UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
Mandate
Mandate
The Traders each gave evidence that they believed their trading was permitted by the Mandate:
Mr Urra did not accept that the Desk was only permitted to carry out market making in cash EGBs and not in Futures. He said he did not recall that the Mandate permitted trading in Futures only for the purpose of hedging. He considered that speculative positions, even those taking directional risk, would be within the Mandate. He did not think the Mandate was scrutinised, and interpreted it as a wide mandate, and took the position that as long as a trade was within the Desk’s limits, a trader was permitted (by the Mandate) to carry the risk.
Mr Lopez did not have a specific recollection of being shown the Mandate; but it is a document he would have known about, and the limits and concepts referenced therein were familiar to him and consistent with his understanding of what the Desk was allowed to do and did in practice. Mr Lopez emphasised that the Mandate permitted “transactions in hedging instruments in anticipation of a highly likely near term exposure to risk, where there is a sound risk management rationale for such anticipatory hedging”.
Mr Sheth couldn’t recall having seen the Mandate at the time, but took the position that his manager, Mr Urra, had shown him the Information Discovery Strategy and therefore it must be within the Mandate.
Mr George, Mr Jaffey and Mr Bailin referred to the conclusions reached by MHI, submitting not only that the Trading Strategies complied with the Mandate but that what mattered was whether the Traders thought that they would be considered by Compliance to be in breach of the Mandate if they pursued the Trading Strategies.
The Tribunal finds it is objectively clear from the terms of the Mandate that:
The Mandate authorises market-making in EGBs, which would include cash BTPs, and hedging in EGB Futures (including BTP Futures) (which we find are Government bond futures and not exchange traded interest rate futures for this purpose).
The Mandate does not authorise market making in Futures.
The market making policy refers to the size of the Desk’s market making inventory and says it must be designed not to exceed, on an ongoing basis, the reasonably expected near-term demand of market making customers. However, this reference to the inventory which may be held is clearly to the instruments in which the Desk may market make, ie EGBs/BTPs, but not the hedging instruments, the Futures.
The Mandate requires that overall trading and hedging strategies must be evaluated and approved by the Desk Head (Mr Urra) and Division Trading Head (Mr Heiberg) (after consultation with the Risk Management and Compliance departments). It provides that Mr Urra and Mr Heiberg must demonstrate that proposed new or amended strategies will not present a high risk to MHI, can be managed within limits, will be appropriately controlled and will comply with the Volcker Rule’s requirements.
We regard the Traders’ attitudes towards the Mandate as potentially significant.
The Traders did not seek approval for their Trading Strategies in accordance with the requirements of the Mandate, a matter which was not addressed by the MHI Compliance Report. This was in circumstances where Mr Urra was responsible for the Desk’s adherence to the Mandate and, on his own account, had devised a new strategy that was not being used by others in the market; whilst Mr Lopez described the practice of anticipatory hedging as “entirely normal practice”, this failed to reflect the fact that the size of the orders he was placing was targeted at a size of RFQ which represented only about 3% of those sent to MHI; and Mr Sheth put forward an explanation of not having seen the Mandate but assumed it must comply as he was being shown a strategy by his manager, even though the training he had undertaken at MHI must have made it clear to him that the Desk’s activities were constrained, and that he must act within limits.
The MHI Compliance Report concluded that:
“The large futures orders, to the extent that these were placed with a view to establishing a hedge against expected near term customer trades or to establish a basis position for future sale to clients, would fall into the category of “anticipatory hedging”, and are permitted by the Desk’s mandate.”
We have already expressed our concerns in relation to the position as understood by Compliance at that time. In addition, we consider that the framing of this conclusion, by reference “to the extent that…” the trades were placed for the stated purpose weakens the strength of this conclusion.
In his interview with the Authority Mr Joshi had described speculative pre-positioning in order to meet anticipated client demand as being within the scope of the Mandate. Having read those pages, we agree that Mr Joshi was discussing the purchase of Futures rather than the cash bonds (as the Authority had referenced the orders being placed by Mr Sheth, asking how these fit into the facilitation of client business, expressly adding that this was effectively asking about the Desk’s Mandate). Mr Joshi said it was legitimate to be positioning yourself in anticipation, not of the client coming back, but others in the market coming to execute an order. The Authority questioned whether this was separate from making money from client business, and Mr Joshi said that they were not “outright prop trading” but nevertheless in order to service clients you need to maintain some inventory, and they need to manage that inventory. However, Mr Joshi made it clear that they had asked themselves what the Traders were doing, as this was a client-based business, but had checked that they were within limits and had confirmed with the Chief Risk Officer that they were within their Mandate.
When Mr Heiberg was interviewed by the Authority, he told the Authority the Mandate permitted “anticipatory trading”, building a portfolio ready to sell to clients. However, we consider that Mr Heiberg was discussing cash BTPs; the transcript does not support a conclusion that Mr Heiberg thought that the Mandate permitted building a portfolio of, and holding as inventory, Futures rather than cash BTPs.
Reading the MHI Compliance Report as a whole and the transcripts of the Authority’s interviews with Mr Heiberg and Mr Joshi, the Tribunal accepts that MHI had not at any stage concluded that the Traders were acting outside the Mandate. We consider that MHI’s conclusion was at least in part based on the fact, which is agreed, that the Traders did not breach the Desk’s limits.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions