UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Placing of concurrent Large Orders
Placing of concurrent Large Orders
There are different ways in which concurrent Large Orders appear in the Instance Pool:
the placing of Multiple Large Orders by Mr Sheth, eg, in F103, F176 and F201, where the orders were for the same number of lots (usually 500) but subsequent orders were placed closer to the touch and which he said were a mistake and that they were a result of him wanting to amend the price of his existing Large Order;
Mr Urra placed concurrent Large Orders within a single Instance. In F82 he placed two Large Orders of 450 lots each. He agreed this was not a mistake; and this is confirmed by the way in which he made price amendments to both of them in the second half of the Instance. Mr Urra thus had concurrent Large Orders for a total of 900 lots, and the second of those Large Orders was placed within a second of Mr Sheth placing a Large Order in the same direction for 500 lots. Mr Urra also placed concurrent Large Orders in F59 and F220, totalling 900 lots on both occasions; and
there were Instances where more than one Trader placed a Large Order in the same direction. In addition to F82 above, this appeared in:
F31 where Mr Lopez’s Large Order of 400 lots overlapped with Mr Urra’s Large Order of 499 lots;
F121 where Mr Sheth placed six Large Orders of 400 lots each, not all of which overlapped, but whilst two of these orders for 400 lots were live Mr Urra placed a Large Order of 450 lots; and
F209 where Mr Urra’s Large Order of 450 lots overlapped with Mr Sheth’s Large Order of 250 lots.
The Tribunal considers that all three of these variations present somewhat inconsistent possibilities, even before we consider in more detail Mr Sheth’s explanation for the Multiple Large Orders.
The placing of concurrent Large Orders by a single Trader (including Mr Sheth’s Multiple Large Orders) could support the Authority’s position that the Traders were applying increasing pressure to the order book according to the levels of supply and demand needed to be shown at a particular time (a submission that was also made by Mr Shivji when explaining that, contrary to Mr Jaffey’s submissions in relation to the size of Mr Lopez’s Large Orders, the Authority did not accept that an order of 200 lots would always be sufficient to facilitate the execution of a Small Order but it depended on price and the total volume of lots being placed). However, if there was an abusive scheme, and its operation required more than one Large Order to be placed, it is not clear why these would then be placed by different Traders, ie why Mr Urra and Mr Sheth would both be placing Large Orders, rather than one of them simply placing more than one Large Order. Yet if Mr Urra and Mr Sheth were pursuing an Information Discovery Strategy, and they say they were not coordinating or discussing their activity during an Instance, they were pursuing it rather ineptly if they both decided to test the theory of a client splitting an order at the same time without telling each other (whether before, during or afterwards). It is notable that there are concurrent Large Orders involving all three Traders, including Mr Lopez, who on his account was pursuing a different strategy and yet was doing the same thing by placing Large Orders in the same direction and very close in time to Mr Urra and Mr Sheth.
The Multiple Large Orders are the overlapping Large Orders which were placed by Mr Sheth in a single Instance, eg in F103 on 21 June 2016 (which was the first date on which he placed Multiple Large Orders) he placed a Large Order to sell 500 lots for 141.14 at 16.29.57.570, cancelled it, then placed a Large Order to sell 500 lots for 141.13 at 16.31.33.702, with his next action being to place another Large Order to sell 500 lots for 141.12 at 16.31.37.776.
Mr Sheth’s evidence was that the Multiple Large Orders were “poor practice” and a mistake, arising as a result of his inexperience and lack of training in operating Bloomberg Escalator, and arose where he wanted to amend the price of his Large Order. The details of his explanation are considered further below.
The MHI Compliance Report had concluded that this was “poor practice”, and Mr Heiberg had described Mr Sheth’s explanation as a “plausible explanation” in his interview with the Authority.
In its Amended Statement of Case for Mr Sheth at [64] the Authority’s position was “Mr Sheth has also suggested that in some cases, where he placed multiple, overlapping Large Orders, these were in fact intended to be amendments to an existing Large Order. Whether or not this is true does not affect the Authority’s assessment of the purpose of the placement of a Large Order on the opposite side of the order book to a small order.” At the hearing Mr Shivji set out the Authority’s position that it did not accept that these subsequent Large Orders were a mistake, or anything other than deliberate behaviour.
In support of Mr Sheth’s position, Mr Bailin submitted that the placing of Multiple Large Orders only served to draw attention to the trading activity during the Relevant Period. This could be seen in, eg F176, one of the Instances questioned by the Exchange, where Mr Sheth placed a total of seven Large Orders and at one point four of them were on the market at one tick intervals, thus showing a total of 2,000 lots on the buy-side.
Mr Sheth has consistently described these Multiple Large Orders as being a mistake, from the first time he was interviewed by Compliance. He said he wanted to amend the price of his Large Order and move it closer to the touch.
Mr Sheth acknowledged that he did know a way to amend the price of a Large Order within Escalator, but described the relevant steps as “slow and cumbersome”, and that in a dynamic trading environment it was far quicker to place a new Large Order. That Mr Sheth knew how to amend the price is clear from F103 itself, as Mr Sheth had amended the price of the Small Order before placing the first Large Order in that Instance. Mr Sheth had initially explained that he forgot to cancel the original order and did not intend to have more than one Large Order in the market at any point; but at the hearing he explained that in his mind the primary focus was the order at the best price, and he considered that the market would not get to his earlier Large Orders which were further away from the touch. His own explanation also makes it clear that he knew that he had not cancelled the first Large Order before placing the second at a better price. The different behaviours are also illustrated in F103, where he cancelled the first Large Order before placing the second, but did not cancel the second before placing the third. Mr Sheth’s focus on the order closest to the touch was then illustrated by his consistency in the order of cancellation of the Large Orders in the Instances involving Multiple Large Orders, as he cancelled that which was closest to the touch first.
The difficulties we have with the terminology of mistake are:
Mr Sheth knew the difference between amending the price of an order and placing a new order at a different price (he accepted this in evidence and this could be seen in the Instances, including in F103);
he did sometimes place a Large Order, cancel it, then place a new Large Order at a different price (eg in F94, which took place on 21 June 2016); and
he knew he had not cancelled the first order which meant that it remained live (he accepted this in evidence, explaining his focus on the order closest to the touch).
The result of these actions, and even based on Mr Sheth’s own evidence, is that at the time he placed the second (and subsequent) concurrent Large Orders in any Instance (and this would be the placing of the third Large Order in F103) he no longer had an intention to trade the previous Large Orders which had been placed and not cancelled (this would be the second Large Order in F103).
The Tribunal considers the issue to be better described as whether this was poor practice (rather than a mistake) or Mr Sheth deliberately increasing the number of lots on the order book to apply further pressure on the book. We accept that placing a new order rather than amending an existing order could be the poor practice of a kind a more junior trader might make.
Mr Bailin submitted that these Multiple Large Orders are potentially significant:
The first Instance involving Mr Sheth’s trading activity was on 13 June 2016, and the first Multiple Large Order did not occur until 21 June 2016. We accept that this raises a question as to whether there was a trigger for this change in behaviour. Mr Sheth’s evidence was that he had spoken to Mr Urra about his frustration with the strategy not working, and that Mr Urra had encouraged him to move his orders closer to the touch. The Authority’s case includes that any explanations now about these discussions on the strategy are fabricated, as they were not pursuing a legitimate strategy, yet the Tribunal acknowledges that in cross-examination by Mr Jaffey (in the context of Mr Lopez’s trading), Mr Creaturo had said that if a trader came to him saying they wanted to trade but their orders were not trading he would encourage them to move the order closer to the touch and iceberg it. (We recognise that these questions were put to Mr Creaturo against the background of Mr Lopez’s evidence that he was looking to take directional risk, having sought to analyse the support and resistance levels within the market.)
Mr Sheth placed these Multiple Large Orders in Multi Trader Instances (as well as in Single Trader Instances), which raises a question as to why, if these orders were a mistake or poor practice and the Traders were acting together to commit market abuse, Mr Urra and Mr Lopez did not notice these orders on the stack and check with Mr Sheth that they were not his to ensure he did not draw unwanted attention to their actions:
In F121 Mr Sheth placed a Small Order to buy 22 lots. Mr Sheth placed six Large Orders in this Instance and Mr Urra placed one Large Order. During that Instance there is more than one point in time where two of Mr Sheth’s Large Orders were on the market at the same time (and on the first occasion they also overlapped with Mr Urra’s Large Order).
In F174 Mr Lopez had placed a Small Order and both Mr Lopez and Mr Sheth placed Large Orders. Mr Sheth placed three Large Orders, of 500 lots each, which were on the market at the same time (including concurrently with Mr Lopez’s Large Order for 200 lots). By the end of the Instance there were Large Orders of 1,700 lots, and Mr Sheth’s final Large Order was at the same price as Mr Lopez’s Large Order.
The volume of the Multiple Large Orders must have been seen by Mr Lopez in F174 as three of them overlap. It is less obvious in F121 as Mr Sheth had a pattern in that Instance of placing the second then cancelling the first, so they overlapped for a shorter period of time. Mr Shivji submitted that this occurrence in Multi Trader Instances is not enlightening as the Multiple Large Orders were not a mistake and were consistent with the practice which can be seen in other Instances of the Traders placing concurrent Large Orders.
The Tribunal is not persuaded that the Multiple Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth should necessarily be assessed entirely separately from the other Large Orders. Mr Urra had also placed concurrent Large Orders within an Instance, and amended the price of his Large Orders closer to the touch.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions