UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Collaboration
Collaboration
The Authority’s position is that the Traders were collaborating in real-time, in person, during the Instances to commit an abusive scheme, and, in the Multi Trader Instances, this involved updating each other on the progress of trading of the Small Order (including not trading or going slowly) and giving sufficient information for the other Trader(s) to place a Large Order in the opposite direction, and then confirming once the Small Order had filled (or mostly filled) at which point the other Trader(s) would cancel the Large Order(s).
The Traders did not share a common blotter, so if one Trader was placing a Small Order and another Trader was going to place a Large Order in the opposite direction to facilitate the execution of the Small Order, they would need to be told the direction in which to place the Large Order, when to do so and when to cancel (even on the assumption that pricing and the nudging of the Large Order closer to the touch were decisions taken alone by the Trader placing that Large Order).
We heard evidence from the Traders as to how they worked together on the Desk, during the course of which, as well as denying that they were collaborating on an abusive scheme, they each gave evidence that they did not discuss their specific trading activity with each other:
Mr Urra said that “opportunities for collaboration were very limited” and “they rarely discussed specific trades, and they primarily focussed on their own books”.
Mr Lopez said that he “did not trade collaboratively with either Mr Urra or Mr Sheth” and that “[w]e did not have a common strategy on the EGB Desk as to how we were going to approach our market making activities”; even where he was hedging for Mr Urra, “I work completely independently”.
Mr Sheth said that the Traders “would tend to trade independently, albeit pursuing the wider strategies and objectives of the EGB Desk”.
We have found that there is no documentary, electronic communications or witness evidence of the Traders collaborating to commit market abuse. Indeed, the Tribunal considers that the evidence goes beyond this (negative) finding:
There is positive evidence from Mr Hill and Mr Barouti that they saw and heard nothing which led them to suspect that the Traders were engaged in anything untoward.
The MHI Compliance Report describes its communications review and found no issues from its review of Bloomberg messages and chats, email communications and telephone records.
The Authority has had access to at least some of the electronic and voice communications between the Traders, namely telephone calls on fixed office lines, audio recordings from the dealer board system, emails and Bloomberg messages. The Authority reviewed the communications data for the rationale for placing of the Large Orders, and have not disclosed that data, ie they do not rely on it themselves nor in the opinion of the Authority might it undermine the decision to take the referred action.
Mr Lopez was on holiday for the first two weeks in August 2016, during which time Mr Urra and Mr Sheth were both interviewed by Compliance. Yet there was no evidence of communications between the Traders during this period.
The Authority submits that this absence of evidence is unsurprising – there was no need for the Traders, who sat next to each other, to document their plan, the acts required to instruct each other to place and cancel orders at particular prices and times would have sounded like ordinary trading activity, and Mr Hill and Mr Barouti were focused on their own trading. Further, and in contrast to the Traders’ denial of any form of collaboration (even about what was agreed to be genuine trading activity) Mr Shivji submitted that there would be reasons to have specific conversations of the type that is denied by the Traders about particular trading – avoiding the risk of errors (by inadvertently trading with each other on the Exchange or breaching the Desk’s limits), when hedging for each other, and the responsibility of Mr Urra and Mr Lopez to supervise when they delegated tasks to Mr Sheth. Mr Shivji also relied on the activity and the coincidences of timing in the Multi Trader Instances themselves.
On the basis of all the evidence, the Tribunal concludes that the Traders were understating the extent to which they did work together and communicate in relation to specific trading activity:
We accept Mr Creaturo’s evidence that trading desks are dynamic environments with frequent communications between the traders, not just about general market information but more specific discussion about what the traders were doing at the time; and that it would be highly unusual for a trading desk not to communicate with one another.
They decided who would respond to particular RFQs, with there being no fixed allocation of RFQs to each of them. Mr Urra would sometimes respond to medium-sized RFQs where he could offer a better price, a decision which itself would require communication as they identified what price they could each offer.
They hedged for each others’ books, and would need, at the very least, to communicate size and direction. In F84 it can be seen that Mr Sheth placed the initial amount of the hedge, with Mr Lopez placing an order for more (we infer once the exact amount required was identified).
In addition, we find that Mr Sheth’s evidence was inconsistent in its approach as to the level of communication on the Desk. His evidence was that if his Large Order had traded, he would have tried to manage it himself first for a few seconds, then sought the assistance of Mr Urra to exit the position. But he also said that not only did he not discuss his use of the Information Discovery Strategy with Mr Urra in relation to particular clients, but that he did not check with Mr Urra whether it would be a good time to try using the strategy, ie whether Mr Urra would be available to assist. This seems to present a difficult scenario, particularly where the Tribunal can see the level of activity on the Desk in short bursts of time and that there were occasions where Mr Lopez and/or Mr Sheth were hedging for Mr Urra yet somehow Mr Sheth was expecting that Mr Urra would have time to assist. We do accept that the size of the Large Orders and the risks to the Desk, proportionate to the size of the Desk’s usual business, means that Mr Urra would have assisted; but consider it surprising that Mr Sheth would have proceeded on such a basis.
We find that the Traders would have been able to carry out the abusive scheme alleged by the Authority in person. We agree with the Authority that, once the Traders came up with a plan (which was in essence very straightforward), they would be able to give any instructions and share information quickly in person in real time; that Mr Urra sat in between Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth would not preclude such coordination between Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth in Multi Trader Instances which did not include orders being placed by Mr Urra (eg F94 and F174) in circumstances where Mr Urra was aware of the abusive scheme. The question is whether or not they did.
Mr Shivji drew attention – both in his submissions and during cross-examination of the Traders – to the occasions on which the Traders placed, amended or cancelled Large Orders so close in time to the activity of another Trader as to be “virtually simultaneous”. The Traders said this was not a coincidence, as it was driven by market information. Mr Shivji submitted that this was no explanation at all – on the Traders’ cases, they were pursuing different strategies, prompted (they say) by completely different triggers and with different aims.
The Tribunal addresses here the activity in the Multi Trader Instances relied upon by the Authority as Specified Instances. The Traders say these are not multi trader instances at all, on the basis that (as we have found) there is no common blotter showing live orders on the Exchange, and (the Traders submit) the Traders were not collaborating and therefore did not know of the orders being placed by another Trader.
We set out below the orders placed by the Traders in the Multi Trader Instances:
Small Orders | Large Orders | |||
Trader | Size | Trader | Size | |
F30 | Mr Urra | 9 lots | Mr Urra | 500 lots (39 filled) |
Mr Lopez | 5 lots | |||
Mr Urra | 39 lots (not filled) | |||
F31 | Mr Urra | 39 lots | Mr Urra | 499 lots |
Mr Lopez | 400 lots | |||
F64 | Mr Lopez | 160 lots (122 filled) | Mr Urra | 480 lots |
Mr Urra | 480 lots | |||
Mr Sheth | 500 lots | |||
F82 | Mr Sheth | 20 lots | Mr Urra | 450 lots |
Mr Sheth | 17 lots | Mr Sheth | 500 lots | |
Mr Urra | 500 lots | |||
F84 | Mr Sheth | 200 lots | Mr Urra | 490 lots |
Mr Lopez | 55 lots | |||
F94 Part I | Mr Sheth | 10 lots | Mr Sheth | 500 lots |
Mr Lopez | 5 lots | |||
Part II | Mr Lopez | 5 lots | Mr Sheth | 500 lots |
Mr Sheth | 500 lots | |||
F121 | Mr Sheth | 22 lots | Mr Sheth | 400 lots |
Mr Urra | 450 lots | |||
Mr Sheth | 400 lots | |||
Mr Sheth | 400 lots | |||
Mr Sheth | 400 lots | |||
Mr Sheth | 400 lots | |||
Mr Sheth | 400 lots | |||
F174 | Mr Lopez | 25 lots | Mr Sheth | 500 lots |
Mr Sheth | 500 lots | |||
Mr Lopez | 200 lots | |||
Mr Sheth | 500 lots | |||
F205 | Mr Urra | 10 lots | Mr Urra | 450 lots |
Mr Urra | 10 lots | Mr Lopez | 200 lots | |
Mr Lopez | 5 lots | |||
Mr Lopez | 5 lots | |||
F209 | Mr Lopez | 35 lots | Mr Urra | 450 lots |
Mr Lopez | 4 lots | Mr Sheth | 250 lots | |
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions