UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
The Authority submitted that the fact of the Instances meeting the Criteria gives rise to an inference that the Large Orders gave or were likely to give a false or misleading impression and/or signal as to the supply of, or demand for, Futures.
The Authority relied on Mr Creaturo’s evidence, which included that the trading activity in the Instance Pool has particular unusual features that are inconsistent with market making, in particular:
There is a notably high rate of cancellation in the Large Orders. 338 out of 341 Large Orders did not trade at all; three orders (all placed by Mr Urra) partly traded but were then moved away from the touch and/or cancelled so that they could not trade in full.
Despite the Large Orders being large for this particular market, none of the Large Orders were iceberged. This is the opposite to what he would expect if there was a genuine intention to trade the Large Orders.
The pricing of the Large Orders, having regard to their size, was unusual in this market, as they were nearly all placed away from the touch and nearly all kept away from the touch, which made them unlikely to trade. The Traders placed 1.93% of their Large Orders at or better than the touch; other market participants placed 80.34% of their Large Orders at or better than the touch.
The size of the Large Orders was inconsistent with MHI’s status as a lower tier market maker that did not engage in proprietary trading and considering the usual size and number of RFQs it received.
The overlap between the Large Orders and the Traders’ Small Orders on the opposite side of the book was unusual. Where traders need to deal with two orders, he would generally expect the priority order to be dealt with first, or for the orders to be netted.
The repeated pattern of the last Large Order being cancelled once the Small Order has traded in full (or nearly traded in full) cannot, in his view, have been a coincidence. The frequency of the overlap and the timing of cancellation suggests to him a deliberate design. His evidence was that it is the proximity in timing of the Small Orders trading and the Large Orders being cancelled that in his opinion is “particularly powerful” in showing that the Large Orders were a function of the Small Orders.
Mr Creaturo’s opinion was that “Taken collectively, [these] factors…are inconsistent with market making as I have known it throughout my career in trading. In my opinion, the only plausible explanation for the strategy used is for the purposes of assisting the execution of the Small Orders and is designed to avoid trading the [Large Orders]”. He had formed the opinion that the trading activity identified in the Instance Pool is “not explained by or consistent with the Traders’ explanations for their trading identified in their Replies and their witness statements”.
The Traders submitted by reference to the decision in Burford that the question is not whether there is a repeated pattern of trading activity but whether the Traders had an intention to trade. We agree with that submission, although note that here the Authority is relying on the pattern (including, eg, moving the price away from the touch or cancelling the Large Order when the market gets close, the time for which the Large Order was live, and the timing of cancellation after the Small Order trades) as giving rise to an inference that the Traders did not intend to trade the Large Orders.
The Criteria and the resulting pattern relied upon by the Authority can be readily seen throughout the Specified Instances. In the Single Trader Instances referred to below by way of illustration, the Large Order (or, where Mr Sheth had placed Multiple Large Orders, the Large Order closest to the touch) was cancelled within four seconds of the Small Order being filled:
F7 (Mr Urra) – The Small Order had been filling, but this paused for more than ten seconds. The Large Order was placed, and the Small Order started to fill within 0.2 seconds.
F31 (Multi Trader Instance) – Mr Urra’s Small Order was live for more than 11 seconds. Mr Urra placed a Large Order, and made several price amendments towards the touch and away again. Mr Lopez then placed a Large Order and the price of the Small Order was amended closer to the touch. Mr Urra then made further price amendments to his Large Order, towards the touch and away again, then back towards the touch, and within this time Mr Lopez also amended the price of his Large Order closer to the touch. Mr Urra’s Small Order started to fill, and during that 2.5 seconds in which it was part filling in slices there were no price amendments to the Large Orders. Trading in the Small Order paused for more than 3.5 seconds, the price of the Small Order was amended, there were further price amendments to Mr Urra’s Large Order towards the touch and the Small Order started to trade again.
F42 (Mr Lopez) – The Small Order had been live for more than 28 seconds, more than half of which at its amended price, and did not fill. The Large Order was placed and the Small Order started to fill within 0.7 seconds.
F56 (Mr Lopez) – The Small Order was live for more than 12 seconds without filling. It started to fill within 0.2 seconds of the Large Order being placed.
F60 (Mr Urra) – The Small Order was live for more than nine seconds without trading. The Large Order was placed and the Small Order started to fill within 0.3 seconds.
F103 (Mr Sheth) – The Small Order was live for more than one minute 26 seconds without filling, more than half of which at an amended price. The Large Order was placed and then cancelled after more than nine seconds. The price of the Small Order was amended. A second Large Order was placed and then, after four seconds, a third Large Order was placed, closer to the touch. The Small Order filled within 0.2 seconds of that third Large Order being placed.
F150 (Mr Urra) – The Small Order had started to fill, but this paused for more than seven seconds. The Large Order was placed and the Small Order started to fill within 0.1 seconds.
The Tribunal agrees with the Authority that the pattern of the trading activity (including the time of cancellation of the Large Orders) in the Instances could potentially support an inference that the Large Orders were placed to facilitate the execution of the Small Orders and that the Traders did not intend to trade the Large Orders.
The Traders submitted that the Criteria relied upon by the Authority are also consistent with them pursuing their Trading Strategies, and that therefore the mere fact of them being met does not support the inference drawn by the Authority. We heard from Ms Mayer for Mr Urra and Mr Bailin for Mr Sheth in relation to the Information Discovery Strategy (whose submissions we have considered together) and from Mr Jaffey for Mr Lopez in relation to the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy.
Ms Mayer and Mr Bailin submitted that the Criteria are consistent with the Information Discovery Strategy being pursued by Mr Urra and Mr Sheth:
The size of the Large Orders was part of the Information Discovery Strategy – showing volume was part of what was intended to make the orders attractive.
This required that the Large Orders were not iceberged – the process of each slice being placed at the same price but at the back of the queue may slow execution; and the strategy requires that you show the full volume available to tempt a Posited Trader into paying a premium to offload their risk in one go.
They were seeking to trade at an advantageous price, in the belief that the Posited Trader would be willing to pay a premium to transact at volume, and Mr Creaturo had accepted in principle that there is nothing wrong with placing an order away from the touch. Further, orders at the touch would be attractive and accessible to all, and would have reduced the informational value gleaned if the order were filled; placing away from the touch offered the trader the opportunity to create a profitable position.
Cancellations were very common in the market, and it was inherent in the strategy that the Posited Trader might not exist in which case it was highly unlikely that the Large Order would be filled at the price or volume at which it was placed. Three of Mr Urra’s Large Orders traded in part, and one is a Specified Instanced, F30. The cancellation is consistent with the strategy – Mr Urra wanted a Posited Trader to aggress the market; it was counterproductive to trade slowly on the back of a more general market movement.
The placing of the Small Orders and the Large Orders may have been prompted by the same client trade, which would explain their relative proximity or overlap. The correlation in timing of the Small Order filling and the Large Order being cancelled does not necessarily imply causation – an underlying event, such as the market ticking up, may have caused the Small Order to fill and prompted the Trader to cancel the Large Order. In addition, both Mr Urra and Mr Sheth had placed Lone Large Orders.
The Large Orders were not hedges for an executed cash trade. Where no RFQ has been identified, the Large Order may have been prompted by other market events or information that is no longer available.
Mr Urra and Mr Sheth didn’t know how many lots a Posited Trader would be looking to trade (with Mr Sheth referring to this as a “strategy of discovery”); they simply needed to ensure the order was sufficiently large. Round numbers fit with this.
The orders served distinct strategic purposes – the Small Orders were typically a hedge for a client trade, and the purpose of the Large Order was to provide an opportunity for MHI to trade at favourable prices. It would have been illogical and commercially counterproductive to net the orders against each other.
The Traders agreed they deliberately deployed the strategy repeatedly. Mr Sheth had also adjusted his approach after speaking to Mr Urra about his frustration with the strategy not working, by amending the price of the Large Orders and moving them closer to the touch. Both Mr Urra and Mr Sheth decreased their use of the strategy when it did not seem to be working.
Mr Jaffey submitted that the Criteria are similarly consistent with the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy:
The average size of Mr Lopez’s Large Orders was noticeably smaller than those placed by Mr Urra and Mr Sheth. The size of 200 lots was chosen by reference to the size of RFQs he expected to and did receive and was within his risk limits, so he was able to keep the hedge, including overnight.
Mr Lopez would iceberg an order to allow him to execute slowly and adjust the price during execution. For the Large Orders, he wanted them to execute, and to execute in full, at a competitive price that may only be available during a very brief pull-back in pricing.
Mr Lopez was seeking to place anticipatory hedges at very precise levels where he thought there might be interest, and placed them at a price where he thought he could be aggressed and the orders could trade at a competitive price.
The pricing of the orders meant that the orders were less likely to trade; this also reflected the information disadvantage faced by the Traders and Mr Lopez’s cautious approach.
Mr Lopez was often doing a number of things at the same time; he placed 1,139 small orders in the Relevant Period and it is not surprising that some of them overlapped. The Small Orders and the Large Orders were not connected.
The Large Orders were not hedges for executed cash trades. They were placed in anticipation of future RFQs which Mr Lopez predicted would be received by the Desk.
The number of lots, usually 200, was based on the predicted size of the RFQs Mr Lopez expected to receive, and was a hedge for medium-sized RFQs.
Netting would make no sense. The Small Orders were a hedge for his book; the Large Orders were trying to capture a price advantage.
Mr Lopez deliberately and repeatedly deployed his strategy. It is accepted that none of his Large Orders traded.
The Tribunal has some reservations about the Traders’ submissions above, in particular in relation to:
Mr Urra’s and Mr Sheth’s position that they needed to show the size of their Large Order to the market (which goes to both the number of lots used and to the decision not to iceberg their orders) – in a market in which all participants knew that there would be invisible liquidity as a result of iceberging, and therefore that there was likely to be more available at the touch than was visible, they gave no explanation as to why a participant who wanted to buy in size would not place an order in size at the price they were prepared to pay and see how much of that traded through the stack. If such other participant did indeed need to hedge, or were interested in trading at that level, they could see how much they could get done at that level. The orders placed by Mr Urra and Mr Sheth did not need to be visible for the Posited Trader to do this;
Mr Lopez’s decision not to iceberg his orders; and
the coincidence in timing between the Small Orders and the Large Orders (which primarily goes to the proximity between the Small Order being filled and the cancellation of the Large Order for all Traders, and the fact of the overlap between the Small Orders and Large Orders for Mr Lopez).
We consider that the first of these issues goes to the question of the plausibility of the Information Discovery Strategy and whether it was being pursued. The fact of the overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez and the absence of iceberging is not necessarily inconsistent with him pursuing the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy when placing Large Orders. However, the coincidence in timing between the Small Order being filled and the cancellation of the Large Orders (including in Multi Trader Instances where Large Orders had been placed by more than one Trader) is striking, and we revert to this below, but we accept that this coincidence in timing is not itself necessarily inconsistent with the Trading Strategies as described by the Traders.
The Tribunal thus accepts that the Criteria relied upon by the Authority may potentially be consistent with the pursuit of the Trading Strategies as described by the Traders.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions