UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Conclusions on market impact
Conclusions on market impact
On the basis of all the evidence before us, including not only the evidence from the experts but also the trading data from the Instances and the SMARTS data, the Tribunal reaches the following conclusions:
The Futures market was more liquid than most of the other interest rate derivatives markets on the Eurex Exchange in the Relevant Period. However, it did not have high levels of immediate liquidity at all times of day - there was significantly less liquidity after the cash bond market closed at 17.30 CET, eg in F32 (Mr Urra) where only 17 lots had traded in the five minutes before the Instance, and there was often not a high level of immediate liquidity around the time of the Specified Instances. This is evident from the Replay graphs produced by the Authority (as at the time each Large Order was placed in the Specified Instances) and by the Other Participant Analysis conducted by Mr Kasapis. By way of illustration:
There was minimal liquidity at the touch in the following Instances (by reference to the actual size of the Small Order):
F12 (Mr Urra) – the Small Order to buy 73 lots is at the touch and there is visible liquidity of about 145 lots on the buy-side (including this 73 which was not iceberged and was at the back of the queue), but only 12 to 15 lots was visible at the touch on the sell-side (and about 80 to 90 lots on each side one tick away from the touch). A total of 258 lots traded during the time the Large Order was live (using Mr Kasapis’s approach of including the traded volumes for the full minute in which the Large Order was placed and that in which it was cancelled) and the Large Order was for 475 lots;
F125 (Mr Sheth) – whilst 1,551 lots had traded in the five minutes before the Instance, in F125 itself the Small Order to sell 15 lots (which was not iceberged) is at the touch and there are about 65 lots visible on the sell-side (more than 20 of which were ahead of the Small Order in the queue), whereas there were only about 17 to 20 lots visible on the buy-side at the touch and about 26 lots visible one tick further away on the buy-side; and
F150 (Mr Urra) – the Small Order to sell 90 lots is at the touch, not iceberged and at the front of the queue. It had started to fill and there were 61 lots still to be done when the Large Order was placed. There were just ten to 15 lots visible on the buy-side at the touch and about 30 to 35 lots visible one tick away on the buy-side. The Large Order was just two ticks from the touch on the buy-side. Visible volumes were low on both sides of the stack until about 11 ticks away on the sell-side, where there were about 180 lots visible; and
F177 (Mr Lopez) – the Small Order to sell 90 lots is at the touch and iceberged to six. There were about 20 lots visible at the front of the queue, and about five to six lots behind it, which would be ahead of subsequent slices of the Small Order. There were about 18 lots visible at the touch on the buy-side, with a further 43 lots visible one tick away from the touch. Just 416 lots had traded in the five minutes before the Instance.
There were some Instances where, although liquidity throughout the stack was not high, there was a good level of visible orders at the touch and one tick away, comparative to the size of the Small Orders, eg F42 (Mr Lopez), F63 (Mr Lopez) and F64 (Multi Trader Instance).
There were Instances where the visible liquidity throughout the stack, not only at the touch but also up to four to five ticks away was multiples of the actual size of the Small Order. This could be seen in, eg, F7 (Mr Urra).
Only 0.02% of Futures orders placed on the Exchange in the Relevant Period were of 200 lots or more, and whilst the number of such orders (2,872, of which 2,406 were placed by other market participants) means that they were showing on screens multiple times per day, this is a very small proportion of the Futures activity that was seen on the market. This leads us to conclude that the Large Orders were large for the Eurex market. (They were also large by reference to the size of MHI’s market making business and related hedging, but we do not consider that to be relevant when assessing market impact.)
That the Large Orders were large in size for the Eurex market was illustrated by the Replay graphs in most of the Instances to which we were taken throughout the cross-examination of the Traders at the hearing. By way of illustration:
The Large Orders were a significant distortion to the shape of the stack at the time they were placed in most of the Instances, eg F12 (Mr Urra), F32 (Mr Urra), F64 (Multi Trader Instance), F125 (Mr Sheth) (where the Large Order was 400 lots and the visible lots were less than 100 at every price point on the entire stack), F150 (Mr Urra), F158 (Mr Sheth), F177 (Mr Lopez) (where the Large Order was 200 lots, although there were 130 lots visible on the sell-side seven ticks away from the touch) and F194 (Mr Urra).
There were some Instances where although the Large Order is distortive there were also distortions at other levels, eg F8 (Mr Urra) (where the Large Order of 333 lots is one tick from the touch and 14 and 15 ticks away from the touch are visible orders of 250 lots, on the same side as Mr Urra’s Large Order), F60 (Mr Urra) (where the Large Order of 444 lots stands out two ticks away from the touch but there were 225 lots visible four ticks away on the opposite side) and F62 (Mr Lopez).
Whilst the Futures market used iceberg functionality more than any other market, such that other market participants knew there was additional liquidity of unknown amounts throughout the stack, the visible lots of the Large Orders would not have been identifiable as single orders. A consequence of this is that other market participants could not have reasoned that orders of this size were unlikely to be iceberged.
None of the Large Orders to which we were taken were placed at the touch (although there were Specified Instances for Mr Urra where he amended the price to move the Large Order to the touch, but then moved the order away again). The Traders’ evidence was that market participants primarily focus on what is happening at the touch. Whilst we accept that this would have been important, we accept Mr Creaturo’s evidence that the Large Orders were close enough (generally two to four ticks away) that they would not only have been visible but also would have formed part of other market participants’ views on supply and demand at the time at which they were placed. This is particularly the case given the relatively low levels of visible liquidity at the touch in most of the Instances.
The result of this is that the Large Orders were each likely to give the impression or signal of significantly increased supply or demand, and we accept Mr Creaturo’s evidence that the most likely market reaction would be for the market to move in the opposite direction to the Large Orders, ie towards the Small Orders. We do not accept the Traders’ submission that this conclusion is inconsistent with the SMARTS data in relation to the large orders placed by other market participants (which were also not iceberged). Mr Jaffey’s submission, in particular, was that the Authority’s position was akin to arguing that all of these large orders would have been moving the market yet, he submitted, there was no evidence of this. That is not our conclusion; we rely on the size, time at which they were placed and price of the Large Orders in the Specified Instances. We did not have specific evidence in relation to the market, timing or the price of the 2,406 large orders placed by other market participants but 72.28% of these partially or fully traded and 80.34% of these were at the best or improved prices. These were thus mainly at the touch, or crossing the spread, ie, as Mr Creaturo put it, engaging with the market. (This can also be said of the “larger” Small Orders which were not iceberged, eg in F150 Mr Urra’s Small Order of 90 lots was not iceberged and had been placed at the touch.) We have taken these other large orders into account, but the fact that they were placed, and we infer that those that did not trade (or trade fully) were cancelled (as a matter of good order management), does not undermine our conclusion in relation to the Large Orders placed by the Traders.
We accept Mr Creaturo’s evidence that a Trader placing the Large Order in these circumstances would have known of this likelihood.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions