infers forms the basis of the Authority’s conclusion that disclosure was not required) and, in submissions, referred to the fact that the Authority does not have the Traders’ books of inventory as they existed in real-time throughout the Relevant Period.
The Electronic RFQs from the Relevant Period had been retained in searchable form by MHI. They were provided by MHI to the Authority, have been disclosed and were in the hearing bundle. However, in response to an information request from the Authority, MHI had responded:
“Where a client submits RFQs to Sales staff by voice (on the phone) or through Bloomberg message/chat functionality, MHI responds to these RFQs by voice or Bloomberg message/ chat. Whilst these client interactions are recorded and records maintained (e.g. phone records, Bloomberg message/ chat records), they are not maintained centrally in an easily searchable format, and as such we have not included these in the attachment.
On occasion, the EGB desk may be asked to ‘work an order’ (for example, where the price quoted by MHI is rejected by the client, the client may ask the desk to trade if the price reaches a certain level). This will usually be done over the phone or through Bloomberg message/ chat. The desk has previously informed MHI Compliance Department that orders represent 1-3% of all trading activity.
In order to prepare a list of RFQs and orders received from clients by voice or through Bloomberg message/ chat during the period requested, a detailed review of electronic communications and telephone recordings between Sales staff and MHI clients would need to be undertaken.”
On the basis of this response, the Tribunal finds that MHI did not provide records of Voice RFQs or Bloomberg/Chat RFQs to the Authority. The Authority was not therefore able to review such data itself or to disclose this data to the Traders; and such records are not otherwise available to the Traders. (The communications that MHI provided to the Authority are identified at [104] below.)
It is not known how many Voice RFQs or Bloomberg/Chat RFQs may have been sent to the Desk. Mr George referred to Mr Sheth’s evidence that the records of executed trades in cash BTPs record “n/a” in the “venue” column if they were in response to a Voice RFQ or Bloomberg/Chat RFQ. There were 446 such trades in the Relevant Period, out of 1,675 recorded entries. The total number of Electronic RFQs received by the Desk in Futures during the Relevant Period was 6,972. Mr George submitted that, assuming the execution rates for Electronic, Voice and Bloomberg/Chat RFQs were broadly similar, there may have been approximately 2,500 Voice or Bloomberg/Chat RFQs during the Relevant Period. The Tribunal accepts this is a reasonable approach to estimating the number of RFQs which were sent to the Desk and in relation to which the parties (and the Tribunal) have no further information.
Save for the communications referred to at [104] below, the Authority has not provided any communications data from the Relevant Period to the Traders, whether emails, phone records, or WhatsApp/text messages. As identified by Mr Bailin, it is clear from the Enforcement Submissions Documents that the Authority did have some communications data from MHI, and MHI’s ability to capture this data is also evident from the list of material which was reviewed by Compliance in its preparation of the MHI Compliance Report.
The Enforcement Submissions Document for each Trader listed the communications provided by MHI which were reviewed by EMO as being telephone calls made on fixed office lines, audio recordings from a dealer board system, emails and Bloomberg messages. MHI had identified a technical fault with the telephone call recording system which resulted in a number of calls not being recorded, and this meant the majority of Mr Sheth’s calls were not recorded as well as calls of some members of the sales team. The review conducted by EMO was “aimed at finding any communications that explained the rationale behind the Traders’ large order placement”, and they reviewed all available communications from 30 minutes before the placement of the first Large Order in each Instance to the cancellation of the last Large Order in each Instance. This review was only conducted for some of the Instances. The EMO stated that no communications were found in which the Traders discussed their rationale for the placement of the Large Orders. They reviewed the communications for anything considered relevant to the placement of the Large Orders, as a result of which 31 communications were provided to the expert for his consideration, and he confirmed that his view of the Traders’ behaviour remained unchanged.
As regards this review by EMO, Mr Bailin drew attention to the aim being to find any communications that explained the rationale behind the placing of the Large Orders. He submitted that the Authority had not reviewed communications for any explanation of the placing of the Small Orders. This submission is relevant to the Information Discovery Strategy said to have been pursued by Mr Urra and Mr Sheth (where the Small Orders and the Large Orders were prompted by the same market activity). However, the Tribunal does not accept that the description of the scope of its review in these terms necessarily means that the EMO, in conducting the review of communications, would have rejected as irrelevant any communications in relation to the rationale for the Small Orders. Whilst Mr Urra and Mr Sheth have both provided further and more detailed explanations of the Information Discovery Strategy since they served their Replies, their explanation that there was a link between the client orders they were receiving and the placing of the Large Orders is reasonably clear from those Replies, and the Authority, we infer, concluded that there was no further material which might reasonably be expected to assist the Traders’ case as disclosed by the Replies. The Authority’s conclusion was that no secondary disclosure was required in respect of its communications review. This was not said to be incorrect by the Traders at that time.
The Authority submitted that the Traders, having seen the Eurex Letter and received the MHI Compliance Report, could have checked their own trading and secured the evidence on which they wish to rely whilst they were at MHI (seeking such assistance as they required from Compliance) - Mr Urra had continued to be employed by MHI until September 2019, Mr Lopez until February 2020 and Mr Sheth until October 2020. During cross-examination, Mr Shivji criticised the Traders for not having obtained this evidence themselves.
The Tribunal would expect Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth (whose trading activity in Futures was involved in F174 and F176) to have obtained all possible information that was potentially relevant to their trading in those Instances as soon as they became aware of the Eurex Letter. The specific activity was referenced by the Exchange, they were asked about it by Compliance, they knew they needed to provide an explanation and the events were relatively recent such that records should have been available.
However, we are not persuaded that it would have been feasible for the Traders to secure evidence in relation to all of their trading activity during the Relevant Period at that time or whilst they were at MHI, nor that they could have anticipated that this would be required:
Whilst the Traders knew their trading was under scrutiny, and the interviews with the Authority in 2018 would have reinforced the potential severity of the situation, we consider that the breadth of the Authority’s case would only have become apparent to the Traders once they received the Annotated Warning Notices in October 2020. Those notices were critical in setting out how the Authority was making its case and making clear that the Authority was relying on such a large pattern of trading activity.
To the extent that the Traders sought information from MHI as to Voice RFQs and Bloomberg/Chat RFQs which were received by the Desk, we anticipate that MHI would have given the same response to the Traders as it did to the Authority.
The Authority has not made submissions or provided evidence as to how it might have been possible for the Traders to capture or recreate data in relation to the cash BTP market from the time, or as to how they could have recreated their books of inventory showing live positions.
The Tribunal has regard to what it considers to be the practical reality, namely that the Traders only have some of the information available to them to assist with explaining their trading activity and it is not possible now to recreate the trading environment within which the Traders were working during Relevant Period. Furthermore, the Tribunal is mindful throughout that the burden of proof is on the Authority.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions