UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-000134 UT-2022-000135 UT-2022-000137 - [2025] UKUT 00214 (TCC)
Fecha: 31-Ene-2025
MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
Volcker Rule and the EGB Desk Mandate
The SOABF [11] records that US legislation known as the “Volcker Rule” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading, ie short-term trading for their own profit and refers to one of the statutory exemptions from this general prohibition for “market making-related activities”.
Under the Volcker Rule, MHI was required to have an internal compliance program designed to ensure compliance with the requirements, including by written policies and procedures and internal controls. This includes policies identifying the instruments in which the trading desk is a market-maker, the actions it will take to “demonstrably reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate promptly the risks of its financial exposure”, including “the products, instruments and exposures each trading desk may use for risk management purposes” and the “techniques and strategies each trading desk may use to manage the risks of its market making-related activities and inventory”. MHI was also required to identify (and enforce compliance with) limits for each trading desk, “based on the nature and amount of the trading desk’s market making-related activities”.
The Desk’s Mandate was prepared in compliance with the requirements of the Volcker Rule. There were two different versions of this mandate in force during the Relevant Period but the differences were very minor. The findings below are based on the Mandate with an effective date of 1 July 2016, and we find that the earlier version of the mandate, which applied during June 2016, had equivalent provisions.
The Mandate identifies the Desk Head as Mr Urra and the Division Trading Head as Mr Heiberg and applied to the EGB Desk (ie both Core and Peripheral EGBs). The Mandate provides that the Desk Head retains ultimate responsibility for the Desk’s adherence to the Mandate, records that the Desk is relying on the market making exemption from the Volcker Rule, and was signed by Mr Urra. The key relevant provisions were:
“Desk Mission & Strategy” – “To provide a client facilitation trading service in European Government Bonds (EGBs) and associated products. Client facilitation trading includes market-making and active trading to support client business…”
“Authorised Instruments” – This lists various products and has columns headed “Market Making” and “Hedging”, and detailed footnotes. “Government Bonds & Bills” are listed with a tick in the Market Making column, and “Government Bond futures” are listed with a tick in the Hedging column. This section separately lists Exchange Traded Interest Rate Futures and ticks both Market Making and Hedging, but the footnote sets out that market-making approval for these instruments relates only to block trades in response to client demand.
“Risk management” – “The Desk’s market making activities give rise to the following principal market risks: interest rate risk, curve risk and basis risk. The Desk may purchase or sell hedging instruments, as set out within this mandate, in order to mitigate these risks.”
Annex A1 - Authorised Instruments – Overall trading and hedging strategies must be evaluated and approved by the Desk Head and Division Trading Head (after consultation with the Risk Management and Compliance departments). The Desk Head and Division Trading Head must demonstrate that proposed new or amended strategies will not present a high risk to MHI, can be managed within limits, will be appropriately controlled and will comply with the Volcker Rule’s requirements.
Annex A3 then expands on Risk Management – The Desk must conduct its trading activities within the limits set by the Fixed Income Division Head and by MHI’s Risk Management Department, and they must be monitored on a daily basis. The limits distinguish between market maker inventory and hedging positions, and the MHI limit for hedging positions is that hedges are not to increase market risk. The Desk must manage exposures within these limits either by selling down long or covering short market-making inventory positions, or selling or purchasing authorised hedging instruments. This section then provides:
“Transactions in hedging instruments must not be conducted, where such transactions increase the Desk’s market risk exposures (other than as described below), and hedge positions must be closed out once underlying inventory positions have been unwound.
The Desk may execute transactions in hedging instruments in anticipation of a highly likely near term exposure to risk, where there is a sound risk management rationale for such anticipatory hedging.”
A4. Market making policy – The Desk “must routinely stand ready” to purchase and sell one or more types of instruments authorised under this Mandate and must be willing and available to quote or transact in these instruments for its own account, in commercially reasonable amounts and throughout market cycles. The size of the Desk’s market making inventory must be designed not to exceed, on an ongoing basis, the reasonably expected near-term demand of market making customers. This assessment must be based on market conditions and a demonstrable analysis of historic customer demand and other relevant factors.
- Heading
- Introduction and summary
- Decision Notices and Authority’s amended statements of case
- Recklessness
- Traders’ Replies and outline of trading strategies relied upon
- Market Abuse
- Dishonesty
- Role of the Tribunal
- Non-disciplinary references
- Disciplinary references
- Burden and Standard of proof
- Evidence including witnesses who had not been called, information that is no longer available and relevance of delay
- Outline of evidence before the Tribunal
- Pace of Authority’s investigation and particularisation of its case
- Lack of information that would have been available to the Traders during the Relevant Period
- Passage of time, memory and witness evidence
- Potential witnesses who were not called by the Authority
- Authority’s Enforcement Division
- Other traders on the EGB Desk - James Hill and Mehdi Barouti
- Management and Compliance at MHI
- Approach of the Tribunal
- EGBs, market making, BTPs and BTP Futures
- The Traders – roles at MHI and experience
- Mr Urra
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- MHI and the EGB Trading Desk
- Risk Management and Limits
- MHI’s EGB Business
- Financial Targets
- Remuneration
- Training
- Monitoring of activity
- Traders’ roles on the EGB Desk and interactions
- Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- Investigation by MHI Compliance
- MHI disciplinary process
- Interviews by the Authority
- Traders’ explanations of rationale for the Large Orders
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Urra
- Information Discovery Strategy – Mr Sheth
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – Mr Lopez
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Illustration of application of Criteria to Trading Activity in Instances
- Mr Urra - F7 at 15.31.06.983 on 7 June 2016
- Mr Lopez - F56 at 17.02.08.899 on 15 June 2016
- Mr Sheth - F55 at 16.55.33.255 on 15 June 2016
- Dates of Instances
- Number and size of Large Orders placed by the Traders in the Instance Pool
- Small Order already trading
- Amendment of price of Large Order after the Small Order filled
- Small orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- Trading Activity of the Traders outside the Instance Pool
- Non-Instance large orders and Lone Large Orders
- Number of small orders placed
- Trading Activity of other participants in the market
- Market abuse
- Evaluation – Whether Large Orders are likely to impact the market
- Tribunal’s assessment of the Experts
- Mr Kasapis
- Summary of evidence of Mr Creaturo
- Market liquidity
- Liquidity of the cash market
- Comparison of traded volumes of BTP Futures in the Relevant Period with other times and markets
- Other Participant Trade Analysis
- Whether Large Orders may influence other market participants
- Market Trend Analysis
- Bid-Offer Spread Analysis
- Volume skew
- Two very large trades in 2017
- Conclusions on market impact
- Evaluation – Whether traders committed market Abuse
- Criteria used to identify the Instance Pool
- The Trading Strategies – contemporaneous explanations
- During the Relevant Period
- Reactions to the Eurex Letter
- Interviews with Compliance
- MHI Compliance Report
- Disciplinary interviews
- Conclusions
- Mandate
- Information Discovery Strategy – plausibility
- Price discovery
- Splitting of orders by clients
- Likelihood of hedging by other market makers
- Whether placing Large Orders gave information benefit to MHI
- Prospect of a profitable position and risk
- Mandate and the Desk’s aims
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Information Discovery Strategy - operation
- Clients in respect of whom the theory of splitting orders was tested
- RFQ Traded Away
- Times of day
- Lack of documentary record of operation of strategy
- Timing for which Large Orders were live and timing of cancellation
- Placing of new Large Orders shortly after cancellation and switching of sides
- Prospect of a profitable position
- Overlap between the Small Orders and the Large Orders
- Amendment of price of Large Orders
- Reduced use of strategy over the Relevant Period
- Conclusions on the Information Discovery Strategy
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – plausibility
- Use of terminology of pre-positioning and anticipatory hedging
- Presentation of evidence by Mr Lopez
- Responsibility for increasing success rate in medium-sized RFQs
- Placing of anticipatory hedges at a beneficial price
- Approach to increasing the hit ratio and winning these RFQs
- 93 RFQs and seeking to win this business
- Directional risk and remaining competitive
- Whether placing of large, uniceberged, orders was less likely to achieve Mr Lopez’s aims
- Anticipatory hedging under the Mandate
- Conclusions on plausibility
- Anticipatory Hedging Strategy – operation by Mr Lopez
- Speculative nature of anticipatory hedge orders
- Timing of placing the Large Orders
- None of the Large Orders traded
- Approach to determination of anticipated buying or selling interest
- Time for which Large Orders were live, amendments to price and cancellation decisions
- Overlap with Small Orders
- Size of the Large Orders
- Conclusions on the Anticipatory Hedging Strategy
- Placing of concurrent Large Orders
- Collaboration
- F30 at 17.39.34.225 and F31 at 17.45.10.137 on 10 June 2016
- F84 at 11.24.53.106 on 20 June 2016
- F174 at 12.58.50.334 on 29 June 2016
- F209 at 10.12.49.319 on 22 July 2016
- Conclusions
- Plausibility of Authority’s case that the Traders conducted an abusive scheme
- Whether the abusive scheme would have worked
- Number and Size of the Small Orders
- Market direction and Small Order already trading
- Pricing of the Small Orders
- Conclusions on facilitation of the trading of the Small Orders
- Abusive scheme would not have benefitted the Traders
- Absence of direct evidence of Traders collaborating to commit market abuse
- Risk of detection
- Authority’s alleged scheme cannot explain all trading activity
- Trading Activity of the Traders in the Relevant Period
- Amendment of price of Large Order in Instance Pool after Small Order filled
- Lone Large Orders
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Lopez
- Lone Large Orders placed by Mr Sheth
- Small Orders which overlapped with (and on same side as) Large Orders
- F27 at 10.15.48.236 on 10 June 2016
- F40 at 14.16.34.477 on 13 June 2016
- F48 at 11.01.18.775 on 15 June 2016
- F83 at 11.15.29.662 on 20 June 2016
- F106 at 10.03.19.849 on 22 June 2016
- F181 at 11.14.07.730 on 1 July 2016
- F203 at 12.36.16.793 on 19 July 2016
- F222 at 11.19.50.290 on 27 July 2016
- Overlapping Small Orders that did not overlap with Large Order
- Other Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on the Overlapping Small Orders
- Conclusions on Market Abuse
- Mr Urra
- Mr Sheth
- Mr Lopez
- Prohibition orders
- Penalties
- Step 2: The seriousness of the breach
- Step 3: Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Step 4: Adjustment for deterrence
- Step 5: Settlement discount
- Authority’s determination of the penalties to be imposed
- Assessment of the financial penalty
- Mr Urra
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 5
- Mr Lopez
- Mr Sheth
- Step 2
- Step 5
- Directions
- JEANETTE ZAMAN
- The Cash BTP Market “BTP” stands for “ Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ” (literally multi-year treasury bonds) which are long term bonds issued by the Italian Government. Alongside bonds issued by Spain, Portugal and Greece
- Market making in EGBs is very competitive US legislation known as the “ Volcker Rule ” prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading (ie, short-term trading for their own profit) but allows an exception for “market-making-related activ
- RFQs and cash trades
- Hedging and trading BTP futures on EUREX Changes in market interest rates typically affect the price of the bond. In essence, when the market interest rate rises, the price of a bond falls and when the market interest rate falls, the price o
- There are several types of BTP future depending on the notional maturity date of the underlying cash BTP. This case concerns a particular type of BTP future called a “Long-Term Euro-BTP Future” (“ BTP
- MHI and the EGB Desk
- GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX 2 Example data for Trading Instances
- At 15:31:07, Mr Urra placed a sell order of 40 lots as an Iceberg Order, iceberged with a maximum show of 9 lots at a time, at what was the Best Bid (crossing the spread) (the Genuine Order )
- Approximately 11 seconds later (the remaining 22 lots of the Genuine Order still not having traded, and sitting at the Best Offer), at 15:31:18, Mr Urra placed a buy order of 444 lots, 1 tick below th
- Conclusions