UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber

UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)

Fecha: 31-Ene-2025

Conclusions on market impact

Conclusions on market impact

393.

On the basis of all the evidence before us, including not only the evidence from the experts but also the trading data from the Instances and the SMARTS data, the Tribunal reaches the following conclusions:

(1)

The Futures market was more liquid than most of the other interest rate derivatives markets on the Eurex Exchange in the Relevant Period. However, it did not have high levels of immediate liquidity at all times of day - there was significantly less liquidity after the cash bond market closed at 17.30 CET, eg in F32 (Mr Urra) where only 17 lots had traded in the five minutes before the Instance, and there was often not a high level of immediate liquidity around the time of the Specified Instances. This is evident from the Replay graphs produced by the Authority (as at the time each Large Order was placed in the Specified Instances) and by the Other Participant Analysis conducted by Mr Kasapis. By way of illustration:

(a)

There was minimal liquidity at the touch in the following Instances (by reference to the actual size of the Small Order):

(i)

F12 (Mr Urra) – the Small Order to buy 73 lots is at the touch and there is visible liquidity of about 145 lots on the buy-side (including this 73 which was not iceberged and was at the back of the queue), but only 12 to 15 lots was visible at the touch on the sell-side (and about 80 to 90 lots on each side one tick away from the touch). A total of 258 lots traded during the time the Large Order was live (using Mr Kasapis’s approach of including the traded volumes for the full minute in which the Large Order was placed and that in which it was cancelled) and the Large Order was for 475 lots;

(ii)

F125 (Mr Sheth) – whilst 1,551 lots had traded in the five minutes before the Instance, in F125 itself the Small Order to sell 15 lots (which was not iceberged) is at the touch and there are about 65 lots visible on the sell-side (more than 20 of which were ahead of the Small Order in the queue), whereas there were only about 17 to 20 lots visible on the buy-side at the touch and about 26 lots visible one tick further away on the buy-side; and

(iii)

F150 (Mr Urra) – the Small Order to sell 90 lots is at the touch, not iceberged and at the front of the queue. It had started to fill and there were 61 lots still to be done when the Large Order was placed. There were just ten to 15 lots visible on the buy-side at the touch and about 30 to 35 lots visible one tick away on the buy-side. The Large Order was just two ticks from the touch on the buy-side. Visible volumes were low on both sides of the stack until about 11 ticks away on the sell-side, where there were about 180 lots visible; and

(iv)

F177 (Mr Lopez) – the Small Order to sell 90 lots is at the touch and iceberged to six. There were about 20 lots visible at the front of the queue, and about five to six lots behind it, which would be ahead of subsequent slices of the Small Order. There were about 18 lots visible at the touch on the buy-side, with a further 43 lots visible one tick away from the touch. Just 416 lots had traded in the five minutes before the Instance.

(b)

There were some Instances where, although liquidity throughout the stack was not high, there was a good level of visible orders at the touch and one tick away, comparative to the size of the Small Orders, eg F42 (Mr Lopez), F63 (Mr Lopez) and F64 (Multi Trader Instance).

(c)

There were Instances where the visible liquidity throughout the stack, not only at the touch but also up to four to five ticks away was multiples of the actual size of the Small Order. This could be seen in, eg, F7 (Mr Urra).

(2)

Only 0.02% of Futures orders placed on the Exchange in the Relevant Period were of 200 lots or more, and whilst the number of such orders (2,872, of which 2,406 were placed by other market participants) means that they were showing on screens multiple times per day, this is a very small proportion of the Futures activity that was seen on the market. This leads us to conclude that the Large Orders were large for the Eurex market. (They were also large by reference to the size of MHI’s market making business and related hedging, but we do not consider that to be relevant when assessing market impact.)

(3)

That the Large Orders were large in size for the Eurex market was illustrated by the Replay graphs in most of the Instances to which we were taken throughout the cross-examination of the Traders at the hearing. By way of illustration:

(a)

The Large Orders were a significant distortion to the shape of the stack at the time they were placed in most of the Instances, eg F12 (Mr Urra), F32 (Mr Urra), F64 (Multi Trader Instance), F125 (Mr Sheth) (where the Large Order was 400 lots and the visible lots were less than 100 at every price point on the entire stack), F150 (Mr Urra), F158 (Mr Sheth), F177 (Mr Lopez) (where the Large Order was 200 lots, although there were 130 lots visible on the sell-side seven ticks away from the touch) and F194 (Mr Urra).

(b)

There were some Instances where although the Large Order is distortive there were also distortions at other levels, eg F8 (Mr Urra) (where the Large Order of 333 lots is one tick from the touch and 14 and 15 ticks away from the touch are visible orders of 250 lots, on the same side as Mr Urra’s Large Order), F60 (Mr Urra) (where the Large Order of 444 lots stands out two ticks away from the touch but there were 225 lots visible four ticks away on the opposite side) and F62 (Mr Lopez).

(4)

Whilst the Futures market used iceberg functionality more than any other market, such that other market participants knew there was additional liquidity of unknown amounts throughout the stack, the visible lots of the Large Orders would not have been identifiable as single orders. A consequence of this is that other market participants could not have reasoned that orders of this size were unlikely to be iceberged.

(5)

None of the Large Orders to which we were taken were placed at the touch (although there were Specified Instances for Mr Urra where he amended the price to move the Large Order to the touch, but then moved the order away again). The Traders’ evidence was that market participants primarily focus on what is happening at the touch. Whilst we accept that this would have been important, we accept Mr Creaturo’s evidence that the Large Orders were close enough (generally two to four ticks away) that they would not only have been visible but also would have formed part of other market participants’ views on supply and demand at the time at which they were placed. This is particularly the case given the relatively low levels of visible liquidity at the touch in most of the Instances.

(6)

The result of this is that the Large Orders were each likely to give the impression or signal of significantly increased supply or demand, and we accept Mr Creaturo’s evidence that the most likely market reaction would be for the market to move in the opposite direction to the Large Orders, ie towards the Small Orders. We do not accept the Traders’ submission that this conclusion is inconsistent with the SMARTS data in relation to the large orders placed by other market participants (which were also not iceberged). Mr Jaffey’s submission, in particular, was that the Authority’s position was akin to arguing that all of these large orders would have been moving the market yet, he submitted, there was no evidence of this. That is not our conclusion; we rely on the size, time at which they were placed and price of the Large Orders in the Specified Instances. We did not have specific evidence in relation to the market, timing or the price of the 2,406 large orders placed by other market participants but 72.28% of these partially or fully traded and 80.34% of these were at the best or improved prices. These were thus mainly at the touch, or crossing the spread, ie, as Mr Creaturo put it, engaging with the market. (This can also be said of the “larger” Small Orders which were not iceberged, eg in F150 Mr Urra’s Small Order of 90 lots was not iceberged and had been placed at the touch.) We have taken these other large orders into account, but the fact that they were placed, and we infer that those that did not trade (or trade fully) were cancelled (as a matter of good order management), does not undermine our conclusion in relation to the Large Orders placed by the Traders.

(7)

We accept Mr Creaturo’s evidence that a Trader placing the Large Order in these circumstances would have known of this likelihood.