UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Step 2
Step 2
The figure at Step 2 will be the greater of a figure based on “relevant income”, a profit multiple, and, for market abuse cases which the Authority assesses to be seriousness level 4 or 5, £100,000.
The relevant period for calculating Mr Sheth’s relevant income is the 12-month period from 30 July 2015 to 29 July 2016, and his relevant income for that period was £82,478.
Mr Bailin referred to DEPP 6.5C.2.2, which provides that the minimum penalty “for market abuse cases which the [Authority] assesses to be seriousness level 4 or 5, £100,000. The [Authority] usually expects to assess market abuse cases committed deliberately as seriousness level 4 or 5”. Mr Bailin submitted:
DEPP also acknowledges that level 4 will not be appropriate in every case of deliberate market abuse, and those factors must be weighed against other factors. DEPP 6.5C contains a list of level 1, 2 and 3 factors, the presence of which in Mr Sheth’s case tend to indicate that his case should have been assessed as level 3 seriousness, namely:
little, or no, profits were made or losses avoided as a result of the market abuse, either directly or indirectly; and
there was no, or limited, actual or potential effect on the orderliness of, or confidence in, markets as a result of the market abuse.
The consequences for Mr Sheth in the Step 2 figure being assessed at level 4 has meant that the minimum penalty of £100,000 has been engaged; yet had his penalty been calculated based on level 4 at 30% seriousness, the penalty would have been £24,843 (being 30% of £82,478). The penalty of £100,000 is disproportionate compared to the penalties imposed on Mr Urra and Mr Lopez by reference to their relevant income. Mr Sheth was the junior trader on the Desk and this is not just and fair.
There are good and appropriate reasons to follow DEPP 6.5C in principle but to depart from it so as to ensure the penalty is fair and just, namely through the application of a percentage of income based approach. To not do so produces disproportionate consequences for Mr Sheth.
Alternatively, the Tribunal could find that the disproportionate consequences stem from the assessment of Mr Sheth’s conduct at level 4, the same level as that assessed for the other Traders. This takes no account of his more junior status, that he did not cause or encourage others to commit market abuse, he did not occupy a prominent position in the market, he was not an experienced industry professional and he did not hold a senior position at MHI. If the conduct had been found to be level 3 seriousness, the penalty would have been calculated based on a percentage of Mr Sheth’s relevant income.
We have found that Mr Sheth’s conduct was deliberate and dishonest. Whilst we accept that the identified level 1, 2 and 3 factors are present, the Tribunal does not consider that the seriousness could be less than level 4 where conduct is deliberate and dishonest, notwithstanding that Mr Sheth was the more junior trader.
If the Tribunal were to apply the approach in DEPP without any adjustments, the Step 2 figure would then be, as calculated by the Authority, the higher of (i) 30% of Mr Sheth’s relevant income of £82,478, ie £24,743, (ii) a profit multiple of 3 applied to his financial benefit of £0, ie £0, and (iii) £100,000.
The Tribunal recognises that the minimum penalty of £100,000 assists with the promotion of the Authority’s policy to promote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct by deterring persons who have committed breaches from committing further breaches, helping to deter other persons from committing similar breaches and demonstrating generally the benefits of compliant behaviour. The Tribunal accepts and agrees that a penalty of £24,743 may not be seen as being of sufficient magnitude for this purpose.
Addressing Mr Bailin’s submissions by reference to the penalties assessed on Mr Urra and Mr Lopez, their relevant income is £744,800 and £143,089 respectively, and we have determined that it will be appropriate for the Authority to impose financial penalties of £223,440 and £100,000 respectively. We do accept that, by reference to relevant income, imposing a penalty of £100,000 on Mr Sheth would be disproportionate to those imposed on Mr Urra and Mr Lopez, and that this is not fair or just. We do not, for this purpose, put any weight on Mr Sheth’s junior status, his relative experience, or their respective roles at MHI; we have found that all three Traders committed market abuse and that their conduct was dishonest. We have decided that it would be appropriate to calculate the Step 2 figure by reference to the proportion which Mr Sheth’s relevant income bears to that of Mr Lopez and to apply that percentage to the amount determined for Mr Lopez at Step 2. This results in a Step 2 figure for Mr Sheth of £57,641 (£82,478/£143,089 x £100,000). This remains imperfect, including by reference to the relevant income of Mr Urra; but we consider that it pays due regard to the Authority’s approach that the figure at Step 2 should not necessarily be limited to 30% of relevant income where the market abuse has been assessed as level 4 seriousness.
Step 2 is therefore £57,641.
Step 3
The Tribunal considers that there are no aggravating or mitigating factors such as to justify an adjustment to the Step 2 figure. Step 3 is therefore £57,641.
Step 4
We consider that the figure of £57,641 is sufficient to deter Mr Sheth, and others, from committing further or similar abuse. We do not increase the penalty at Step 4.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions