UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Interviews with Compliance
Interviews with Compliance
Members of MHI’s Compliance team interviewed the Traders and Mr Heiberg. The notes of those interviews were prepared by Compliance, and were signed (unamended) by the relevant Trader. Giving evidence, the Traders challenged the accuracy of these notes.
Mr Urra was interviewed by Mr Joshi, Mr Algeo and Mr Lloyd (all from Compliance) at 8.30am on 29 July 2016. The note of that meeting records that Mr Urra had noted that the orders looked strange. It records:
“Mr Urra noted that the desk had concerns that futures orders placed by MHI were being front run, possibly by algorithms … MHI had raised this with Bloomberg and MSUSA. Mr Urra stated that MHI undertook “price discovery” by putting capital at risk and that adding size to an order neutralised this front running effect. Mr Urra was asked whether this was the reason for these trades that Eurex had highlighted and he stated that this would not have been the reason for placing these orders.”
When he returned with a written response at midday, the note of the meeting records Mr Urra “stated that the large bid orders related to liquidity provision to get some size into the books into a curve position, for example if other dealers were hit by cash bond sellers at once. Mr Urra added that the multiple large orders being placed on the book was an error – the correct procedure should have been to amend the price of the original order”.
The Tribunal did not have a copy of Mr Urra’s written response which he provided at that time. Mr Urra produced a second draft on 2 August 2016. That note, which was included in the MHI Compliance Report, says “… the ask side trades refer to hedging at market level of cash transactions and the bid side liquidity provision below the market refers to an interest to get some size into the books into a curve position in case other market participants decide to take advantage of the size of the bid, which could have happened should the cash bond sellers or futures block hedging of the time were hitting several dealers at once”.
Mr Urra was then interviewed by Mr Joshi, Mr Algeo and Mr Tippetts on 5 August 2016. The note has a sub-heading “Price Discovery rationale” and refers to MHI not having the same level of information as primary dealers in the market as they do not see the flow, that the desk may contribute liquidity to the market and that they only decide to use price discovery if they feel “blind” to what is going on and need to gather more information to give them direction. The Desk began trading in this way around March 2016.
Both of these notes were signed by Mr Urra on 12 October 2016, and when giving evidence Mr Urra said he had not scrutinised them at that time.
Mr Sheth was interviewed by Mr Algeo and Mr Lloyd on 3 August 2016. The note of the interview says that Mr Sheth explained that the large buy orders placed beneath the current market execution price provided information on the market. The futures market was not very liquid, and price transparency was not great as much use was made of hidden orders. Mr Sheth said that the Desk suspected that their orders were being “front run” by other firms’ algorithms, and “Mr Sheth noted that the placing of large opposite side orders away from the current traded market level often had the effect of enabling the desk to get their smaller orders executed at the current traded market level”. Mr Sheth explained that the large orders were used for price discovery purposes on other occasions, eg to price up a security for a client, rather than as part of filling a client order. The entry of multiple large orders was said to be a mistake.
Mr Sheth was interviewed by Mr Joshi and Mr Tippetts on 9 August 2016. The background section of the note of that interview refers to Mr Joshi saying that he would like to understand the rationale for the transactions and to understand more clearly how the trading strategy aids price discovery. The note records that Mr Sheth explained that the Desk did not always put on orders on the opposite side of a small order. When a client asks for a bid/offer, the Desk does not have the complete picture of the market since they only see 10-20% of what is happening. Large orders were often priced two or three ticks away from the market, but in BTPs that is not substantially away. The multiple orders were a mistake – a likely reason for this might have been that he had intended to cancel or amend the trade.
The notes of these interviews were signed by Mr Sheth but not dated.
MHI responded to the Eurex Letter, and Compliance then conducted interviews with Mr Lopez and Mr Heiberg.
Mr Lopez was interviewed by Mr Joshi, Mr Algeo and Mr Lloyd on 29 September 2016. The note of the interview records that Mr Lopez had stated that in April the Desk had been asked to get more business and increase flow. It needed to offer tighter pricing in order to achieve this and, as a result, better market information was needed. Mr Lopez said his order of 200 lots (in F174) had been for price discovery purposes, as some clients hit multiple dealers with orders at the same time. He also noted that if the orders were filled then they would be of benefit to the positioning side of the Desk’s activities. Mr Lopez expanded on the rationale for “price discovery”, explaining that the BTP market was less liquid than core markets and prices were more erratic. The purpose is to understand how liquid the market was in order for the Desk to be able to offer the tight pricing required by clients. This activity of placing orders, in part for price discovery purposes, had been common at his previous employer and it was a widespread practice in the market. Mr Lloyd had queried the sequence for price discovery – Mr Lopez agreed that a price discovery trade would be placed first, then based on the results a firm quote would be provided to the cash client and then a hedging futures order would be placed. The note includes a section on the placing of multiple orders, with Mr Lopez recorded as saying that this was “in part due to the configuration of the order book on his PC”.
Mr Lopez signed the note of that meeting on 11 October 2016.
Mr Heiberg was interviewed by Mr Joshi and Mr Lloyd on 6 October 2016. The note of that interview referred to them having previously had a number of conversations with him. In his view on the explanations it is said he had not been aware that the Desk was engaging in “this pattern of trading prior to the Eurex letter”, that Mr Urra had indicated that “this” was a one-off and had not disclosed that there had been a repeated pattern of similar trading. Mr Heiberg said that capturing a potential basis position was a possible explanation for these orders, but that the frequency, their size and timing meant this was “not a fully convincing explanation”.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions