UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
This Instance was one of the two Instances questioned in the Eurex Letter. Mr Lopez had placed a Small Order, he also placed a Large Order and Mr Sheth placed three Large Orders.
Mr Lopez had bought a €5m May 2023 bond on MTS from MPS Capital Services at 12.58.10. This was on his own initiative, and not related to an RFQ. He placed the Small Order to sell 25 lots partially to hedge this bond transaction.
The trading activity was as follows:
At 12.58.50.334 Mr Lopez placed a Small Order to sell 25 lots, iceberged to three, for 142.15.
At 12.58.50.686 Mr Sheth placed a Large Order to buy 500 lots for 142.09. Mr Sheth placed another Large Order to buy 500 lots for 142.10 at 12.58.52.674. (The first Large Order remained live.)
Mr Lopez’s Small Order started to trade – there was a part fill of two lots.
At 12.58.57.448 Mr Lopez placed a Large Order to buy 200 lots for 142.11.
Four more lots of the Small Order traded.
At 12.59.00.588 Mr Sheth placed a third Large Order to buy 500 lots for 142.11.
The Small Order continued to trade.
At 12.59.00.785 Mr Lopez amended the price of his Large Order, increasing it to 142.12.
The Small Order continued to trade, filling at 12.59.03.536.
All four Large Orders were cancelled. Of his three orders, Mr Sheth cancelled his order which was at the highest price first (ie the one that had been placed third, for 142.11), then those further away from the touch. The cancellations were at 12.59.04.531 to 12.59.06.704.
The explanations given for the Large Orders were as follows:
In his witness statement and in cross-examination Mr Lopez explained how he may have considered that a support level could have formed at around 141.85, anticipated client buying interest based on RFQs which had been received by the Desk, and may have seen that the Bund/BTP Futures spread wanted to tighten. He therefore placed his Large Order in anticipation of client buying interest.
Mr Sheth explained that he would have seen that Mr Lopez had bought the bond from MPS Capital Services and would have deployed the Information Discovery Strategy in relation to this. In cross-examination, when presented with Mr Lopez’s explanation (ie that the cash bond was not related to an RFQ), Mr Sheth put forward an alternative possibility, namely that he had seen that MPS Capital Services, a market maker, was selling, and might have hypothesised that it might be on the back of what MPS treasury would be doing.
The coincidences in this Instance are:
Mr Sheth placed his first Large Order 0.352 seconds after Mr Lopez placed the Small Order. Mr Lopez’s cash bond trade had been done 40 seconds previously, so at this point in time it is unlikely that Mr Sheth would have been responding to that information on the MTS screen.
Mr Sheth had placed Large Orders priced at 142.09 and 142.10. Mr Lopez’s Large Order was priced at 142.11. Mr Sheth placed his third Large Order at that price and 0.197 seconds later Mr Lopez increased the price of his Large Order to 142.12.
The whole Instance takes place over 56.37 seconds from placing of the Small Order to the final cancellation of the Large Orders. Yet, within this, once the Small Order is filled, all four Large Orders are cancelled within 3.168 seconds.
The strategies relied upon by Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth would suggest that they are doing different things – Mr Lopez is trying to position himself for client buying interest (ie which would involve MHI selling bonds) whereas Mr Sheth is testing whether another market maker needs to sell Futures having bought bonds from a client splitting a sell-side RFQ. Yet both have decided to place a Large Order to buy Futures within a very short period of time.
Both Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth denied collaborating with each other. Mr Lopez’s evidence was that the timings were not a coincidence; the timing can be explained by the market information which would have been on the MTS screen, showing the movements in the cash bonds. They both denied knowing of the orders which had been placed by the other Trader.
The Traders relied on the activity in this Instance, in particular Mr Sheth having placed Multiple Large Orders in a Multi Trader Instance, submitting that the Authority’s case relies on Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth both knowing what the other is doing, yet Mr Sheth had already placed two Large Orders, totalling 1,000 lots, at the time Mr Lopez placed a Large Order of 200 lots. If they were coordinating, Mr Lopez would have known of these Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth, would not have seen the need to place another 200 lots, and would have seen that Mr Sheth was failing to amend the price of his Large Orders but instead placing new Large Orders at a different price and failing to cancel the earlier Large Order(s). Essentially, the Traders submitted that, if the Traders were involved in an abusive scheme, Mr Lopez would have seen that Mr Sheth was deploying this poorly and risked drawing attention to their activity.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions